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General Introduction
Nowadays many scholars agree that the self-interest hypothesis, which postulates that
humans care only about their own utility, is not the most accurate assumption to explain
decision-making. Countless empirical studies provide evidence that humans have social
preferences, meaning that they care about the well-being of other, unrelated individuals.
Furthermore, in contrast to the predictions of standard economic theory, concerns about
fairness and reciprocity aﬀect behavior in many situations (Fehr & Schmidt, 2003). These
social preferences are the central theme of my thesis.
For the functioning of modern societies, social preferences are crucial (see for example
Ostrom, 1990; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). They facilitate for instance cooperation in groups
of strangers, the provision of public goods or the maintenance of social order, to name just
a few. Generally speaking, in many situations, the welfare of the group depends on the
individual willingness to behave prosocial. In these situations, individuals have an incentive
to free-ride on the others to increase their private benefit. However, if all individuals would
act like this, everyone would be worse oﬀ. Let’s consider the classical example of a group
work at the university. If one student free rides and the others behave prosocial and
cooperate, the free rider has the highest payoﬀ. He does something else, which increases
his utility while the others work on the group project. In the end, however, he still benefits
from a good grade thanks to the eﬀort of the others. In contrast, if all group members
would free ride the group work would not be done, and hence everyone would be worse oﬀ.
Charitable giving or volunteering activities are other examples where prosocial behavior is
necessary. Thus, for social scientists, it is important to understand the development and
determinants of social preferences.
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This thesis contains three essays, in which I elaborate on social preferences from dis-
tinct angles. Common, besides the topic, is the methodology of experiments, which I
applied throughout the thesis. The diﬀerent types of experiments which we or I con-
ducted rely all on standard methodologies from experimental economics. As the title of
the thesis suggests, we conducted one experiment online, one in the laboratory and one in
the field. Experiments can be used to either measure preferences or to elaborate factors
which causally aﬀect preferences. In chapter one, the main purpose of the experiment was
to measure social preferences and their relationship to other socially relevant variables.
The results of such correlational studies can reveal patterns which serve as hypothesis for
subsequent research. For example, to test whether the observed relationship is causal.
Furthermore, based on these correlations one can make predictions. Lastly, such correla-
tions can be evaluated across countries and cultures, to elaborate cross-cultural diﬀerences.
In contrast, in chapter two and three the aim was to evaluate factors which aﬀect social
preferences causally. These designs allow to draw conclusions about the determinants of
social preferences. Moreover, insights from such analyses can be very valuable for policy
making.
To be more precise, in chapter one, we study the link between moral values and vari-
ous forms of prosocial behavior. Since decades, cross-cultural psychology examines moral
values using data from standardized surveys, assuming that values guide human behavior.
However, so far, the claim that moral values influence prosocial behavior has only been
demonstrated for activities that respondents self-reported in surveys (Welzel & Deutsch,
2012) but never for directly observed behavior. Moreover, we are interested in a particular
set of moral values; namely, emancipative and secular values. Emancipative values reflect
the appreciation of equal freedoms and secular values the depreciation of sacred author-
ity. They become more important as the living conditions of individuals improve (Welzel,
2013). To fill this gap, we conducted online behavioral experiments with participants from
the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) in Germany. This allows us to link the
respondents’ moral values, as measured by the WVS, to the same respondents’ prosocial
behavior, as observed in the behavioral experiment. In the online behavioral experiment,
participants conducted several incentivized decision tasks. Concretely, we elicited measures
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for cooperation in a public goods game, the ability to coordinate in a property rights game,
and altruism using a donation decision. We test the hypotheses that, (a) emancipative val-
ues show a strongly positive association with prosocial behaviors, (b) secular values show
a modestly positive association, (c) at the same as they associate strongly negatively with
protectionist behavior. The evidence boils down to three findings. Emancipative values
relate to higher common pool contributions and larger donations to charitable organiza-
tions. Secular values, on the other hand, are linked to more productive and less protective
investments. As these results conform to key theories and reach empirical significance in a
major postindustrial nation, we conclude that we have significant evidence at hand high-
lighting the potential of combined survey-experiment methods to establish value-behavior
links that are otherwise inexplorable.
In the second chapter, we conducted a laboratory experiment to evaluate the eﬀect of
salience on the contributions in a public goods game. According to standard theory in
economics, an individual should process all available information before making a decision.
This does not mean that all choice attributes receive the same weight in the decision-making
process, but they should at least be considered to determine their weight. However, for
instance, when I go to Montreal, and I want to buy something, I constantly valuate the
items to be cheaper than they actually are. I neglect the taxes because the price tag does
not include them. In such cases, the tax is not salient, and salience guides my choice. If
and how salience aﬀects choices is the topic of the second chapter. In the first part of
the chapter, we introduce a salience factor to the Fehr-Schmidt model (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999) to derive theoretical predictions. All bilateral comparisons that individuals make
are weighted by how salient the behavior of other relevant group members is. Based on
this extension, we hypothesize that the salience of the contributions of the other players
should aﬀect contributions in a standard public goods game systematically. We implement
two treatments to test our predictions empirically. In the maximum treatment, the highest
contribution is most salient. In contrast, in the minimum treatment, the lowest contribu-
tion within a group is most salient. Our results are surprising: We find that people do
not adjust their contributions according to our hypotheses. If the lowest contribution in a
group is most salient, it does not lead to an immediate decline in the contribution. Vice
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versa, if the maximum contribution is salient, it does not result in higher contributions.
Based on our results we hypothesize that focusing on the maximum provides an upper
bound of the acceptable contribution level, while the minimum serves as lower bound.
Lastly, in chapter three, I elaborate how the social environment of children aﬀects
their development in general and in particular the formation of their preferences. Children
from low-income families often perform worse with respect to skills compared to children
from more advantaged families. Research on early childhood development suggests that
providing children with high-quality preschool education potentially closes this skill gap
(Heckman, 2006). I elaborate on an intervention which aimed at improving the quality of
care in community nurseries in Colombia. These community nurseries are part of a national
program, which has been implemented about 40 years ago and targets families from the
lowest stratum. Bernal, Fernández, Flórez, Gaviria, et al. (2009) evaluated the program
and reported that many caregivers have insuﬃcient knowledge about infant development.
Therefore, a local NGO implemented an intervention with four components to improve
the quality of care. First, community mothers received a formal vocational training as
early childhood teacher. Second, they received support and coaching to integrate what
they learned in their daily nursery routines. Third, they learned how to teach parents
about issues related to appropriate child care and development. Fourth, the implement-
ing NGO monitored and supported the children in school, once they left the community
mother. While the existing research has focused on cognitive and socioemotional skills, I
complement the analysis with an elaboration of the eﬀect on individual preference mea-
sures. For that, I conducted lab-in-the-field experiments with children who have visited
a treated nursery and compare them to children who have been in an untreated nursery.
I elicit measures for prosocial behavior, egalitarian preferences, trust, risk and time pref-
erences. Moreover, I do evaluate not only the eﬀect in the short run but also four years
after the implementation. The intervention improved children’s cognitive, psychosocial,
and psychomotor skills. More importantly, the eﬀects persist up to four years after the
intervention. We show that children from the treated group have better grades and are
more likely to be in the right grade for their age. Interestingly, the intervention also af-
fected social preferences of the children. Children who visited a treated nursery are more
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altruistic than children who attended a regular nursery. The evaluation set-up does not
allow to fully rule out that unobserved factors drive the eﬀects. Furthermore, we are not
able to identify which part of the intervention is responsible for the observed eﬀects. But
the pattern of results makes me confident that what I see can be traced to the intervention.
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Chapter 1
Survey Response and Observed
Behavior: Emancipative and Secular
Values Predict Prosocial Behaviors
∗
∗This chapter is joint work with Christian Thöni and Christian Welzel.
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1.1 Introduction
It is widely understood that cooperative behavior among strangers is a key ingredient
of thriving societies in which institutions function impartially (Axelrod, 1986; Ostrom,
1990; Coleman, 1990; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). The
willingness to behave prosocially—to forgo individual gains for the benefit of others—
diﬀers considerably across societies and individuals (Gächter, Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010).
Understanding the determinants and origins of prosocial behaviors is of central interest to
all social sciences.
In this study, we investigate the role of moral values for prosocial behavior. Research
in social psychology suggests that values guide prosocial behavior (Kluckhohn, 1951; Eck-
stein, 1961, 1998; Inkeles, 1969, 1983; Rokeach, 1968, 1973; Axelrod, 1986; Putnam,
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994; Putnam, 2000; Welzel, 2010). Indeed, there is convincing
evidence that “benevolence” and “universalism” values are related to prosocial behavior
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Sagiv, Sverdlik, & Schwarz, 2011). According to these findings,
people who express concern for the well-being of others are more prosocial (cf. Schwartz,
2004, 2006, 2007).
In a separate strand of scholarship, Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel focus on two par-
ticular sets of moral values that grow stronger as the living conditions of the bulk of a
population improve: secular values and emancipative values (R. Inglehart & Norris, 2003;
Norris & Inglehart, 2004; R. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). These values are indeed indicative
of a host of life quality indicators, from subjective well-being to life expectancy to educa-
tion, information access, income equality, physical security, rule of law, democracy, social
capital, and ecological sustainability (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003; R. Inglehart
& Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010; Welzel, 2013). The emergence of these two
sets of values is described as a psychological reaction to the societal transformations that
modernization brings about.
Welzel (2013) describes modernization as an empowering process through which the
lives of ordinary people improve. Indeed, where and when it happens, modernization
makes people’s lives safer, longer, and enriches them with more options to pursue a pur-
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pose of their choice. Modernization, thus, transforms the nature of life, turning it from a
source of threats to suﬀer into a source of opportunities to thrive. As this happens, soci-
eties climb the “utility ladder of freedoms”: Tolerating and practicing freedoms becomes
increasingly vital to take advantage of the options that a more promising life oﬀers. In
recognition of this utility shift, people change their moral values: They begin to see less
value in sacred authority and more value in equal freedoms. The first process—depreciation
of sacred authority—is reflected in rising secular values and is linked to a growing sense
of existential security. The second process—appreciation of equal freedoms—is reflected
in rising emancipative values and linked to a growing sense of individual autonomy. The
egalitarian component of these values has a strongly antidiscriminatory impetus that fa-
vors a deeper internalization of impartiality norms. Welzel (2013) hypothesizes that the
antidiscriminatory and humanitarian tendency of emancipative values predisposes their
carriers to prosocial behavior vis-à-vis strangers (cf. Welzel, Inglehart, & Deutsch, 2005;
Welzel & Delhey, 2015).
As concerns secular values, scholars working in the Inglehart-Welzel framework did not
phrase explicit hypotheses about these particular values’ behavioral consequences. The
evidence, however, that secular values emerge from feelings of existential security suggests
various hypotheses. Perhaps, the most intuitively plausible expectation deriving from
secular values’ link to existential security is that secular oriented people avoid protectionist
behavior. Inglehart andWelzel’s theory also posits that existential security reduces people’s
fear of foreigners, which suggests that secular values ease cooperation with strangers.
However, secular values by definition involve lower religiosity. Accordingly, these val-
ues’ impact on behavior should reflect how religiosity aﬀects behavior. Shariﬀ (2015)
provides an overview of studies that see religiosity as a force encouraging prosocial behav-
ior. From this point of view, one would assume that—because of their inverse relation to
religiosity—secular values are negatively linked with prosocial behavior. Shariﬀ’s study
clarifies, however, that the relationship between religiosity and prosocial behavior only
holds for self-reported measures of prosocial behavior and vanishes when prosocial behav-
ior is measured by observation. Galen (2012) supports this conclusion. In light of this
evidence, the antireligious impetus of secular values should be neutral as concerns these
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values’ influence on observed prosocial behavior. By contrast, the alleged absence of exis-
tential fear among secular oriented people should encourage prosocial behavior. Overall,
we thus hypothesize a modestly positive link of secular values with prosocial behavior.
Our clearest expectation with respect to secular values, however, is that they discourage
protectionist behavior.
So far, the claim that secular and emancipative values influence prosocial behavior has
only been demonstrated for activities that respondents self-report in surveys (Welzel &
Deutsch, 2012) but never for directly observed behavior. With this study, we close this gap.
We investigate the link between our predictor variables (secular and emancipative values)
and outcome variables, measuring three facets of prosocial behavior: (a) cooperation in a
social dilemma game, (b) productive versus protectionist investments in a property rights
game, and (c) donation to charity. We test the hypotheses that, while (a) emancipative
values show a strongly positive association with prosocial behaviors, (b) secular values
show a modestly positive association, (c) at the same as they associate strongly negatively
with protectionist behavior.
The dominant explanation of prosocial behavior by far is social capital, which is sup-
posed to facilitate interactions between strangers (Coleman, 1990; Putnam et al., 1994;
Knack & Keefer, 1997). While definitions of social capital vary, scholars routinely include
interpersonal trust and adherence to civic norms. In contrast to the research on values,
there exists an extensive literature investigating the link between standard social capi-
tal measures and behavior in controlled experiments. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and
Soutter (2000) investigate the relation between the trust question and behavior in a trust
game and do not find a strong relation. In experiments similar to the public goods game
reported in this study, Gächter, Herrmann, and Thöni (2004) find only weak evidence for
the relation between trust questions and cooperation, while Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström
(2012) find a positive link between trust and cooperative behavior in a large and repre-
sentative sample of the Danish population. Balliet and Van Lange (2013) survey a large
number of studies on prisoner’s dilemma and public goods games and find a small to mod-
erate positive relation between dispositional trust and cooperation. In this study, we are
not interested in the influence of social capital per se. Instead, we include social capital
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to see whether the influences of our interest—emancipative and secular values—withstand
its control.
To investigate our hypotheses, we invited the respondents of the sixth round of the
World Values Survey (WVS) in Germany to participate in an online behavioral experiment.
This allows us to link the respondents’ moral values, as measured by the WVS, to the
same respondents’ prosocial behavior, as observed in the behavioral experiment. Germany
is a relevant and insightful case for our study. The country includes the biggest national
population in Europe and constitutes the fourth-largest economy in the world. It is also a
nation with the typical features of postindustrial knowledge societies, arguably the most
advanced type of society in human history (R. Inglehart &Welzel, 2005). What we find here
in terms of value-behavior links is presumably representative for a wider set of countries
at the forefront of modernization.
Moreover, Germany incorporates cleavages of more general interest from a cross-cultural
point of view. For one, there is the North-South cleavage between historically Protestant
and Catholic regions that characterizes the whole of Europe. No question, secularization,
urbanization, and migration have blurred this historic division but culture is an inert force
that leaves a lasting imprint. Since the writings of Max Weber, the literature has attributed
Protestants a stronger tendency to cooperate with strangers than Catholics.
Equally important, there is the East-West cleavage between ex-communist and market-
capitalist societies that is also of a more general cross-cultural relevance, with the East
having experienced 40 years of a Soviet-type dictatorship. In light of this division, the
literature on “homo Sovieticus” (Kuran, 1997) suggests that “Easterners” tend to trust
strangers less and to cooperate to a lesser extent.1
Germany embodies these cultural cleavages in a single nation, which allows to study
cross-cultural issues while retaining comparability of individuals at a maximum level, as
they all belong to the same national culture. Taking advantage of this specific context,
we test two subhypotheses: (a) West German respondents behave more prosocially than
those from East Germany, and (b) Protestants behave more prosocially than Catholics.
1The legendary mutual support networks and neighborhood help in communist systems might suggest
otherwise but these phenomena indicate cooperation among people connected through bonds of familiarity.
This is not cooperation among strangers.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: the “Methodological Advantage
of Behavioral Experiments” section outlines the added value of combining a behavioral
experiment with a nationally representative survey; the “Design and Procedures” section
describes the design and procedures; the “Results” section presents the findings; finally, the
“Discussion” section concludes.
1.2 Methodological Advantage of Behavioral Experiments
In a seminal article, Brislin (1970) pointed out that one of the major challenges of cross-
cultural research is to ensure equivalence across diﬀerent languages. Besides language,
context diﬀers considerably between cultures, which also reduces equivalence (see also Hui
& Triandis, 1985). While the task description of our behavioral experiment still relies
to some degree on natural language, we argue that the use of behavioral experiments
(Camerer, 2003; Camerer & Fehr, 2004) mitigates the equivalence problem substantially.
The reason is that the underlying strategic situation is a well-defined game, that is, it
consists of a set of formal rules and mathematical functions.2 These rules and functions
are independent of the cultural context and the language of exposition. Hence, such well-
defined formal games facilitate the comparison of outcomes across cultures (Gächter et al.,
2010; Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008).3
As a methodological contribution, we develop a novel instrument for an Internet-based
behavioral experiment. Key advantages of this tool relative to standard methods in ex-
perimental research are (a) high flexibility in terms of the number of participants, their
educational background, their local and timely availability; (b) easy adaptation to other
participant pools with diﬀerent languages; and (c) relatively low administrative costs.
Furthermore, our experiment does not require a laboratory because respondents can par-
2A strategic game is defined by (a) a set of players, (b) a set of strategies for each player, and (c)
the players’ preferences (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994, see for example). Although (a) and (b) are under
full control of the experimenter, the participants’ preferences are not directly observable. The pioneering
work by Smith (1976) highlighted the importance of inducing preferences with financial incentives. Smith
argues that this can be achieved “[. . .] by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary value
on actions” (p. 275).
3Most of these studies rely on convenient samples from student populations and it is an ongoing
debate to what extent the results of such games generalize to entire national populations (Henrich, Heine,
& Norenzayan, 2010).
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ticipate from any Internet-connected device. For these reasons, our behavioral experiment
is ideally suited for cross-cultural research in combination with opinion surveys like the
WVS.4 In the spirit of Hui and Triandis (1985), we see behavioral experiments as a com-
plementary tool for cross-cultural research, which should be used in combination with other
methods.
1.3 Design and Procedures
Our main sample consists of respondents who participated in two studies. First, they were
interviewed for the WVS in Germany. Their responses in the WVS serve as independent
variables of our study. At the end of the WVS interview, we invited all respondents to
participate in our online behavioral experiment, which measures three facets of prosocial
behavior that form our dependent variables. In this section, we describe our data sources
and procedures in detail.
1.3.1 WVS
Since 1981, the European Values Study (EVS) and WVS conduct representative public
opinion surveys in scores of countries around the world. The basis is an English-language,
fully standardized master questionnaire. The questionnaire covers a host of topics, from
social capital to tolerance to trust to happiness to civic engagement. The master question-
naire is translated into national languages with semantic checks through back translation.
Questionnaires are administered among randomly selected adult residents, with a minimum
sample size of 1,000 people per country. Fieldwork is usually conducted through face-to-
face interviews. Average interview length is about 50 min. Thus far, the EVS/WVS has
conducted some 300 national surveys in by now 106 societies that represent more than
90% of the world population. Further details on fieldwork, sampling, questionnaires, as
4Some of the features of our behavioral experiment come at a cost. The fact that it is Internet-based
restricts the potential participant pool to computer-literate individuals with access to an online device.
Unlike in the laboratory, we do not have control over the environment in which participants take their
decisions. Although this can be an advantage (the lack of direct interaction with the researcher increases
cross-subject anonymity and might lower experimenter demand eﬀects or impression management eﬀects),
it can also introduce a confound because the researcher does not know whether responses reflect the
participant’s individual decision, or whether respondents consulted other sources before responding.
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well as downloadable data sets are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. All data are
public domain. Between 2010 and 2014, the WVS finalized its most recent and sixth round
of surveys in a total of 60 societies. As part of this project, the sixth German WVS was
fielded in fall 2013. Roughly, 2,000 interviews have been realized.
Moral values
Emancipative values and secular values are each measured on the basis of 12 items from the
WVS. The 12 items of secular values measure distance from sacred authority in the domains
of religion, the nation, the state, and group pressures. The 12 items of emancipative
values measure an emphasis on equal freedoms in the domains of personal autonomy,
gender equality, the voice of the people, and sexual liberty. These items are combined in
a “formative index” procedure, as documented in Welzel (2013, pp. 57-73). These pages
also document the cross-cultural validity of these measures as well as their approximately
normal distribution.5 Index scores vary from minimum 0 to maximum 1 on both value
indices. The original wording (from the English master questionnaire) and response format
of all items used to create the secular and emancipative values are reported in the appendix.
Measures of Social Capital
Trust is measured using the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” from the WVS.
The answer is binary, that is, either “most people can be trusted” or “need to be very
5We do not report Cronbach’s alpha or any other internal coherence statistics because this would raise
the false expectation that our value measures are “reflective scales” that need to be evaluated against the
standards of latent variables. We point this out very explicitly, emphasizing that our measures of secular
values and emancipative values are “formative indexes”. Accordingly, they are not summarized because they
reflect interchangeable manifestations of single unifying dimension. Instead, they are summarized because
(a) they represent complementary constituents that build on each other in fitting the overarching definition
of secularism and emancipation and (b) because, in their very combination, these measures are empirically
consequential. To meet these two criteria, interitem correlations should actually be modest at best (which
is what they are) because only then do the items incorporate enough complementary variance to make their
combination suﬃciently distinct from what each single item contributes. As the literature on these values
has stressed from the beginning Welzel (2013, pp. 58-73) and more recently in a specifically methodological
piece (Welzel & Inglehart, 2016)), this “formative” approach to summarize items is appropriate whenever
there are good reasons to assume that items are complementary rather than interchangeable and that what
truly matters is indeed the combination of these complementarities. As we will see, our results strongly
confirm this approach: When rerunning our regressions with the value measures unpacked into their single
components, we generally obtain weaker and less significant results. The supposed eﬀects only surface
when the items combine into a single measure of emancipative and secular values each.
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careful.” For civic norms, we use four items in which respondents indicate whether they
find the following behaviors acceptable: (a) “claiming government benefits to which you
are not entitled,” (b) “avoiding a fare on public transport,” (c) “stealing property,” and (d)
“someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” Answers to these items are given
on a scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). We average the four items
to our measure for civic norms (Cronbach’s α = .74).
Further Control Variables
In all our regression models, we include age, gender, political interest, and left-right ori-
entation as control variables. Political interest is measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale
ranging from very interested to not at all interested. Left-right indicates a person’s self-
reported political position on a scale from 1 to 10, with lower numbers indicating left and
higher numbers right.6
1.3.2 Behavioral Experiment
At the end of the WVS interview, all participants were invited to participate in the be-
havioral experiment. They received a flyer with information about the procedures of the
behavioral experiment, the possibility of earning money, and the login information. Each
participant received a unique and randomly generated six-digit login code.7 We use this
code to match the answers in the WVS questionnaire to the behavioral data. The be-
havioral experiment consists of several decision tasks: a public goods game, a property
rights game, and a donation decision.8 The ordering of the tasks is the same for all par-
ticipants. We administered the behavioral experiment online and designed it such that no
6The exact wording of the two political interest and view questions were (a) How interested would you
say you are in politics? (b) In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
7All interviewers asked participants to indicate their email address. Participants willing to provide us
their address received an email with a personalized link to login to the behavioral experiment.
8Participants also played a public goods game with punishment, a second property rights game, a risk
elicitation task, and a task measuring honesty. To keep the article concise, we restrict our attention to
the public goods game, the property rights game, and the donation decision. In short, the analysis of the
remaining decision tasks supports the results reported in this article. The link between the moral values and
the public goods game with punishment is essentially the same as in public goods game (see “Contributions
to the Public Good” section). Honesty seems to be weakly positively correlated with emancipative values.
We do not find evidence that moral values have predictive power for risk preferences.
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real-time interaction among the participants is necessary. For all decision tasks, involving
more than one participant, we matched participants into groups only at the very end of
the data collection period. This procedure allows participants to answer the questions at
their convenience, that is, they can quit the behavioral experiment anytime and continue
at a later point in time.
Following the methodological standards for behavioral experiments, we oﬀer monetary
incentives for all decision tasks. Participants’ earnings are calculated in an experimental
currency unit (ECU; in the experiment we speak of “Talers”). At the beginning of the
experiment, participants were informed about the payment procedures. First we commu-
nicated the exchange rate from ECU to the local currency, which was 1 ECU to 4 Euros.9
Second, we explained the random draw. In each decision task, the amount of ECU depends
on the participant’s decision, and—in case of group decisions—on the decision of the other
group member (another randomly selected participant). For each task, we randomly drew
a participant to receive the amount he or she earned in the given task. In case the task was
a two-player game (public goods game and the property rights game), we randomly drew
another participant as the partner. Hence, for these games, we randomly selected a group,
for which both participants received the earnings from the decision task. The donation
decision became payoﬀ relevant for the participants who had been randomly selected to
get paid for one of the other decision tasks. For these participants, we subtracted the
percentage according to their donation decision and transferred the money to the charity
indicated by the participant. The four participants who have been selected for payment in
the public goods game and the property rights game, earned on average e 400 (minimum:
e 208, maximum: e 640).10
9We introduced an experimental currency (ECU) to have a measurement of profits independent of
the local currency. This procedure facilitates the adaptation of the experiment to other populations with
diﬀerent currencies because it is suﬃcient to change the exchange rate to the local currency, while all other
payoﬀ parameters remain unchanged.
10We calibrated these amounts with the aim to set expected payoﬀs similar to the financial incen-
tives oﬀered in comparable studies. Participants’ expected payoﬀs depend on the response rate of the
behavioral experiment, which introduces an additional element of uncertainty in the incentives. There
is a methodological debate about the importance of financial incentives and the eﬀect of diﬀerent stake
sizes in behavioral games. In their survey, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) stress the importance of financial
incentives, but they also conclude that there is little evidence suggesting that the size of the incentives
importantly influences the results. In total (for all decision tasks) we paid 13 participants of this behavioral
experiment an amount of e 263.50 on average.
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Public goods game
The public goods game is a standard tool in experimental economics to elicit cooperative
behavior (Ledyard et al., 1995). In our case, we randomly group players in pairs of two.
Each player is endowed with 100 ECU and has to decide how many ECU to contribute to a
common pool, called the group account, that is, they simultaneously choose a contribution
ci ∈ {0, 20, . . . , 100}.11 The contributions of both players are summed up and multiplied by
1.5. The resulting amount is returned to the two players in equal shares. Thus, independent
of a player’s contribution he or she is entitled to half of the amount in the group account.
The payoﬀ function of player i in a group with player j is
πi = 100− ci +
1.5
2
(ci + cj),
Under standard game-theoretic assumptions (selfish preferences and rationality), this
game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which both players contribute zero to the public
good. Individual rationality commands a contribution of zero because each ECU con-
tributed to the group account yields only 0.75 ECU in return. However, the fact that the
other player also receives 0.75 ECU for every ECU contributed means the social return is
1.5 and thus collective rationality calls for full contribution by both players. Much like the
famous prisoner’s dilemma, this game models a social dilemma.
In the design of the behavioral experiment, we paid great attention to guide partici-
pants carefully through the procedures and to give instructions that are intuitive and easy
to understand. Interactive graphs illustrate the key features of the game. Participants
go through four stages before taking their decision. First, they read the instructions of
the public goods game, explained by six bullet points. The bullet points appear consec-
utively on the screen, and each step is accompanied by a new element in the interactive
graph. Participants can go back and forth between the bullet points. Second, participants
are shown the payoﬀ consequences of three possible outcomes of the game (both play-
ers contribute zero; both players contribute 100; one player contributes 60 and the other
11The word “simultaneous” does not mean “at the same time,” but should be understood in a game-
theoretic sense, namely, that participants choose their actions not knowing the decision of their counterpart.
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player contributes 100). Third, participants proceed to an exploration stage, where they
can enter any combination of the two contributions and calculate their own and the other
group members’ hypothetical payoﬀ. Figure 1.1 shows the screen of this exploration stage.
Fourth, participants have to answer control questions. In the control questions, they are
presented with a randomly selected combination of contributions and have to calculate the
resulting payoﬀ. Participants who provide an incorrect answer are asked to try again two
times.12 Finally, participants choose their contribution and proceed to the next game.
Figure 1.1: Screen shot of the public goods game.
Note. Participants can use the + and − buttons to choose the contributions of the two
players, which is represented by coins shifted from the personal account to the bowl in
the middle. Pressing a button “calculate” (not visible) multiplies the contributions by
1.5 and returns the money to the two players. The figure shows the outcome when the
player to the left contributed 60 Talers (ECU) and the player to the right contributed
100 Talers, leading to final profits of 160 Talers and 120 Talers. Participants can click
on NEW to reset the situation and calculate another situation. ECU = experimental
currency unit.
Property Rights Game
The second decision task aims to capture the strategic situation in an environment with
weak external enforcement of property rights. In all modern societies, formal institutions
govern protection of property rights. Nonetheless, we observe considerable amounts of
private investment in protection of property, suggesting that formal protection is imperfect.
Under these circumstances, populations can either coordinate on eﬃcient situations with
12Answering correctly was not a requirement to proceed with the experiment, as we did not want to
lose respondents not willing or unable to answer the control question. We follow the method of Roux and
Thöni (2015) and present the participants with randomly chosen contributions in the control question to
avoid a systematic influence on decisions.
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high mutual respect for property, or they can coordinate on very ineﬃcient situations with
mutual distrust and high private investments in protection.
Like in the public goods game, players are randomly paired into new groups of two. To
facilitate understanding, we give the property rights game an agricultural framing, in which
participants act as “farmers” who can allocate resources (“working hours”) to production,
protection, and stealing. In the graphical representation of the game, production refers to
planting carrots in fields, and we refer to stealing in a neutral way and label it as “taking.”
Depending on their decisions and those of their paired counterpart, players end up with
more or less carrots. The monetary payoﬀ of the game is equal to the number of carrots
they acquire, with each carrot being worth one ECU. Planting carrots is the only productive
activity; the other two activities aﬀect only the distribution of wealth. Participants have
seven fields to plant carrots and seven units of resources, and they receive a monetary
endowment.13 Players simultaneously allocate their resources to production, protection,
and stealing. Similar to the public goods game, participants go through four stages of
learning and exploring the game. All parts are accompanied by interactive graphics. Figure
1.2 shows the screen in the exploration stage.
The three activities, production, protection, and stealing have the following payoﬀ
implications: each resource for production yields a carrot on each of the seven fields. The
marginal return is thus seven ECU if the other player does not steal some of the player’s
fields. Each resource unit allocated to protection builds a fence around one field, which
protects this field against theft. Each unit allocated to stealing results in the annexation
of the crop of one field of the other player (the hands in Figure 1.2), up to the number of
unprotected fields. Stealing starts from above, protecting starts from below, that is, if a
player allocates a unit to stealing, then the first field stolen is the field at the top of the
13We implemented three endowment treatments, where the initial endowments varied across players.
In one treatment, a player was rich (endowment of 40 ECU) compared with the other player in the group
(endowment of 10 ECU). In a second treatment, a player was poor compared with the other player, and
in the baseline treatment, both players had the same endowment (10 ECU). Participants were randomly
allocated to one of the three treatments. Thus, the eﬀect of the treatment should not influence the
analysis with regard to emancipative and secular values. The main eﬀects of the treatment variation on
the allocation decision are weak. A one-way ANOVA test indicates the treatment diﬀerences are weakly
significant for production (F = 2.24, p = .085), and insignificant for the other two outcomes (protection:
F = 1.41, p = .242, stealing: F = 0.65, p = .585). In the main article, we do not further discuss these
treatment variations. In Tables B3 and B4 in the appendix, we show that none of our results change when
we control for diﬀerences in the endowment.
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screen. The next field stolen is the one to the left in the second row and so on. If a player
allocates a unit to protection, then the first field protected is the one at the very bottom
of the screen. The next field protected is the one to the right in the second last row.
Figure 1.2: Screen shot of the property rights game.
Note. The figure depicts a situation where the player to the left allocates three units
to production, two to protection, and two to stealing (take). The player to the right
allocates six units to production and one to stealing. Initial endowment is 10 Taler
(ECU) for both players. The final payoﬀs are 40 Talers for player to the left and 43
Talers for the player to the right. ECU = experimental currency unit.
The marginal return of stealing depends on the allocation of resources of the other
player. If the other player allocates all her resources to production, then stealing a field
yields seven ECU. In case the other participant does not allocate any resources to produc-
tion, his fields are empty and stealing provides no benefit.
Under standard assumptions, a player’s best response is to allocate all her resources
to production and stealing if the other player does not protect and allocates less than six
units to stealing. If the other player allocates six or more units to stealing, then the best
response is to protect three or four fields and use the remaining resources for production.
In case the other player protects (and allocates less than six units to stealing), there is a
unique best response to allocate all the resources to production. In brief, a player protects
if she expects excessive stealing. She allocates all resources to production if she expects
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some (minimal) degree of protection, and she is indiﬀerent between stealing and production
if the other player does not protect at all. Nash equilibria in this game are all situations in
which both players allocate all their resources to production and stealing, and do not steal
more than five units. Payoﬀs in the Nash equilibria range from 14 in the situation where
both players steal five units to 49 with no stealing. Coordinating on the Nash equilibrium
without stealing and without protection is desirable because it maximizes total surplus.
Protection cannot be part of an equilibrium, because player i’s best reply to protection by
player j is not to steal. But if i does not steal, then it is not the best reply for j to protect.
Our design of the property rights game is similar to Ahn et al. (2016) who study a
repeated game in a laboratory environment. Related are also Wilson, Jaworski, Schurter,
and Smyth (2012) and Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010), who show in a series of
production and consumption experiments that property rights are respected most when
they emerge as informal agreements within civil minded groups.
Donation Decision
The third decision task provides us with a measure for altruism. In the final task of
the behavioral experiment, participants are asked to indicate how much of their potential
earnings they would be willing to donate to a charity of their choice. Participants’ earnings
depend on random events and decisions of others, therefore participants do not know their
earnings when making this decision. We ask them to indicate the percentage of their
potential earnings they are willing to donate. In addition, participants choose a charity
from a set of four charities (World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Amnesty International, Red
Cross, Doctors Without Borders) or indicate another charitable organization of their choice.
1.4 Results
In total, 252 respondents participated in the behavioral experiment, of whom 55.6% are
women. This compares with 50.4% women in the full German WVS sample. Partici-
pants are on average 7 years younger in the behavioral experiment sample (42.5, SD =
20
15.2), compared with the WVS sample (49.5, SD = 17.7).14 We address the issue of
self-selection bias in the section “Controlling for Sample Selection Bias.” Over the course
of the behavioral experiment, dropout leaves us with 179 participants who completed the
entire behavioral experiment. Women finish the experiment more often than men do (p =
.056, χ2-test). Apart from that, we find no systematic diﬀerences between dropouts and
finishers.
Table B1 in the appendix provides an overview of the zero-order correlations of all our
predictor and outcome variables. Emancipative values correlate positively with secular
values (r = .273, p < .001) and trust (r = .077, p < .001). Moreover, secular values
correlate negatively with civic norms (r = .527, p < .001). Finally, trust and civic norms
correlate only weakly with each other (r = .041, p = .067). We present our results starting
with the public goods game, followed by the property rights game, and finally the donation
decision.
1.4.1 Contributions to the Public Good
A total of 252 respondents participated in the public goods game. The mean contribution
is 55.1 out of 100, with a standard deviation of 25.4. Figure 1.3 shows the histogram of the
contributions. Only four participants (1.6%) contributed zero. Compared to other public
goods games, the proportion of minimum contributors is surprisingly low in our data. In
an online experiment in Denmark, with a randomly selected sample from the population,
Thöni et al. (2012) observe that 15% of the participants contribute zero. However, the
average contribution is lower than in the Danish sample, where participants on average
contribute 70% of their endowment.
14For the emancipative values, the range in the World Values Survey (WVS) sample is [0, 0.875] and
the standard deviation is 0.156 compared with a range of [0.13, 0.875] and a standard deviation of 0.132 in
the sample of the participants of the behavioral experiment. For the secular values, the range in the WVS
sample is [0.0279, 0.943] and the standard deviation is 0.154; in the sample of the behavioral experiment,
the range is [0.110, 0.874] and the standard deviation is 0.145.
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Figure 1.3: Histogram of contributions in the public
goods game.
To investigate our hypotheses, we conduct multiple regression analyses. We use ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimates with robust standard errors15 to regress a participant’s
contribution on her or his values, trust, civic norms, and demographic characteristics. Be-
cause of missing responses in some of the predictor variables, we lose some observations
(N = 245). Model 1 shows the link between emancipative and secular values on one hand
and the contribution to the public good on the other hand. For better comparability of
the estimates, we normalized all nonbinary predictor variables. Increasing emancipative
values by one standard deviation weakly significantly increases the contributions by 3.5
units (t = 1.84, p = .066). Secular values are not significantly linked with the contribu-
tion decision. Due to multicollinearity between the predictor variables, the relationship
between emancipative values and the contribution to the public good is underestimated.
Indeed, a simple linear regression using emancipative values as the only explanatory vari-
able reveals a significant link with the contribution decision ( β= 4.23, t = 2.31, p = .021).
These results provide evidence for the predictions by Welzel (2013): People with stronger
emancipative values contribute more to the public good. Model 2 in Table 1.1 depicts the
results for the social capital variables. In line with the results by Thöni et al. (2012), we
find that trust is positively related to contributions. Our estimates suggest that people
who indicate that “most people can be trusted” contribute roughly seven units more than
15In all our regression models, we use Huber-White robust standard errors. The significance levels of
our results do not change if we estimate the models without robust standard errors.
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participants who state that “one cannot be too careful in dealing with other people” (t =
2.20, p = .029). However, people indicating stronger civic norms do not seem to contribute
more than people indicating weak civic norms. Comparing the overall fit of Models 1 and
2, we find that the values explain more variance than the social capital variables. In Model
3, we estimate the link between values and cooperation controlling for the social capital
measures. All coeﬃcients become insignificant, which is presumably due to the positive
correlation in the predictor variables. In Model 4, we include further control variables.
Aside from the obvious controls for gender and age, we add two control variables capturing
general political interest and ideological orientation. We do not find significant eﬀects of
these control variables, while trust and emancipative values remain insignificant.16
Regarding our subhypotheses, we do not find evidence that participants fromWest Ger-
many behave more cooperatively than participants from East Germany (Mann-Whitney,
z = 0.179, p = .858). In accordance with our hypothesis, we observe that Protestants
contribute significantly more than Catholics (58.2 vs. 47.5, Mann-Whitney, z = 2.19, p =
.029). To conclude, we observe a positive relation between emancipative values and con-
tributions in a simple regression, whereas in multiple regressions the coeﬃcient is at best
weakly significant. For secular values, we do not find a significant link with cooperation.
1.4.2 Production and Protection in the Property Rights Game
In total, 188 participants completed the property rights game. Figure 1.4 shows the his-
tograms of the allocation of the seven resource units. On average, participants allocate
4.37 units (62%) to production; 1.94 units (28%) to protection, and 0.7 units (10%) to
stealing.17
16Alternatively, we estimated Model 1 including the Big Five personality measures. In the WVS, the Big
Five are measured using Muck, Hell, and Gosling (2007). Previous research (Lu & Argyle, 1991; Ashton,
Jackson, Helmes, & Paunonen, 1998) finds positive links to cooperation for extraversion and agreeableness
and a negative link for neuroticism. Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok (2011) find that participants who score
high on agreeableness are more likely to have stable cooperation preferences. In our data, we do not find
any significant relationship between cooperation and personality traits. Similarly, we included measures
for ingroup and outgroup trust in the estimation and find no significant links to contribution. Finally, we
check whether our results are driven by a sense of existential security. A set of questions (V170-V191)
from the WVS elicits people’s feelings of safety. Several of these items load on a first principal component
(existential security). We find that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of this variable. See Table B2
in the appendix.
17Our results are comparable to Ahn et al. (2016). They report that participants use on average 43% of
their resources for production, 29% for protection, and 28% for stealing. The design of the game diﬀered
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Table 1.1: OLS Estimations for the Contribution to the Public Good.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
Emancipative values 3.498# 2.770 3.007
[-0.238, 7.234] [-1.017, 6.557] [-0.937, 6.951]
Secular values 2.701 3.691 3.268
[-0.970, 6.371] [-0.756, 8.138] [-1.328, 7.863]
Trust 7.039∗ 4.954 4.516
[0.725, 13.353] [-1.442,11.350] [-2.252, 11.284]
Civic norms −0.525 1.820 1.364
[-4.179, 3.129] [-2.456, 6.096] [-3.162, 5.890]
Female −3.126
[-10.166,3.914]
Age 0.051
[-0.162,0.265]
Political interest −0.254
[-4.004,3.496]
Left-right −1.383
[-5.708,2.942]
Constant 52.061∗∗ 51.274∗∗ 50.016∗∗ 49.807∗∗
[48.641,55.480] [47.063,55.485] [45.717,54.316] [37.985,61.630]
F -test 3.7 2.4 2.8 1.8
Prob > F 0.025 0.092 0.025 0.086
R2 0.029 0.020 0.045 0.051
N 246 245 245 245
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is contribution in the public goods game [0, 20, 40, 60,
80, 100]. Independent variables are standardized except for age, female and trust. Female and
trust are dummy variables. Political interest measures how interested a person is in politics. Left-
right indicates where a person positions herself with regards to left and right on a scale from 0 to
10, lower numbers indicating left, higher numbers right. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.4: Allocation of the resources in the property rights game.
In the following analysis, we focus on production and protection. As participants
have to distribute all seven units to the three activities, stealing is merely the residual.
Table 1.2 shows regressions with robust standard errors to analyze the relationship between
production and our covariates from the WVS. We find a strong relationship between secular
values and the production decision, whereas emancipative values do not associate with
this decision (Model 1). Participants who score one standard deviation higher on secular
values allocate 0.33 units more to production (t = 2.47, p = .014). Similar to public good
contributions, production decisions are positively linked with trust, but not with civic
norms (Model 2). A person who trusts allocates roughly 0.6 units more to production (t
= 2.42, p = .016). In Model 3, we include both sets of explanatory variables and find that
the link between trust and the production decision weakens, whereas for secular values
the link retains its strength. Hence, secular values account for additional variance above
and beyond social capital. Eﬀect sizes and significance levels are robust to the inclusion
of political and demographic controls (Model 4), and the controls itself are insignificant.18
Concerning our two subhypotheses, we find that West and East Germans do not diﬀer
significantly with respect to production (Mann-Whitney, z = 1.34, p = .179). However, we
observe significant diﬀerences across religious groups. Protestants allocate on average 4.5
units to production, versus 3.8 units for Catholics (Mann-Whitney, z = 1.99, p = .046).
To sum up, secular values show robust predictive power for the production decision,
whereas emancipative values seem unrelated. People who trust and attribute less value to
sacred authority are more likely to realize eﬃcient outcomes. We take these results as an
on some important dimensions. Most importantly, they implemented a repeated game with 10 periods.
18Among the additional sets of covariates, we find that ingroup trust and openness to experience are
positively related to the production decision, while all other factors are insignificant (see Table B3 in the
appendix).
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Table 1.2: OLS Estimates for Production.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production Production Production Production
Emancipative values 0.163 0.090 0.087
[-0.148, 0.474] [-0.239, 0.419] [-0.256, 0.430]
Secular values 0.329∗ 0.356∗ 0.355∗
[0.066, 0.591] [0.058, 0.655] [0.043, 0.668]
Trust 0.591∗ 0.474# 0.436#
[0.109, 1.072] [-0.033, 0.981] [-0.070, 0.943]
Civic norms −0.140 0.050 0.024
[-0.401, 0.120] [-0.249, 0.350] [-0.295, 0.342]
Female −0.041
[-0.579, 0.498]
Age 0.007
[-0.009, 0.023]
Political interest 0.028
[-0.251, 0.306]
Left-right 0.039
[-0.230, 0.308]
Constant 4.187∗∗ 4.069∗∗ 4.001∗∗ 3.743∗∗
[3.907, 4.468] [3.759, 4.378] [3.685, 4.318] [2.901, 4.584]
F -test 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.1
Prob > F 0.012 0.033 0.007 0.039
R2 0.047 0.037 0.071 0.076
N 183 182 182 182
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is units allocated to production in the property rights
game [0,7]. Independent variables are standardized except for age, female and trust. Female
and trust are dummy variables. Political interest measures how interested a person is in politics.
Left-right indicates where a person positions herself with regards to left and right on a scale
from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher numbers right. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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indication that secularization is compatible with desirable social outcomes.
In the next step, we analyze the protection decision. As mentioned above, devoting
resources to protection is not part of an equilibrium. However, if excessive stealing is
expected, allocating three or four units to protection is a rational response. As shown in
Figure 1.4, we observe that 80% of participants allocate at least one unit to protection.
The multiple regression analyses in Table 1.3 show the inverse pattern to that of the
production behavior. In Model 1, we look at the link between values and the protection
decision. Participants, who score high on secular values, use significantly less resources
for protection. We find that an increase of secular values by one standard deviation leads
to a decrease of protection of roughly 0.35 units (t = 2.93, p = .004). In Model 2, trust
is weakly significantly linked to protection (t = 1.66, p = .099). In Model 3, we include
both sets of variables and the social capital measures become insignificant, whereas secular
values retain strength and significance. The same holds if we include the additional controls
(Model 4).19
While we find that Catholics and Protestants behave diﬀerently with respect to pro-
duction, we do not observe such diﬀerences in the protection decision (Mann-Whitney, z
= 1.22, p = .224). Furthermore, we do not find evidence for diﬀerences in the behavior
between West and East German participants (Mann-Whitney, z = 0.623, p = .533). To
conclude, we observe that behavior in the property rights game is tightly associated with
secular values. Participants who score high on those values allocate on average more re-
sources to production and fewer to protection. This confirms our hypothesis about the
negative link between secular values and protectionist behavior.
Consequently, the higher the score on secular values, the closer is a participant’s be-
havior to the socially optimal behavior. Interestingly, while we observe that secular values
relate positively to production and negatively to protection, they are not significantly
linked to stealing. Behavior in this game might be strongly driven by the beliefs partici-
pants hold about their partner. People who emphasize secular values find little appeal in
sacrosanct authority, which is usually idolized as a force of order in a presumably chaotic
19The link between the secular values and the protection decision is robust to the inclusion of the
additional control variables discussed in the appendix, while none of the controls is significant (see Table
B4).
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Table 1.3: OLS Estimates for Protection.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protection Protection Protection Protection
Emancipative values −0.013 0.026 0.016
[-0.273, 0.248] [-0.246, 0.298] [-0.260, 0.293]
Secular values −0.348∗∗ −0.355∗∗ −0.348∗
[-0.581, -0.114] [-0.614, -0.096] [-0.615, -0.081]
Trust −0.325# −0.263 −0.260
[-0.713, 0.062] [-0.670, 0.143] [-0.678, 0.158]
Civic norms 0.174 −0.006 0.017
[-0.037, 0.384] [-0.239, 0.227] [-0.224, 0.259]
Female −0.036
[-0.469, 0.398]
Age −0.007
[-0.020, 0.006]
Political interest 0.062
[-0.148, 0.273]
Left-right −0.020
[-0.229, 0.190]
Constant 2.034∗∗ 2.105∗∗ 2.135∗∗ 2.419∗∗
[1.810, 2.258] [1.857, 2.352] [1.877, 2.393] [1.727, 3.112]
F -test 5.3 2.8 3.6 1.9
Prob > F 0.006 0.066 0.008 0.060
R2 0.059 0.029 0.072 0.078
N 183 182 182 182
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is units allocated to protection [0,7]. Independent
variables are standardized except for age, female and trust. Female and trust are dummy variables.
Political interest measures how interested a person is in politics. Left-right indicates where a person
positions herself with regards to left and right on a scale from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left,
higher numbers right. Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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and dangerous world. Hence, adherents of secular values might generally be more relaxed
and less fearful, and expect less stealing from others. On the contrary, strong secular values
do not seem to be related to a participant’s own “immoral” behavior.
1.4.3 Donations
We observe behavior in the donation decision for 179 participants. On average, participants
are willing to donate 14.4% of their potential income to a charity (SD = 20.9). A bit more
than half of the participants (54%) are willing to donate. Among the participants who
donate, the mean donation is 26.6% (SD = 21.9). In a design very similar to ours (with
a student sample), Schulz, Thiemann, and Thöni (2015) find about 44% willing to donate
and 16.3% of the earnings donated on average.
Table 1.4 depicts the results of the OLS regressions for the link between values and
donations. In Model 1, we regress the amount donated (as percentage) on emancipative
and secular values. We find that emancipative values are strongly related to the donation
decision. An increase in emancipative values by one standard deviation is associated with
an increase in donations by 5.7 percentage points (t = 3.05, p = .003). In Model 2, we
regress the amount donated on the social capital measures. Both predictors account for
some variance of the dependent variable. Participants who trust donate on average 7.1
percentage points more (t = 2.31, p = .022). An increase of one standard deviation in
civic norms leads to an increase in the amount donated of about 5 percentage points (t =
5.00, p < .001). In Model 3, we include both sets of predictors and find that emancipative
values and civic norms retain significance, whereas trust becomes insignificant. Compared
with Model 2, the adjusted R-squared increases. Model 4 shows that the link between
emancipative values and the donation decision is robust to the inclusion of our control
variables (t = 2.17, p = .031). Unlike in the previous estimates, we observe a significant
link between age and donation, with older participants being more generous (t = 2.73, p =
.007). Furthermore, stronger interest in politics seems to be positively related to donations
(t = 1.87, p = .063).20
20Table B5 in the appendix reports the estimates for extended controls. The coeﬃcient for emancipative
values is robust in all specifications, while none of the other predictor variables (Big Five, in/outgroup
trust, perceived security) reaches significance.
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Table 1.4: OLS Estimates for Donation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation Donation Donation Donation
Emancipative values 5.723∗∗ 4.864∗ 4.119∗
[2.013, 9.432] [0.784, 8.943] [0.373, 7.865]
Secular values −2.135 0.971 0.996
[-5.632, 1.362] [-3.007, 4.948] [-2.780, 4.771]
Trust 7.159∗ 4.366 2.323
[1.046, 13.271] [-2.241,10.974] [-4.684, 9.330]
Civic norms 5.246∗∗ 6.255∗∗ 4.634∗∗
[3.173, 7.319] [3.337, 9.174] [1.662, 7.605]
Female −3.195
[-9.844, 3.453]
Age 0.315∗∗
[0.087, 0.544]
Political interest 2.657#
[-0.146, 5.460]
Left-right −2.952
[-6.580, 0.677]
Constant 12.089∗∗ 11.398∗∗ 10.025∗∗ −0.509
[9.384, 14.794] [6.997, 15.799] [6.128, 13.923] [-10.260, 9.241]
F -test 4.7 15.8 8.7 5.4
Prob > F 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.049 0.081 0.118 0.209
N 174 173 173 173
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is the amount donated to a charity of choice in percentage
of the earnings [0, 100]. Independent variables are standardized except for age, female and trust.
Female and trust are dummy variables. Political interest measures how interested a person is in
politics. Left-right indicates where a person positions herself with regards to left and right on a
scale from 0 to 10, lower numbers indicating left, higher numbers right. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
We do not observe a significant diﬀerence in the donation behavior between East and
West German participants (Mann-Whitney, z = 0.98, p= .327). Nor do we find a significant
diﬀerence between Protestants and Catholics (Mann-Whitney, z = 0.96, p = .337).
Overall, the eﬀect size of emancipative values on donation is in the magnitude of an
increase between 4.4 and 5.7 percentage points per standard deviation. If we estimate the
link between the donation decision and values only for the sample of people who donate,
we observe an increase of the eﬀect size to roughly 7 percentage points (t = 3.07, p = .003).
Summing up, both emancipative values and adherence to civic norms associate pos-
itively with the amount donated. If one follows Welzel (2010) and defines “civicness” as
people’s willingness to cooperate with strangers and to share with unfamiliar others, then
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our results provide evidence for the civic implications of certain sets of moral values. Specif-
ically, we see from the donation decisions that people with strong emancipative values share
more with strangers compared with what people with weak emancipative values do.
1.4.4 Controlling for Sample Selection Bias
At the beginning of the “Design and Procedures” section, we mentioned that women and
young people are overrepresented in our experimental sample compared with the WVS
sample. To control for selection bias, we follow Heckman (1979). The first step of the
Heckman correction is to estimate a probit model for the individual probability to belong
to the selected sample (selection equation). Second, we use the estimated coeﬃcient of
the selection equation to predict the inverse Mill’s ratio. The final step is to estimate the
original regression using the inverse Mill’s ratio as a regressor.
It is crucial to this method to identify the selection equation. In practice, this means
that the selection equation has to include at least one variable, which matters for selection
but is not related to the outcome variable (exclusion restriction). Ideally, this variable
does not come from the respondent’s answers or characteristics. Fortunately, we have a
variable, which strongly predicts participation but is, most likely, unrelated to the outcome
variables. The variable measures an interviewer’s success in motivating the respondents of
the WVS in participating in the behavioral experiment.
The roughly 2,000 WVS interviews were conducted by 134 interviewers. For each in-
terviewer, we calculate an individual success rate as the total number of email addresses
collected for the behavioral experiment, divided by the total number of interviews con-
ducted. Interviewers diﬀered a lot in their success rate (mean = 0.24, SD = 0.22, minimum
= 0, maximum = 1). This variable is highly related to selection into the sample of the
behavioral experiment, but unlikely to be related to the dependent variables of interest.
Participants who indicated their email address are more likely to participate in our behav-
ioral experiment because we were able to send them a direct link to access our website.
However, the success rate of the interviewer is not likely to be related, for example, to
contributions in the public goods game.21 We reestimated all our models from Tables 1.1
21We do not observe any statistically significant correlation between our dependent variables and the
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to 1.4 using the Heckman procedure. All our main links remain unchanged, which suggests
that the results are not driven by selection bias.22
1.5 Discussion
We study the individual-level linkage between secular and emancipative values, on one
hand, and prosocial behavior, on the other hand, as observed in a nationally representa-
tive sample. As concerns secular and emancipative values, we have shown four relations,
most of which proved robust against controls for sampling bias, demographic characteris-
tics, public interest, ideological orientations, as well as personality traits and social capital.
To begin with, emancipative values seem to relate to (a) larger contributions to the public
good and (b) relate strongly to more generous donations to charities. Both relations involve
decisions about sharing some part of one’s endowment with strangers. But while mutual
cooperation produces a personal gain, donating is clearly a sacrifice. The donation decision
is, hence, more indicative of altruism, and this is where the link with the emancipative
values is strongest. Apparently, the behavioral impulse of these values is more powerful
when it comes to decisions about true material sacrifice than in situations that still in-
volve opportunities for material gain. Hence, we confirm Welzel (2010) hypothesis that
emancipative values correspond with universal altruism—at least for the German context.
Secular values, for their part, show no behavioral impulse in situations in which social
sharing is the issue. They show such an impact, however, in the property rights game, in
which the success of a strategy depends on what strategy the others have chosen. Specifi-
cally, stronger secular values correspond with (c) more productive investments and at the
same time (d) less protective investments. Although these decisions do not involve a joint
project, they nevertheless depend on beliefs about the other player’s strategy. From this
point of view, secular values involve lower fears that strangers behave in an asocial manner,
for which reason these values contribute to investment decisions conducive to the social
optimum. Despite their significance, the behavioral impulses of secular values proved to
individual success rate of the interviewer. Hence, it seems that the individual success is a valid exclusion
restriction.
22For the results of the selection models, see the working paper version (Kistler, Thöni, & Welzel, 2015).
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be considerably weaker than those of emancipative values, especially in the case of altru-
ism. Our results also support the notion that the positive relation between religiosity and
prosociality found in self-reported data does not carry over to behavioral data (Shariﬀ,
2015).
Moreover, our analysis shows that one standard measure of social capital associates
with observed behavior while another one does not, or only very weakly so. Specifically,
interpersonal trust is linked with larger contributions in the public goods game and bigger
investments into production in the property rights game. By contrast, adherence to civic
norms is only associated with the donation decision. The lack of relevance of adherence
to civic norms confirms Welzel (2010) criticism that this measure often does not keep to
the promise of its expected prosocial eﬀects, presumably because it rather captures social
desirability than truly internalized civic orientations.
Historically rooted cleavages that characterize the cultural map of Europe, namely, the
East-West cleavage and the Protestant-Catholic cleavage did not prove overly important
in the German context. The only eﬀect we found with respect to these historic cleavages is
that Protestants contribute more to the public good and allocate more units to production
in the property rights game than Catholics.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to establish a direct individual-level
link between secular/emancipative values and behavior, with respect to observed—not self-
reported—behavior. This was possible through a methodological innovation, combining a
national representative survey in Germany with a behavioral experiment on three facets
of prosocial behavior. The fact that we reached empirically significant and theoretically
meaningful results shows that this innovation works and can be extended to other societies
with a suﬃcient degree of computer literacy.
As Germany represents Europe’s biggest nation and the fourth-largest economy in the
world, the results are relevant in and by themselves. But Germany is also in many respects
a typical postindustrial knowledge society, for which reason comparable results might well
be obtainable in other such societies, from the United States to Australia to Japan, and
even beyond.
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Figure 1.5: Emancipative values and experimentally measured coopera-
tive behavior at the macro level.
Source. Emancipative values: World Values Survey and own calculations. Contribu-
tions: Herrmann et al. (2008), Figure 2A.
Preliminary evidence that our approach and findings, especially concerning the link
between values and cooperation, might be valid in a wider cross-cultural context than just
Germany is provided in Figure 1.5. It plots data from laboratory experiments conducted
with student subject pools in 14 countries around the globe (Herrmann et al., 2008), in rela-
tion to the average emancipative values in the respective national population, as measured
by the WVS. Although this plot only covers 14 diﬀerent country locations, the relation-
ship is highly significant (standardized linear regression: β = .71, t = 3.65, p = .003)
and explains a substantial part of the variance in cooperation (R2 = .51).23 Much like in
the behavioral experiment we propose in this article, cooperation shown in Figure 1.5 was
measured in a controlled and incentivized environment, following a standardized procedure
in all countries. Diﬀerences in the observed individual-level behavior can be explained by
country-level diﬀerences in the cultural environment of the participants. Presumably, the
diﬀerences in emancipative values as measured by the WVS capture important determi-
nants for cooperative outcomes in social dilemma situations. Against this backdrop, our
23The relation between contributions and emancipative values is surprisingly robust to the inclusion of
control variables such as trust, the human development index, or a measure for democracy.
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German pilot study is truly essential as it tells us that this macro-level link does not seem
to be a mere artifact of aggregation but has a valid micro-foundation at the individual
level—at least at one of the places covered.24
This suggestive evidence calls even more loudly for a replication of our study at other
places. To conclude, we are convinced that the combination of behavioral experiments with
representative surveys provides a novel and powerful tool to establish mind-set-behavior
links in a more valid way than is possible by either one method alone. We see our study as
a promising first step to extend this research design to more countries covered in Round 7
of the WVS. This would allow to examine whether and how the individual-level linkages
between moral values and cooperative behavior vary by cultural background and country-
level characteristics.
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Appendix
1.A Items and Response Format
Emancipative Values
1. Autonomy Subindex:
• Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?
– Independence (mentioned/not mentioned)
– Imagination (mentioned/not mentioned)
– Obedience (mentioned/not mentioned)
2. Equality Subindex:
• Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following state-
ments? When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
(agree/disagree/neither agree nor disagree)
• For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you
agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree?
– A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
(strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree)
– On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
(strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree)
3. Choice Subindex:
• Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always
be justified, never be justified, or something in between using this card (10-point
scale):
– Homosexuality (1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
– Abortion (1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
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– Divorce (1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
4. Voice Subindex:
• People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the
next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which diﬀerent people
would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself,
consider the most important? (. . .) And second most important?
– Giving people more say in important government decisions
(most important/second most important/not important)
– Protecting freedom of speech
(most important/second most important/not important)
– Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs
and in their communities
(most important/second most important/not important)
Secular Values
1. Defiance Subindex:
• People pursue diﬀerent goals in life. For each of the following goals, can you tell
me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with it?
– One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.
(strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree)
• I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might
take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen,
whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind?
– Greater respect for authority (good/don’t mind/bad)
• How proud are you to be [German]?
(very proud/quite proud/not very proud/not at all proud/I am not [German])
2. Agnosticism Subindex:
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• For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life.
– Religion (very important/rather important/not very important/not at all
important)
• Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious
services these days?
(more than once a week/once a week/once a month/only on special holy days/once
a year/less often/never, practically never)
• Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say
you are
(a religious person/not a religious person/an atheist)
3. Relativism Subindex:
• Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always
be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
– Avoiding a fare on public transport
(1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
– Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
(1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
– Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
(1 [never justifiable] to 10 [always justifiable])
4. Skepticism Subindex:
• I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a
lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?
– The armed forces (a great deal/quite a lot/not very much/none at all)
– The police (a great deal/quite a lot/not very much/none at all)
– The courts (a great deal/quite a lot/not very much/none at all)
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Table B2: OLS Estimates for Contribution in the Public Goods Game Including Additional
Control Variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Contribution Contribution Contribution
Emancipative values 2.253 3.310# 3.424#
[-1.960,6.466] [-0.519,7.139] [-0.471,7.319]
Secular values 2.785 2.711 2.579
[-1.153,6.723] [-0.943,6.366] [-1.179,6.337]
Outgroup trust 1.784
[-3.262,6.829]
Ingroup trust 1.672
[-2.860,6.203]
Perceived security 1.912
[-1.286,5.110]
Extraversion −0.078
[-3.878,3.722]
Neuroticism 0.506
[-2.622,3.634]
Openness to experience 0.711
[-3.002,4.424]
Conscientiousness −0.260
[-3.523,3.004]
Agreeableness −0.836
[-4.545,2.872]
Constant 52.712∗∗ 51.935∗∗ 51.900∗∗
[49.109,56.315] [48.545,55.324] [48.387,55.413]
F -test 1.9 3.1 1.3
Prob > F 0.106 0.026 0.251
R2 0.036 0.033 0.032
N 235 246 245
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is contribution in the public goods
game [0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100]. Independent variables are standardized except
for perceived security, age, female. Female and trust are dummy variables.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B3: OLS Estimates for Production in the Property Rights Game Including Addi-
tional Control Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production Production Production Production
Emancipative values 0.083 0.168 0.094 0.167
[-0.276,0.441] [-0.149,0.484] [-0.211,0.398] [-0.148,0.481]
Secular values 0.364∗∗ 0.329∗ 0.353∗ 0.280∗
[0.092,0.635] [0.066,0.592] [0.085,0.620] [0.013,0.547]
Outgroup trust 0.012
[-0.357,0.381]
Ingroup trust 0.313∗
[0.001,0.625]
Perceived security −0.031
[-0.265,0.203]
Extraversion −0.196
[-0.471,0.079]
Neuroticism −0.144
[-0.375,0.088]
Openness to experience 0.273∗
[0.032,0.514]
Conscientiousness 0.082
[-0.166,0.330]
Agreeableness −0.001
[-0.271,0.270]
T_rich −0.364
[-0.922,0.194]
T_poor 0.344
[-0.274,0.963]
Constant 4.240∗∗ 4.188∗∗ 4.191∗∗ 4.227∗∗
[3.945,4.536] [3.908,4.468] [3.921,4.462] [3.860,4.593]
F -test 4.2 3.1 3.5 3.6
Prob > F 0.003 0.028 0.002 0.008
R2 0.076 0.048 0.091 0.069
N 175 183 182 183
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is units allocated to production [0,7]. Independent
variables are standardized except for perceived security, age, female and trust. Female and trust
are dummy variables. T_rich and T_poor are dummy variables for the endowment treatments.
T_rich is the treatment in which the respondent is paired with a person who has a lower endow-
ment in the game. T_poor is the treatment in which the respondent is grouped with a person
with a higher endowment in the game. Baseline is the treatment where both respondents have
the same endowment. Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B4: OLS Estimates for Protection in the Property Rights Game Including Additional
Control Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protection Protection Protection Protection
Emancipative values 0.079 −0.013 −0.005 −0.009
[-0.221,0.379] [-0.282,0.255] [-0.264,0.253] [-0.267,0.250]
Secular values −0.391∗∗ −0.348∗∗ −0.314∗ −0.327∗∗
[-0.642,-0.141] [-0.582,-0.114] [-0.553,-0.075] [-0.561,-0.092]
Outgroup trust −0.092
[-0.379,0.194]
Ingroup trust −0.115
[-0.368,0.138]
Perceived security 0.006
[-0.196,0.207]
Extraversion 0.133
[-0.078,0.344]
Neuroticism −0.095
[-0.281,0.091]
Openness to experience −0.085
[-0.273,0.103]
Conscientiousness −0.057
[-0.248,0.133]
Agreeableness 0.053
[-0.160,0.265]
T_rich 0.133
[-0.296,0.563]
T_poor −0.262
[-0.759,0.236]
Constant 1.988∗∗ 2.034∗∗ 2.042∗∗ 2.044∗∗
[1.750,2.225] [1.810,2.258] [1.815,2.268] [1.748,2.341]
F -test 3.4 3.6 2.4 3.2
Prob > F 0.011 0.015 0.022 0.014
R2 0.077 0.059 0.075 0.070
N 175 183 182 183
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is units allocated to protection [0,7]. Independent
variables are standardized except for perceived security, age, female and trust. Female and trust are
dummy variables. T_rich and T_poor are dummy variables for the endowment treatments. T_rich
is the treatment in which the respondent is paired with a person who has a lower endowment in
the game. T_poor is the treatment in which the respondent is grouped with a person with a
higher endowment in the game. Baseline is the treatment where both respondents have the same
endowment. Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B5: OLS Estimates for the Donation Decision Including Additional Control Vari-
ables.
(1) (2) (3)
Donation Donation Donation
Emancipative values 4.579∗ 5.416∗∗ 5.247∗∗
[0.394,8.764] [1.574,9.257] [1.555,8.939]
Secular values −1.594 −2.141 −1.513
[-5.247,2.059] [-5.678,1.396] [-4.965,1.938]
Outgroup trust 1.237
[-3.243,5.718]
Ingroup trust 2.066
[-1.921,6.054]
Perceived security 1.890
[-1.173,4.954]
Extraversion −0.609
[-3.906,2.688]
Neuroticism −2.104
[-5.200,0.993]
Openness to experience 1.242
[-1.708,4.192]
Conscientiousness 2.063
[-1.238,5.364]
Agreeableness 0.556
[-2.777,3.890]
Constant 12.654∗∗ 12.061∗∗ 12.154∗∗
[9.703,15.605] [9.353,14.769] [9.359,14.949]
F -test 2.7 3.9 2.1
Prob > F 0.032 0.009 0.048
R2 0.057 0.055 0.076
N 167 174 173
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is percentage donated [0,100]. In-
dependent variables are standardized except for perceived security, age, female.
Female and trust are dummy variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Salience in Public Goods Games
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2.1 Introduction
Standard economic theory usually assumes that agents use all available information when
making a decision irrespective of the mode of presentation. However, when we think about
decisions in our daily life, most of us would agree that we do not include all available choice
attributes when we make a decision. We are often guided by the mode of presentation
because our attention is limited. Meaning that usually some characteristics are more
salient than others and consequentially we include them in the decision-making process
while we neglect others.
Taylor and Thompson (1982) define salience as: “[..] the phenomenon that when one’s
attention is diﬀerentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to oth-
ers, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighing in
subsequent judgments.”
In economics, Schelling (1960) was among the first to use salience to explain coordina-
tion behavior. He asked his students to indicate where they would meet with a friend in
New York. A significant majority answered at the Grand Central Terminal. His argument
was that the Grand Central Terminal is a more salient choice among all possible meeting
points in New York City, because of its tradition to meet at this place. By choosing this
salient option, people can solve the coordination problem eﬃciently. Akerlof (1991) applied
the concept of salience to explain why people procrastinate. He postulated that future con-
sequences of today’s decisions are not salient and therefore not taken into account when
making a decision.
The reasons for why certain choice attributes are salient while others are not, can be
endogenous or exogenous. Furthermore, in some cases salience can lead people to attach a
disproportional weight to a decision attribute while in other cases salience helps to filter out
the relevant attributes of a choice environment. An endogenous factor, for instance, are our
political attitudes. Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) show that participants of an
experiment spent more reading time on articles that are in line with their political attitudes.
An example for an exogenous factor are policies to promote healthy food choices. These
policies aim to design labels to draw the consumer’s attention on the health consequences
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of her choice. Van Herpen and Van Trijp (2011) show that Traﬃc-light labels receive more
attention than the standard nutrition table and guide consumers to chose healthier options.
Presumably, such Traﬃc-light labels make the health consequences of a food choice more
salient and many consumers change their decision because of they take the consequences
into account.
It is only recently that economists started to include salience in formal models. A first
strand of the literature views salience as arising endogenously within the set of available
options (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012). They assume that a characteristic of a good
is salient if it stands out compared to the respective feature of a reference good. Meaning
that the attribute that is furthest from the reference level is the most salient and will get
more weight in the decision process.1
The second strand of the literature views salience as an exogenous characteristic of the
choice environment. DellaVigna (2009) proposes a simple model to describe why people
neglect for example shipping costs or taxes in the valuation of goods. In his model, each
object contains a visible and an opaque component. Due to limited attention, the consumer
processes the information of the opaque component only partially. Applying this model
to consumer taxes, for instance, means that the labeling of the taxes aﬀects the valuation
of the respective product. In the extreme case where the price does not include the tax,
the model predicts that consumers neglect the tax completely because it is not salient.
The contrary is that the price includes the tax. In this case, the model predicts that the
consumer processes the tax in the valuation of the object fully. Empirical data supports
this claim. In a field experiment with a grocery store Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)
observe that when the price includes the tax, demand decreases compared to the case
where the tax is separate.
These studies provide evidence that salience can play a role in decision making. There-
fore, one of the questions which arises is if salience plays a role beyond consumer and
lottery choices. For example, whether behavior in social dilemmas is aﬀected by salience.
1Mormann and Frydman (2016) test this model in a laboratory experiment. Besides the lottery choices,
they record eye-tracking data from all participants. The authors find that the outcomes are consistent
with the theory. However, when they elaborate the eye-tracking data, they observe that participants do
not look at the options, which are predicted by the model to be salient. Instead, they discover that the
longer the subjects look at any option, the more likely it is that the subject will choose this option.
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There are compelling reasons to expect that salience plays a role for contributions in public
goods games because many people are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher, Gächter, &
Fehr, 2001). For conditional cooperators, the contributions of the other group members
are decisive of their own behavior. In this paper, we are interested to see if exogenously
increasing the salience of, for instance, the highest contribution in a group aﬀects behav-
ior in the public goods game. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research which
evaluates salience in social dilemmas such as the public goods game. Hence, we extend
the literature on salience by evaluating formally and empirically if and how salience aﬀects
decisions in a social dilemma.
Closest to our design, and a prerequisite for our manipulation to work, is the research
on information provision in public goods games. Subjects have to be sensitive to the
information provided to them. Otherwise, salience cannot play a role. Engel, Kube,
and Kurschilgen (2014) find evidence that providing participants with diﬀerent pre-play
information aﬀects their behavior. In their experiment, subjects of a public goods game
receive selected information about the behavior in previous experiments. In one treatment,
they showed them high contribution levels, and in the other treatment, participants got
information about low contribution levels. They observe that depending on the disclosed
information two distinct cooperation norms are established.
Hoﬀmann, Lauer, and Rockenbach (2013) present participants in a repeated public
goods game with exaggerated feedback, i.e., the actual average is multiplied by a factor
bigger than one.2 Surprisingly, subjects do not change their contribution in response to
exaggerated feedback. Hartig, Irlenbusch, and Kölle (2015) evaluate how subjects react to
diﬀerent forms of feedback. They compare the provision of the group mean to the provi-
sion of the individual behavior of all group members. They find that subjects contribute
on average more when they get full information about the behavior of the other group
members. Furthermore, they report that the minimum contribution in a group is decisive
for the decision of conditional cooperators.
A similar design to ours is by Samek and Sheremeta (2014). They provide participants
of a public goods game with additional information about the highest or lowest contributors
2Participants received the information that the feedback might deviate from the actual average.
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in their group. In the feedback stage participants see, besides the contribution level, a
photo, and the name of the other group members. Compared to the standard public
goods game, only the treatment which reveals the identity of the lowest contributor in a
group aﬀects contributions. Participants in this treatment contribute significantly more
compared to the standard public goods game. The mechanism behind the results is unclear;
the salience of a certain contribution level could aﬀect the behavior or the identification of
contributors.
Summing up, this strand of the literature shows that how information is displayed can
have eﬀects on the contribution of subjects in public goods games. However, in most of
these papers, the information provided to participants diﬀered depending on the treat-
ments. In contrast, we aim to only shift the focus of attention, while holding the content
of the information constant.
In a first step, we extend the Fehr-Schmidt model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) to derive
theoretical predictions of how salience may aﬀect contributions. The model is set up in
the spirit of DellaVigna (2009). In a second step, we conduct a series of three laboratory
experiments to test whether we observe systematic diﬀerences in behavior due to an ex-
ogenous manipulation of the salience of the contribution levels in a standard public goods
game.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we introduce our model. In section 2.3,
2.4, and 2.5 we describe our three experiments and their results. In section 2.6 we discuss
the results of the pooled dataset and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theory
In a typical public goods game, each of n > 2 subjects in a group receives an endowment
of y tokens. Each group member can choose to keep the endowment to herself or to invest
parts or all of it into a common pool (the public good). All tokens invested in the public
good will be multiplied by a factor a (1/n < a < 1) and equally shared among all group
members. The payoﬀ function of a subject i is given by:
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xi = y − gi + a
n∑
j=1
gj i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, (2.1)
where gi is the investment of subject i to the public good (with gi ∈ [0, y]), and a denotes
the marginal per capita return of the contribution to the public good.
Under standard assumptions, the only Nash equilibrium in this game is that all players
contribute zero tokens to the public good. However, numerous empirical studies provide
evidence that people often deviate from the standard prediction and contribute positive
amounts. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a utility function, which can account for
positive contributions. The function does not only take the player’s own payoﬀ into account
but also the distance to the payoﬀ of the other players. It represents the observation that
individuals often not only care about their payoﬀ but also about the welfare of others. The
assumption is that players like equality and increasing the diﬀerence between one’s own
payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of other group members generates disutility. The utility function
takes the following form:
Ui(x) = xi −
αi
n− 1
∑
j ̸=i
max [xj − xi, 0]−
βi
n− 1
∑
j ̸=i
max [xi − xj , 0] (2.2)
where αi is the aversion factor towards disadvantageous inequality, while βi stands for the
aversion towards advantageous inequality. It is assumed that αi > βi and 0 < βi < 1.
In the case of n = 4 and a = 0.4, which is the group size and the MPCR in the three
experiments later on, the standard version of the model predicts that the best reply of
subject i is to match the lowest contribution within her group (gi = R(gj) = min{gj}).3
We introduce individual salience factors θij in the Fehr-Schmidt model to derive how
salience potentially aﬀects behavior. We posit the following utility function:
Ui(x) = xi − αi
∑
j ̸=i
θij max [xj − xi, 0]− βi
∑
j ̸=i
θij max [xi − xj , 0] ,
with
∑
j ̸=i
θij = 1 and θij ≥ 0
(2.3)
3For more details on the predictions of the model see Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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All the payoﬀ-comparisons are now additionally weighted by θij . The size of θij defines
how salient the comparison with j is. Thereby, we assume that overall the attention
stays constant, but the proportion of attention that each bilateral comparison gets can
be diﬀerent. If a certain θij is equal to 0, it means that this comparison does not receive
any attention and is hence not considered in the calculation of the utility. On the other
hand, if all θij are equal (θij =
1
n−1 ∀j ̸= i), function (2.3) is equivalent to the original
Fehr-Schmidt utility function.
To derive the best response functions, take player i facing three other players with
contributions gl, gm, and gh, such that gh ≥ gm ≥ gl. Then the best response of player i
depends not only on her αi and βi but also on how salient the contributions of the other
players are.
gi = R(gj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if a+ βi < 1
gl else if θil > θˆil
gm else if θih < θˆih
gh else if θih > θˆih
with θˆil =
a+ βi − 1
αi + βi
and θˆih =
1− a+ αi
αi + βi
(2.4)
Figure 2.1 depicts the best responses graphically. θij denotes the salience level of player
i towards the contribution gj , with 0 ≤ θij . θˆl and θˆh respectively stand for the critical
salience levels of the lowest and the highest contributions from the other group members.
If the lowest contribution is suﬃciently salient θˆl ≤ θl, the best response of player i is
to match the lowest contribution gi = gl. In other words, if the lowest contribution is more
salient relative to the other contributions, it will receive more weight in the utility function,
and player i is best oﬀ if he matches the lowest contribution of his group. The more a
person dislikes disadvantageous inequality, the lower the threshold for θˆl. In contrast, the
more a person disrelishes advantageous inequality, the lower the threshold for θˆl. Likewise,
if the middle contribution becomes more salient relative to the other contributions, the
player will match this contribution. Lastly, if θˆh ≤ θh the participant will put the most
attention on the highest contribution in her group. She will try to minimize the inequality
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with respect to the highest contributor and match his contribution.4
^
^
gi = gl
gi = gm
gi = gh
0
θh
1
θ h
0 θl 1
θl
Figure 2.1: Optimal contributions of players under diﬀerent salience levels.
In this model, we assume that the salience weight is determined exogenously. Obviously,
this is the simplest explanation for the determination of the salience weights. Salience can
not only be aﬀected by exogenous factors of the choice environment but also through
endogenous channels such as the preferences of an individual, her past choices, or strategic
behavior. Given that there is no research yet on how salience aﬀects behavior in a public
goods game, we believe that it is justified to first start with the question whether salience
aﬀects behavior at all. If salience is relevant, our results can then be used to further think
about the determinants of the salience weights in the context of social dilemmas.
To conclude, with our extension of the Fehr-Schmidt model, we can show that, de-
pending on the salience of the other contributions within a group, the best response of
player i changes. Consequentially, we set up a series of laboratory experiments to test
these hypotheses empirically.
4A participant will not contribute more than the maximum contribution of the others, because the
condition for that would be a > αi + 1 while αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 and a < 1.
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2.3 Experiment 1 - The Recall Experiment
2.3.1 Design and Procedures
The first experiment consisted of two sequences. In each sequence, participants played ten
consecutive periods of a standard public goods game. At the beginning of the first sequence,
we assigned participants randomly into groups of four. The group composition remained
the same during the entire experiment. Each group member received an endowment of 20
tokens at the beginning of every period. The marginal per capita return (a) was 0.4. A
period consisted of the individual contribution decision followed by the feedback about the
individual earnings and the contributions of the other group members.5
We based our salience manipulation on results from research in cognitive psychology.
The literature shows that attention is often biased towards what is currently in mind (for
a review see Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, and Roelfsema (2011)). Furthermore, according
to that literature, recalling an item aﬀects the perception about that item. For example,
Dutch students reported using their bike more often after recalling instances of bicycle
use.6 In a similar vein, Janiszewski, Kuo, and Tavassoli (2013) show that paying repeated
attention to a product increased the probability of choosing this product in a subsequent
choice. Hence, to manipulate the salience of the diﬀerent contribution levels within a group,
we introduced a question at the end of every period. The question implied to recall one
of the previously displayed contributions of another group member. The goal was to draw
the attention of the participant on a specific contribution level. This central feature of our
experimental design is worth emphasizing. Participants memorize a contribution level such
that it occupies parts of their working memory and shifts their attention to that level. We
provided participants with two stimuli, (i) the minimum and (ii) the maximum stimulus.
Under the minimum stimulus, as the name indicates, participants were asked to recall
the lowest contribution in their group. On the contrary, under the maximum stimulus,
participants had to remember and reproduce the highest contribution of the other group
5Participants received the information about the exact contributions of the other group members; they
did not get the mean contribution of their group. However, it was easy to calculate the mean from the
available information. The screenshots of this experiment are in appendix 2.C.
6According to the research, the eﬀect is only present when the recalling task is easy, i.e., when the
items to recall come to mind easily (Schwarz, 2004).
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members. Subjects earned a point if they recalled the respective contribution correctly.7
Hence, in both treatments, we did not manipulate the information structure but only the
salience of a certain piece of information.
Within a group, all participants received the same stimulus. We assigned the groups
randomly to one of the two stimuli at the beginning of the experiment, and they stayed
within the assigned stimulus for the first sequence. In the second sequence, all groups
switched stimulus. Groups who started under the minimum stimulus switched to the
maximum stimulus in the second phase and vice versa. In the instructions, we explained
that participants will need to memorize a specific information and that they will receive
more information about this task directly on the screen once the experiment started. A
translated version of the instructions is in appendix 2.C.
2.3.2 Sample Size Calculation
To know how many independent observations we need to draw statistically meaningful
conclusions, we calculate the sample size using the power analysis by Cohen (1988). We
want to compare the means under the two stimuli, hence, to calculate the sample size, we
need an estimate of the eﬀect size, the standard deviation and to specify the significance
level and power. Since our model does not give precise predictions about the size of the
treatment eﬀect, we rely on values reported in the related literature. The three papers
which are most closely related to our design (Hoﬀmann et al., 2013; Engel et al., 2014;
Samek & Sheremeta, 2014) report treatment eﬀects in the range of 25 and 30 percentage
points. Only Engel et al. (2014) report the standard deviation. For the significance level
and power, we use the common levels of 0.05 and 0.8 respectively. Based on a treatment
eﬀect of 5.3 token and a standard deviation of 5 tokens, the formula indicates that our
sample size should be 28 (14 in each treatment cell) to be able to compare the mean under
the maximum stimulus to the mean under the minimum stimulus.
7We incentivized this question to make sure that participants had an incentive to answer the question
correctly and hence took it seriously.
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2.3.3 Results
We conducted the experiment at the LABEX of the University of Lausanne in Switzer-
land. 108 individuals participated, and we used the software zTree to run the experiments
(Fischbacher, 2007). For the analysis, the unit of independent observation is the group.
Hence, in this experiment, we observe the behavior of 27 independent groups.
In Figure 2.2 we display the behavior of the participants in the first sequence graph-
ically. The thin lines depict the average contributions, which participants had to recall
under the two stimuli. We observe that the mean with the maximum stimulus is 12.76
(SD: 6.84) compared to an average of 4.75 (SD: 6.55) with the minimum stimulus. This
diﬀerence is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p <0.01)
and a prerequisite for our treatment manipulation to work. Because if participants had to
recall numbers which are not substantially diﬀerent, there would be no reason to expect a
diﬀerence between the minimum and the maximum stimuli.
To our surprise, the two stimuli do not translate at all into significant diﬀerences in the
contribution behavior. Participants under both stimuli contribute on average similarly (see
the thick lines in Figure 2.2). The mean contribution with the maximum stimulus is 8.76
tokens (SD: 7.37) compared to an average of 8.41 tokens (SD: 7.76) with the minimum
stimulus (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.662).8 Moreover, the variance
within the groups over time remains rather constant and is statistically not diﬀerent be-
tween the two stimuli (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.771).
8We elaborated additionally if participants who behave as conditional cooperators behave diﬀerently.
Conditional cooperators are participants which condition their contribution on the contribution of the
other group members. To classify them, participants had to fill out a contribution table at the very
beginning of the experiment. In this table, they had to indicate how much they contribute given the
average contribution of the other group members. We followed the procedures of Fischbacher et al. (2001),
which allow classifying participants into freeriders, conditional cooperators, hump shaped and others. The
results are the same if we restrict the analysis at the subgroup of conditional cooperators. Furthermore, the
analysis of the second sequence (of all participants) reveals very similar results as in the first sequence. The
average contribution, which subjects recalled under the maximum stimulus is 8.71 (SD: 7.86) compared
to 4.52 (SD: 6.27) under the minimum stimulus. The diﬀerence is not as pronounced as in the first
sequence. Moreover, it is only weakly statistically diﬀerent (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27,
p=0.093). Again, we do not observe diﬀerences in the subsequent contribution behavior (see Figure B1
in the appendix). The average contribution with the minimum stimulus is 6.93 (SD: 7.30), which is even
higher than the average of 5.80 (SD: 7.58) with the maximum stimulus. The diﬀerence is statistically not
significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.599).
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Figure 2.2: Behavior in the Recall Experiment, first sequence.
One possibility for not finding diﬀerences could be that participants did not recall the
correct contribution and therefore had diﬀerent numbers on top of their head. However,
in 93% of the cases, participants recalled the contribution correctly.9 Hence, it is fair to
assume that people focused on the correct number.
We further elaborate whether the stimuli might aﬀect groups diﬀerently depending on
the homogeneity of the contributions within the group. It could be that if the contributions
in a group are very similar the stimulus leads to a diﬀerent eﬀect compared to the situation
where the behavior within a group is very diﬀerent. However, this seems not to be the case.
We do not find a diﬀerence between the stimuli in neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous
groups.
So far we discussed the between-subject eﬀects. It might be that, even though we do not
observe diﬀerences between subjects, subjects themselves react to the stimuli. Our design
allows to evaluate whether the behavior of the subjects is diﬀerent between the first and
the second sequence. Based on a sign-rank test we do not find a significant within-subject
diﬀerence (Signed-rank test, N=16, p=.918).
Thus, the results of this experiment lead us to conclude that either the contributions
of subjects in the public goods game are more stable than we thought or that our salience
stimuli were too weak. We suspected the second option and decided to manipulate salience
more radically in a second experiment.
950 % of the participants answered the recall question correctly in all ten periods. 33% replied to the
question correctly in 9 periods. The remainder of the subjects answered between 6 to 8 times correctly.
59
2.4 Experiment 2 - The Limited Information Experiment
2.4.1 Design and Procedures
The basis of experiment two is the same standard public goods game as in the first experi-
ment. However, we manipulated salience more drastically. After the contribution decision,
we provided participants only with very limited feedback about the behavior of the other
group members. Under the maximum stimulus, we only revealed the highest contribution
in the group. To be specific, we stated: “The highest contribution in your group was X.”
Under the minimum stimulus, we only revealed the lowest contribution in the group. In
both stimulus-treatments, participants did not receive information about their individual
earnings until the very end of the experiment. Hence, they could not infer any informa-
tion about the behavior of the group except for either the minimum or the maximum
contribution. Compared to the previous experiment, participants only received very lim-
ited information. We argue that this is a very strong form of salience because it is the
only available information. Hence, the focus of attention must lie by construction on the
minimum or the maximum contribution respectively.
We also elicited the beliefs of a subset of participants. These participants had to indicate
their belief about the average contribution level of the other group members at the same
time as they decided about their contribution. We incentivized the belief elicitation with
one additional token per correctly estimated average contribution. Again, we implemented
an AB/BA design; some groups started with ten periods under the maximum stimulus and
then played ten periods under the minimum stimulus and vice versa.10
2.4.2 Results
In this experiment, a total of 80 subjects participated. Thus, we have 20 independent
observations for the two sequences of the experiment. It is important to note, that these
are diﬀerent subjects than in experiment one.
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the results. The thin lines depict the stimuli that
participants received. With the maximum stimulus, in most of the groups and during the
10The instructions are in appendix 2.C.
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first seven periods, the contribution displayed was the maximum contribution (20 tokens).
Whereas when the stimulus was the minimum, the average of the displayed contribution
was 4.65 token with a standard deviation of 6.71 tokens.
To evaluate whether our manipulation has a chance to aﬀect behavior, we first look at
the beliefs of the participants. We observe that at the beginning of the experiment beliefs
under the two stimuli are on average similar. Given that our manipulation is at the end of
each period, the beliefs in the first period should and are not diﬀerent.11 However, over the
course of the experiment, the beliefs under the two stimuli start to diﬀer. All periods taken
together, the beliefs are statistically significantly diﬀerent (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-
sided, N=11, p=0.045).12 Furthermore, we observe that the change in the beliefs between
the periods is significantly bigger under the minimum stimulus, where participants on
average reduce their belief by 1.15 tokens, compared to a decrease of 0.43 tokens under the
maximum stimulus (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=11, p=0.100). These results
suggest that the stimuli aﬀect the beliefs.
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Figure 2.3: Displayed contributions and behavior in the Limited Information Experiment.
However, beyond the manipulation of the beliefs, we do not observe a statistically
significant diﬀerence in the contribution decisions of the participants (see Figure 2.3).
11Analog to the setup of the Recall Experiment, participants do not know that two separate treatments
exist. We instruct them that they will get some feedback after each period and that they will get more
detailed information once the experiment started. Thus, participants learn at the end of the first period
that they receive a minimum or maximum stimulus.
12From the fifth period and onward the diﬀerences between the two stimuli are even more pronounced
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=11, p=0.028).
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The mean contribution with the maximum stimulus, depicted by the thick line, is 10.77
(SD: 8.8), with the minimum stimulus, the mean is 8.28 (SD: 7.76), represented by the
dashed thick line. The diﬀerence is not significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided,
N=20, p=0.112).13 Contrary to the findings in the recall experiment, we observe that the
variance within the groups is diﬀerent under the two stimuli. The standard deviation under
the maximum stimulus amounts to 6.6 tokens under the minimum stimulus it amounts to
4.6 tokens (both across periods). This diﬀerence is significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
two-sided, N=20, p=0.016). Under both stimuli, the standard deviation is constant across
the periods.
Again, we do not observe significant within-subject diﬀerences (Signed-rank test, N=20,
p=0.767).
To sum up, in this experiment, we observe that providing participants with very limited
feedback about the group behavior aﬀects their beliefs and the variance within the group,
but to our surprise, it hardly aﬀects the average contributions.
2.5 Experiment 3 - The Belief Experiment
2.5.1 Design and Procedures
Our third attempt to manipulate salience builds on the successful manipulation of the
beliefs in the previous experiment. The basic set-up was the same as in the first two
experiments - the standard version of the public goods game. All participants had to
indicate their beliefs at the same time as they indicated their contribution. We imple-
mented the third salience stimulation in the following way; under the maximum stimulus,
we asked participants to indicate their beliefs about the maximum contribution in their
13The behavior in the second sequence of the experiment, where the groups switched treatments, re-
veals a similar picture. We find that under the maximum stimulus the average displayed contribution is
15.85 (SD: 5.32) and under the minimum stimulus, it is 8.28 (SD: 9.35). While in the first sequence of
this experiment, the beliefs were aﬀected by the stimuli, we do not observe diﬀerent beliefs in the second
sequence. With the maximum stimulus the average belief is 8.77 token (SD: 8.09), and with the minimum
stimulus, it is 8.73 token (SD: 6.73), (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=11, p=0.715). Given that the
beliefs are already not diﬀerent from each other it would be very surprising if the behavior under the two
stimuli would diﬀer. In fact, we even observe a reversed trend; the average contribution under the maxi-
mum stimulus is lower than the average contribution under the minimum stimulus (Maximum: M=8.51,
SD=8.71 and Minimum: M=9.75, SD=8.34). However, this disparity is statistically not significantly
diﬀerent (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=20, p=0.305).
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group. Consequentially, under the minimum stimulus, they had to indicate their belief
about the lowest contribution in their group. We incentivized the belief elicitation with
an additional point per correct estimation. After their contribution, participants received
the full information about the behavior of the other group members (analog to experiment
one).14
2.5.2 Results
We conducted the experiment with 108 subjects, which leaves us with 27 independent
observations. Again, the subjects which participated in this experiment did neither par-
ticipate in the recall experiment nor in the limited information experiment.
In Figure 2.4 we depict the average beliefs and contributions under the two stimuli.
Concerning beliefs, we observe that with the maximum stimulus subjects estimated that
the highest contribution is on average 8.56 tokens (SD: 7.04). This number seems rather
low, but note that it is across all periods. In the first period, subjects estimated that
the maximum contribution is 15.32 tokens (SD: 4.94), compared to 6.05 token on average
(SD: 6.97) for the last period. Under the minimum stimulus, the overall estimation was on
average 5.42 (SD: 6.34). At the beginning of the experiment, participants estimated that
the lowest contribution in their group is 7.38 (SD: 6.66) on average, whereas in the last
period the average of the estimations dropped to 1.90 (SD: 4.25).15 We take these results
as an indication that participants under the maximum stimulus do not expect their group
members to contribute fully. In contrast, under the minimum stimulus, subjects do not
expect their group members to freeride completely. Actually, under the minimum stimulus
subjects have rather high beliefs about the lowest contribution of their group members at
the beginning of the experiment.
14The instructions for this experiment are in appendix 2.C.
15The diﬀerence in the estimation between the stimuli is statistically significantly diﬀerent (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.047).
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Figure 2.4: Beliefs and behavior in Belief Experiment.
Since we observe that the beliefs are significantly diﬀerent under the two stimuli, we
think that these diﬀerences lead participants to adjust their behavior accordingly. As de-
picted in Figure 2.4 by the thick lines, participants do change their behavior in response to
our stimuli. However, the behavioral change is not in the direction that we expect it rather
goes into the opposite direction. With the maximum stimulus, participants contribute on
average 5.40 (SD: 6.76) under the minimum stimulus the average contribution over all
periods is 7.86 (SD: 7.72). This diﬀerence is weakly statistically significant (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.058).16
Anew, we evaluate whether the two stimuli aﬀected the within group variance. We find
that the standard deviation under the maximum stimulus is 4.3 tokens compared to 5.3
tokens under the minimum stimulus (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.081).
In contrast to the Limited Information Experiment, the diﬀerence is the opposite. Under
the minimum stimulus, the standard deviation is bigger than under the maximum stimulus.
Under both stimuli, the standard deviation remains constant across the periods.
Furthermore, we do not observe that the stimuli lead to a within-subject eﬀect (Signed
rank test, N=27, p=.838).
16We also analyzed the behavior in the second sequence of this experiment. Probably again, due to the
experience in the previous phase, the beliefs under the two stimuli are only weakly significantly diﬀerent
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p <0.073). As depicted in Figure B3 in the appendix we do not
observe the reversed trend from the first phase. On average with maximum stimulus subjects contribute
6.66 tokens (SD: 7.72). With the minimum stimulus, the average is with 5.33 (SD: 6.78) slightly lower.
The diﬀerence is not significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided, N=27, p=0.308).
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In conclusion, we notice that letting participants think about what they belief will be
either the highest or the lowest contribution in their group aﬀects their behavior weakly.
This leads us to hypothesize that the two stimuli might generate a lower or upper bound for
the contribution. Meaning that if a participant receives the minimum stimulus, she tries
to contribute just a little more. In contrast, under the maximum stimulus, a participant
might perceives it as legitimate to contribute just a little less. Thus overall there is no
diﬀerence or as we observed in this experiment a diﬀerence which is against our predictions.
To elaborate this hypothesis in more detail, we pooled the data of the three experiments
and describe the results in the next section.
2.6 Pooled Data
According to our power calculation we are short of the number of independent observations
in all three experiments. Hence, to increase the statistical power and to further elaborate
the relationship between our stimuli and the contribution decision, we pool the data of the
three experiments and estimate OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at
the group level. In total, we have 74 independent observations.
In Table 2.1 we display the results of the OLS estimations. In column (1) we regress
the contribution decision on the period, the stimulus dummy (Maximum= 1, Minimum=
0), the sequence (Second Sequence), the dummy for the Limited Information experiment
(LimInfo) and the dummy for the Belief Experiment (BelExp). The recall experiment
serves as baseline.
We confirm the finding of the separate analyses; overall the stimuli do not lead to
significant diﬀerences in the contributions. Only the period has predictive power for the
contribution decision; the coeﬃcient indicates a clear negative time trend. Furthermore,
although insignificant, the dummy for the stimulus is negative. This tendency is contrary
to what we expect based on the predictions of our extension of the Fehr-Schmidt model.
To further understand this negative tendency, we add control variables for the individual
contribution in the previous period (Contribution (t-1)), the so-called salience point, and
the interaction between the salience point and the stimulus (Salience Point*Max ) in column
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(2). With salience point, we mean the contribution on which an individual was forced to
focus on due to the stimulus. For experiment one, the stimulus is the contribution which
an individual had to recall. In experiment two, the stimulus is the information about the
highest or lowest contribution in the group. For the third experiment, the stimulus is the
belief about the highest or lowest contribution of the other group members.
Once we control for these additional variables, we observe that the coeﬃcient of the
stimulus dummy is still negative and becomes significant. Participants under the maxi-
mum stimulus contribute on average 2.27 tokens (p<0.001) less to the public good than
participants under the minimum stimulus. This negative eﬀect becomes stronger in the
second sequence of the experiment. Not surprisingly, the contribution in the previous
period is highly predictive for the contribution in the current period. Indicating that a
positive relationship between the lagged contribution and the current contribution exists.
We observe the same link between the contribution and the salience point. An increase of
one token in the salient contribution or belief, resp. leads to an increase of the contribution
by 0.24 tokens (p <0.001). Additionally, the interaction term indicates that the eﬀect is
slightly stronger under the maximum stimulus, where an increase by one point leads to an
increase in the contribution by 0.30 tokens.
Summing up, we find that once we control for the previous contribution and the salience
point, participants contribute significantly less under the maximum stimulus than under
the minimum stimulus. This result might explain why we do not observe an eﬀect in the
first place. Both stimuli lead subjects to adjust their contributions towards the middle.
Let us illustrate this point with a numerical example. If a subject, for instance, sees a
contribution of 15 tokens as the salience point under the maximum stimulus, our estima-
tion predicts that she will contribute roughly 11 tokens. In contrast, if a subject under
the minimum stimulus gets a salience point of 5 tokens, the regression model predicts a
contribution of roughly 10 tokens.17 Thus, under both stimuli, participants will contribute
similarly, but adjust their contributions diﬀerently. Under the maximum stimulus, our
model estimates that participants decrease their contribution in respect to the salience
17We calculated the predictions for the second period and with a contribution of 10.8 tokens in the
previous round.
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Table 2.1: Contribution in the public goods game.
(1) (2)
Period −0.804∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.050)
Maximum (D) −0.107 −2.275∗∗∗
(0.580) (0.370)
Second Sequence (D) −1.018∗∗ 0.306
(0.476) (0.197)
LimInfo (D) 1.720 0.024
(1.472) (0.439)
BelExp (D) −1.360 −0.254
(1.242) (0.317)
Contribution (t-1) 0.506∗∗∗
(0.026)
Salience Point 0.248∗∗∗
(0.023)
Salience Point * Max 0.075∗∗
(0.033)
Constant 12.621∗∗∗ 4.283∗∗∗
(1.088) (0.581)
F -test 53.8 182.2
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.116 0.528
N 5480 (74) 4636 (74)
Note. OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the contri-
bution to the public good [0,20]. The table depicts the results
for the pooled dataset. Maximum is the dummy variable in-
dicating treatment status. Second sequence controls for order
eﬀects. LimInfo is a dummy for the limited information ex-
periment. Analogously BelExp is the dummy variable for the
belief experiment. Contribution indicates the contribution of
the subject in the previous period, and Salience point controls
for the contribution which a subject had to focus on due to
the salience manipulation. Robust standard errors, clustered
on the group level, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
67
point. In contrast, under the minimum stimulus participants increase their contribution.
Hence, salience seems to play a role in the public goods games, but the eﬀect is subtle,
and the direction is contrary to our predictions in section 2.2.
2.7 Conclusions
Researchers in cognitive psychology are concerned with the topic of salience for many
years. In economics, on the other hand, this topic is relatively new, and research on it
is scarce. The literature started to show how salience aﬀects decisions under risk and
consumer choices. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on how salience
aﬀects behavior in social dilemmas. Inspired by the work of DellaVigna (2009), where he
models how salience influences consumer choice, we extended the Fehr-Schmidt model to
include salience. Based on this extension we can derive clear predictions for how salience
aﬀects behavior in a standard public goods game. If the lowest contribution in a group
is most salient compared to the other contributions, this contribution level will get more
weight in the decision-making process. Hence, contributions will be biased towards the
minimum in the group. The predictions for the case where the highest contribution in a
group is most salient are vice versa.
Consequentially, we conducted a series of laboratory experiments to verify our theoret-
ical predictions. In all three experiments, we manipulated the salience of the contributions
of the other group members exogenously; in one treatment (stimulus) the highest contribu-
tion was made salient, whereas, under the other stimulus the lowest contribution was made
salient. In the Recall Experiment, we manipulated salience through an additional recall
question. We did not find that salience aﬀects contributions as predicted. Consequentially,
we conducted a second experiment with a much stronger salience manipulation - the Lim-
ited Information Experiment. In this experiment, participants received as feedback only
the information about either the highest or the lowest contribution in their group. To our
big surprise, the results stayed the same; i.e., the salience stimuli did not aﬀect contribu-
tions in the public goods game. In the last experiment, the Belief Experiment, we asked
participants to indicate their belief about either the highest or the lowest contribution of
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the other group members. Again, the experiment did not confirm our hypotheses. On
the contrary, we find weak evidence that participants under the maximum stimulus con-
tributed on average less than participants under the minimum stimulus. Indicating that
with this salience manipulation we were able to alter behavior, but not in the direction of
our predictions.
A more detailed analysis of the pooled dataset of all three experiments revealed that
the two stimuli might created an upper or lower bound for the contribution decision. We
hypothesize that subjects under the maximum stimulus perceived the maximum contribu-
tion as some kind of upper bound and thought that it is fair to contribute slightly less than
the maximum. In contrast, participants under the minimum stimulus perceived the mini-
mum as the minimum acceptable contribution and thus contributed slightly more than the
minimum. However, to confirm this interpretation, we need further experiments. A simple
test would be to conduct the same experiments but to not label the salience stimuli as min-
imum or maximum. This would allow to disentangle the eﬀect generated by the labeling
from the eﬀect of the raw number. Additionally, more research is needed to understand
how participants perceived the salience manipulation. This would also help to unravel the
eﬀects observed in Samek and Sheremeta (2014). Based on our results, we suppose that
the loss of anonymity drives their results and not the labeling of the contributions.
Another interpretation of our results is that the stimuli were not powerful enough.
Especially in our set up with groups of four, it is easy for a participant to remember the
contributions of all other group members. Possibly, in a larger group where participants
do not keep all contributions in mind easily, making them focus on a specific contribution
would be more eﬀective.
Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, our results provide initial evidence that focus-
ing on a role model, might not be as eﬀective as intuitively thought so far. It might be that
individuals perceive a role model as the upper bound, which then serves as justification
for a cooperation level which is considerably lower. As we stated before, this explanation
is only a hypothesis, and its confirmation depends on further research.
To sum up, our series of experiments is an important starting point to elaborate how
salience aﬀects behavior in social dilemmas. We add to the literature by showing that
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salience aﬀects the beliefs and that the eﬀect on the behavior is subtle and contrary to our
predictions.
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Appendix
2.A Proposition and Proof
Propositions
Suppose that a player i is facing a contribution vector (g1, g2, ..., gn−1) of n − 1 group
members, in which 0 ≤ g1 ≤ g2 ≤ ... ≤ gn−1
Proposition 1 A player with a+ βi < 1 has a dominant strategy to choose gi = 0.
Proposition 2 Use k (0 ≤ k < n) to represent the amount of players which display
a+ βi < 1. If k ≥
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij−(1−a)
n−1∑
j=1
θij
θi1
, there will be a unique equilibrium where all gi = 0,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the inequality above, j ̸= i and θi1 refers to the salience assigned to the
zero contribution of freeriders g1 = g2 = ... = gk = 0. We assume that in an anonymous
environment contributions of the same amount will get the same attention.
Proposition 3 If k <
βi
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij−(1−a)
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αiθ
i
1
(j ̸= i), there is an equilibrium in which players
with a+ βi > 1 make positive contributions.
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The contribution of player i will be:
gi = R(gj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if a+ βi < 1
[0, g1] if a+ βi = 1
g1 if a−
θi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=2
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi < 1 and a+ βi > 1
[g1, g2] if a−
θi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=2
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi = 1
g2 if a−
θi1+θ
i
2
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=3
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi < 1and a−
θi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=2
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi > 1
. . . . . .
gz if a−
z∑
j=1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=z+1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi < 1and a−
z−1∑
j=1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=z
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi > 1
. . . . . .
gn−1 if a−
n−2∑
j=1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
θin−1
n−1∑
j=1
θin−1
βi > 1
(2.5)
where j ̸= i and z ̸= i. θij denotes how salient the contribution of player j is for player
i. We define 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1.
Proposition 1 indicates that, after contributing one token to the public pool, a player
i earns a tokens from the public good in monetary terms, and at the same time, he also
can get at most βi subjective benefit from reducing inequality. This is the same as the
Fehr-Schmidt model. Hence, if the player displays a + βi < 1, his dominant strategy will
be to contribute zero.
Proposition 2 indicates that if there are only a few players with a + βi > 1, they will
never choose to contribute a positive amount, as long as there are too many freeriders.
Therefore, there will be only one equilibrium in which all players choose gj = 0, ∀j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Nevertheless, if high contributions from the other group members become
more salient compared to those from the freeriders, the tolerance with respect to the
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amount of freeriders increases.
Proposition 3 shows that if there are enough players with a + βi > 1, it is possible to
sustain an equilibrium with positive contributions. If the positive contributions are salient
enough relative to the saliency of the behavior of the freeriders, the utility of conditional
cooperators does not decrease that much by the inequality created by the behavior of the
freeriders.
Considering all the contributions from the other group members, the respective deci-
sions made by player i are listed in proposition three. By making high contributions more
salient, a player with suﬃcient α and β levels will respond with a higher contribution.
However, it is impossible for a participant to make a contribution larger than the max-
imum contribution of others, because the condition for that would be a > αi + 1, while
αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 and a < 1.
Proof
Re-label and fix all players, except for player i, such that 0 ≤ g1 ≤ g2 ≤ · · · ≤ gn−1. The
utility function of player i can be described as follows:
Ui(gi, g−i) = y − gi + a
∑
gj − αi
∑
j ̸=i
θij∑
j ̸=i
θij
max{gi − gj , 0}
−βi
∑
j ̸=i
θij∑
j ̸=i
θij
max{gj − gi, 0}
(2.6)
which is a continuous function.
If all players j, (j ̸= i) contribute zero, it is optimal for player i to choose gj = 0 as
well, since Ui(0, 0, . . . , 0) < Ui(gi, 0, . . . , 0) = y + (a − 1)gi − αigi, where a − 1 < 0 and
αi ≥ 0.
Now we calculate the partial derivative of the utility function of player i with respect
to his contribution:
74
∂Ui
∂gi
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 + a+ βi gi ∈ [0, g1)
−1 + a−
θi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=2
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi gi ∈ (g1, g2)
. . . . . .
−1 + a−
n−2∑
j=1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
θin−1
n−1∑
j=1
θin−1
βi gi ∈ (gn−2, gn−1)
−1 + a− αi gi ∈ (gn−1, y)
(2.7)
where j ̸= i.
We can see from above that: ∂Ui∂gi is decreasing from gi = 0 to y. At the same time,
player i will never choose a contribution gi ∈ (gn−1, y]. If player i has a dominant strategy
to contribute 0 token,∂Ui∂gi has to be smaller than 0, which means a+ βi < 1.
Consider that there are k players with a+βj < 1, who will certainly choose to keep all
of their endowments for themselves. Player i with a+ βi > 1 would not choose a positive
contribution if:
∂Ui
∂gi
= −1 + a−
kθi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi ≤ 0
⇐ −1 + a+
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij − kθ
i
1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi ≤ 0
⇔
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij − kθ
i
1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi ≤ 1− a
⇐
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij − kθ
i
1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
≤ 1− a
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k ≥
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij − (1− a)
n−1∑
j=1
θij
θi1
In proposition three, if it is possible for a player i to make a positive contribution, the
derivative of his utility should be non-negative in a small interval around gi = 0, which
means if:
−1 + a−
kθi1
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αi +
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij
n−1∑
j=1
θij
βi ≥ 0
⇔ k ≤
βi
n−1∑
j=k+1
θij − (1− a)
n−1∑
j=1
θij
αiθ
i
1
where j ̸= i, is met, there will be an equilibrium with positive contributions. We can
also elicit proposition three from our derivative function 2.7.
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2.B Additional Tables
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Figure B1: Behavior in the Recall Experiment (second sequence).
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Figure B2: Displayed contributions and behavior in the Limited Information Experiment
(second sequence).
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Figure B3: Beliefs and behavior in the Belief Experiment (second sequence).
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2.C Translated Instructions
Note. Text in normal font indicates that it was part of the instructions of all three exper-
iments. Cursive text indicates that the corresponding part was only in some instructions,
depending on the experiment.
Introduction
You are now taking part in an economic experiment financed by various foundations for
research. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can depending on your deci-
sions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read
these instructions with care.
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is prohibited to communicate with the
other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please ask us. If
you violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the experiment and forfeit all payments.
During the experiment, we will not speak in terms of Swiss Francs, but in Points. During
the experiment, your entire earnings will be calculated in Points. At the end of the experi-
ment, the total amount of Points you have earned will be converted to Swiss Francs at the
following rate:
1 Point = 0.08 CHF
At the end of the experiment, your entire earnings from the experiment plus the show-up
fee will be paid to you in cash.
Detailed Information About the Experiment
The experiment is divided into 10 separate periods. In each period all participants are
divided into groups of four. You will, therefore, be in a group with 3 other participants.
The composition of the groups will stay the same for all ten periods. In the following
pages, we describe the experiment in detail.
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 tokens. We call this his or
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her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide
how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a project and how many of them to
keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail below. At the
beginning of each period the following input-screen will appear:
Figure C4: Decision screen in the first and second experiment.
Figure C5: Decision screen in the third experiment.
The period number appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right corner,
you can see how many more seconds remain for you to decide on your contribution. You
will have 90 seconds in the first two periods and 60 seconds in the remaining periods. Your
decision must be made within the time limit.
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Your endowment in each period is 20 tokens. You have to decide how many tokens you
want to contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input field.
This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided how
many tokens to contribute to the project, you have also decided how many tokens you
keep for yourself: This is (20 - your contribution) tokens. After entering your contribution,
you must click the O.K. button. Once you have done this, your decision can no longer be
revised.
Belief Experiment: Below the contribution input field there is another input field called
“Estimation”. You will have to enter an estimation about the behavior of a group member.
You will get the detailed information directly on the screen.
Recall Experiment and Belief Experiment: After all members of your group have
made their decision the following screen will show you the total amount of tokens contributed
by all four group members to the project (including your contribution). This screen also
shows you how many Points you have earned in this period.
Figure C6: Feedback screen in the first and third experiment.
Limited Information Experiment: After all members of your group have made their
decision you will get some information about the contributions of the other group members.
Your income consists of two parts:
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (“Income from retained tokens”) whereby
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1 token = 1 Point.
(2) The “income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0.4 times the total contributions to the project.
Your income in Points of a period is, therefore:
(20 - your contribution to the project) + 0.4*(total contributions to the project)
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, i.e.,
each group member receives the same income from the project. Assume, for example,
that the sum of the contributions of all group members is 60 tokens. In this case, each
member of the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*60 = 24 Points. If the
total contribution to the project is 9 tokens, then you and all other members of the group
receive an income of 0.4*9 = 3.6 Points from the project.
For each token, which you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Point. Suppose you
contributed this token to the project instead, then the total contribution to the project
would rise by one token. Your income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 Points.
However, the income of the other group members would also rise by 0.4 Points each, so that
the total income of the group from the project would rise by 1.6 Points. Your contribution
to the project therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other
hand, you earn an income for each token contributed by the other members to the project.
For each token contributed by any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 Points.
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds
to view this income screen. If you are finished before the time is up, please click the
“continue”-button.
Recall Experiment and Belief Experiment: Next, the information screen appears,
which reveals the contributions of the other group members.
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Figure C7: Information screen in the first experiment with the additional question.
Figure C8: Information screen in the third experiment.
This screen shows how much each of the other group members contributed to the project.
Your contribution is displayed in blue in the first column, while the contributions of the
other group members are shown in the remaining three columns. Please note that the order
in which contributions are displayed is changed randomly in each period. The contribu-
tion in the second column, for example, in general, stems always from a diﬀerent group
member. The same holds for the contributions in the other columns. Besides the absolute
contributions, the contributions as a percentage of the endowment are also displayed.
Limited Information Experiment: The profit will be calculated each period, but it will
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not be displayed to you. The profits of all periods will be added up, and you will get informed
about your final profit at the end of the last period.
Recall Experiment:
Additional question
In each period you can earn an additional Point by responding correctly to the additional
question. You will need to memorize some information about the behavior of the other
group members. You will receive the detailed information directly on the screen.
In the following screen, you are asked to enter your response. You will receive an additional
Point if you answer the question correctly.
Figure C9: Screen with the additional question in experiment one
Do you have any questions?
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2.D Examples of the zTree Screens
Recall Experiment
Figure D10: Example of the screen with the additional question [MINIMUM STIMULI]
Limited Information Experiment
Figure D11: Example of the feedback after the contribution stage [MAXIMUM STIMULI]
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Belief Experiment
Figure D12: Screen with the additional belief estimation [MAXIMUM STIMULI]
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Chapter 3
Positive Eﬀects of High-Quality,
Community-Based Child Care.
Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field
Experiment in Colombia
∗
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3.1 Introduction
In most developing countries, children face risks, which prevent them from developing
their full potential (Walker et al., 2011). Many children lack adequate cognitive and non-
cognitive stimulation, do not have access to basic health and hygiene, are malnourished,
their families have fewer resources, and some even experience violence (Walker et al., 2011).
These risks are held responsible for the skill gap which we observe later in life between
children from disadvantaged families and children from more advantaged families (Duncan
& Brooks-Gunn, 2000). The development of a child in its first five years of life is decisive
for her future and depends highly on the quality of its environment and the relationship to
parents or other caregivers (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003). Children who grow up with more
responsive caregivers, which interact with them frequently and in an aﬀectionate way and
who are surrounded by a stimulating environment, have better prerequisites to develop
their full cognitive, social and emotional potential (Shonkoﬀ & Phillips, 2000). Therefore,
all children, and especially children facing poverty and hardship, are likely to benefit greatly
from high-quality preschool education. One of the most prominent examples is probably the
Perry Preschool Program; a randomized intervention, which demonstrated that preschool
education for disadvantaged African-Americans had long lasting eﬀects. Compared to non-
treated individuals, individuals in the program benefited along many dimensions, such as
lower crime rates, higher salaries, and a higher probability of graduation (Schweinhart et
al., 2005).
Advocates of preschool education as Heckman for example, argue that investment in
early childhood development is so eﬃcient because of self-productivity and dynamic com-
plementarity. Self-productivity means that skills acquired in one period persist into future
periods of life. Dynamic complementarity refers to the fact that skills produced in one
stage rise the productivity of investments in skills in later periods of life (see Heckman
(2006) for a short and comprehensive overview).
Since 1990, preschool education and its benefits have gained increasing political at-
tention in many Latin American countries, and governments implemented such programs
(Araujo, López Bóo, & Puyana, 2013). The long-term impact of early child care programs
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depends highly on the quality of care provided in the respective institution (Barnett, 1995).
Bernal et al. (2009) note about a program in Colombia that the quality of care is low and
that the knowledge of the caregivers about infant development is not suﬃcient.
Researchers recognized that the quality of care is crucial, nevertheless, the literature
on how to eﬀectively improve it is scarce. Moreover, most of the existing studies focus on
the immediate eﬀects, and the question whether the eﬀects persist in the long run remains
open often (Behrman, Fernald, & Engle, 2013). Three of the rare studies evaluating the
long-term eﬀect of improving the quality of preschool education in the context of developing
countries are Raine, Mellingen, Liu, Venables, and Mednick (2003), Yoshikawa et al. (2015),
and Özler et al. (2016). Raine et al. (2003) observe that children who benefited from an
enriched environment at the age of 3 to 5 display less antisocial behavior at puberty age
and are less prone to develop schizotypal personalities. Yoshikawa et al. (2015) evaluate
a quality enhancing intervention in Chile. Yoshikawa et al. (2015) do not observe that
the intervention improved the schooling outcomes of the children. The authors conclude
that more intensive curricular approaches are needed to ensure that children benefit in the
long run. Eventually, Özler et al. (2016) elaborate an intervention in Malawi. They report
that improving teacher quality in combination with parental education had positive eﬀects
on the children in the short run: their language skills improved and they exhibited more
prosocial behavior.1 However, 36 months after the treatment, the eﬀect is insignificant.
Engle et al. (2011) propose that the quality of preschool education in low and middle-
income countries can be improved by appropriate design, adapting the curriculum, in-
cluding practice for parents, training for childcare workers, monitoring and assessment,
improved governance, and supervision. These recommendations have been taken into ac-
count by Apoyar, a local Colombian non-governmental organization (NGO) when designing
an intervention to improve the quality of care oﬀered in hogares comunitarios, a popular
preschool program in Colombia. It is a community-based program, where so-called commu-
nity mothers provide day care services to children in their proper home. The intervention
to improve the quality lasted for one year and consisted of four components. First, com-
1Prosocial behavior in this study was measured using the Strengths and Diﬃculties Questionnaire,
which was filled out by the primary caregiver of each child.
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munity mothers received a formal vocational training as early childhood teacher. Second,
they received support and coaching to integrate what they learned in their daily nursery
routines. Third, they learned how to teach parents about issues related to appropriate
child care and development. Fourth, the implementing NGO monitored and supported the
children in school, once they left the community mother. Hence, this intervention targeted
community mothers, children, and their parents.
The main aim of this paper is to elaborate if this quality improvement of preschool edu-
cation has measurable eﬀects on a broader set of outcomes of the children. The paper adds
to the relatively small body of literature on the eﬀects of enhancing the quality of preschool
education in developing countries. Moreover, in the literature on the eﬀectiveness of early
childhood interventions, researchers traditionally evaluated the eﬀect on weight, height,
cognitive skills, socio-emotional development, and proxies for success in life such as crime
rates or income. I am convinced that it is important to expand the analysis to individual
preferences because the literature shows that these preferences are good predictors of dif-
ferent economic and health outcomes such as labor market participation, saving decisions
or health choices (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011; Becker, Deckers,
Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012; Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, & Trautmann, 2013; Falk
et al., 2017). Furthermore, research on the formation of these preferences shows that they
form in early childhood (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Angerer, Glätzle-Rützler,
Lergetporer, & Sutter, 2015). Thus, it is important to evaluate how the social environment
such as preschool education aﬀects the formation of these preferences. Moreover, assessing
the improvement along a number of child development outcomes allows drawing a more
complete picture of the potential benefits of high-quality preschool education.
To assess how the program aﬀected the children, I use two diﬀerent datasets. First,
I analyse a dataset which contains monitoring data elicited by the implementing NGO.
Second, I run lab-in-the-field experiments four years after the implementation of the inter-
vention. I elicit the preferences of the children and compare children who benefited from
the intervention with children who left for school just before the intervention started.
I find that enhancing the quality of the existing preschool program leads to large skill
gains in the short-run which can be observed four years after the intervention. Immediately
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after the treatment, children who visit a treated community mother display improved cog-
nitive, psychosocial, and psychomotor skills compared to children from the control group.
Four years after the intervention, children who visited a quality improved hogar perform
better in school, are more likely to be in the right grade, and exhibit higher levels of social
preferences compared to children from a standard hogar. The evaluation design set-up
does not allow to fully rule out that unobservable factors drive the eﬀects. However, I
conduct diﬀerent robustness checks, which provide further support for the observed re-
sults. Moreover, I cannot identify which component or combination of components of the
intervention drives the results. Nevertheless, I am confident that my results add to the
literature on how high-quality preschool education aﬀects the cognitive abilities of children
and the formation of their preferences.
The chapter continues as follows: Section 3.2 provides a detailed explanation of the
intervention. In section 3.3 I outline the conceptual framework. In section 3.4 I present
the study design and discuss the strategy for the data analysis. Section 3.5 contains the
results and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Intervention
The main aim of the intervention under consideration was to improve the quality of care in
public community nurseries (called hogares comunitarios or simply HC) in Colombia. The
Colombian state agency ICBF (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar) introduced
these HC in the mid 1970ies. An HC is run by a so-called community mother (MC) and
targets children in preschool age (from birth up to entering school). HCs target families
from the lowest socioeconomic stratum. The task of the community mother is to attend
children during the day, cook them lunch and prepare the children for their schooling
career. She is allowed to take care of up to 14 children in her proper home. The state
subsidizes the HCs by paying the salary of the MCs and the food for the children. Parents
have to pay a minimal fee (around 5 USD per month) to bring their children to an HC.
Today this program is the most widespread preschool program in the country reaching
roughly a million children by 69’000 MCs. Most often children who attend an HC are from
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very poor families.2
Bernal et al. (2009) reports that the community mothers, have often no more than
primary education and no particular training in providing childcare services.3 In response
to that, the Fundación Apoyar4 implemented an intervention to improve the quality of
care with the ultimate goal of improving the situation of vulnerable children in Colombia.5
Apoyar implemented the complete program in collaboration with the local state agency
ICBF.
They implemented the intervention professional and comprehensive community child
care in Las Ferias in the city of La Dorada, department of Caldas. More specifically,
the project was rolled out in Las Ferias, a densely populated neighborhood with about
25’000 inhabitants and a high incidence of poverty and many internally displaced families.
Children in this neighborhood grow up in home environments with only limited learning
opportunities. Moreover, children are often left unattended. Hogares have therefore the
potential to improve the living conditions of these children considerably.
The main objective of the intervention by Apoyar was to increase the quality of care
oﬀered in these HCs. The program oﬀered an overarching bundle of education and support
for the community mothers, the parents, and their children. It included four main com-
ponents. The core of the intervention consisted of a vocational education training for the
community mothers. Two private educational institutions6 in collaboration with the ICBF
provided the formal training, which lasted for one year. During that year, MCs learned
how to provide age adapted childcare services so that they prepare the children adequately
for school. Community mothers who finished the training received an oﬃcial degree in
early childhood teaching.
The second component of the intervention was assistance of the community mothers in
2The families of the children of this study are all from the lowest stratum according to the national
classification SISBEN
3Baseline data collected by Apoyar shows that more than half of the children had uncompleted vacci-
nation cards, and one-third lacked access to health care and civil registration. Furthermore, many children
suﬀered from malnutrition.
4Apoyar is an NGO dedicated to support the development of children and their families through
community projects. Apoyar works mainly in two regions in Colombia.
5The Swiss foundation Vivamos Mejor funded the intervention.
6Instituto de Conocimiento para el Trabajo y el Desarrollo Humano (ICT) and Instituto Unidades
Tecnicas de Boyacá (UTB)
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their household.7 During the treatment year, Apoyar supported the MCs to implement the
national pedagogical model in her daily nursery routine. Trained pedagogues of Apoyar
visited the HC regularly and provided coordinated coaching to reinforce the strategies and
concepts.
Third, Apoyar supported the MCs with the organization of parental workshops. The
ICBF obliges the community mothers to hold monthly parental workshops, where they
discuss diﬀerent topics related to care, education and development of children. Apoyar in-
vited the community mothers regularly to discuss the topics themselves and to discuss how
to transmit them to the parents eﬃciently. Furthermore, Apoyar provided the community
mothers with well-elaborated materials to organize and hold the parental workshops. For
each topic, they designed a clear schedule with hands-on teaching activities and discus-
sions of the issues with the parents. Issues considered in these workshops include lactation,
illnesses of children, nutrition of children, importance of early childcare education, relation-
ship between parents and their children, children’s rights, sexual education and education
about the rights in case of sexual abuse, childbearing guidelines, diminution of aggression
within a family, quality time with the family, and so on.
The fourth component of the intervention was the supervision of the children who left
for school. Apoyar supervised the school attendance of these children and provided them
with extra classes if needed through a mentor who was an intern at Apoyar.
Due to limited implementation capacities from the side of Apoyar, the program was
implemented step-wise. In 2011, 20 community mothers started with the program. In
2012, Apoyar extended the program to a further set of 20 community mothers, and in 2013
the last set of 20 community mothers received the treatment. Selection into cohort was
not random, but it did not follow a clear pattern either. The local ICBF agency, which
approved the program, created the order of implementation in agreement with Apoyar.
It is important to note that the community mothers were not able to opt-in, and none
opted out of the program. Moreover, according to Apoyar children did not change the HC
because of the treatment. Still, assignment to cohort was not random, and hence there
7This component has been shown to be eﬀective to improve child outcomes in developed countries
(Zaslow, Tout, Halle, Whittaker, & Lavelle, 2010).
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might be imbalances at baseline. I will elaborate these potential imbalances at baseline in
detail in subsection 3.4.3.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I outline the channels through which the intervention potentially aﬀected
the outcomes of the children.
The formal education in combination with the coaching, which ensured that the com-
munity mothers implemented what they have learned in their daily nursery routines, can
be beneficial for the children for three reasons. First, the infants receive the required cog-
nitive and non-cognitive stimuli, and importantly these stimuli correspond to their age.
Thus, they are in a more appropriate learning environment, which fosters their develop-
ment. Second, the MC will be able to recognize malnutrition or other health issues and act
upon them. This will improve the nutritional and basic health condition of the children,
which in turn can aﬀect their cognitive development (cf. Glewwe, Jacoby, & King, 2001;
Walker et al., 2007; Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007; Martorell et al., 2010). Lastly, harsh
parenting styles are still common in many Latin American countries (cf. Fontes, 2002;
Ramírez, 2006). The formal education provides the community mothers with knowledge
about child care, which should translate to a more benign parenting style. Treating chil-
dren more aﬀectionate can have a positive eﬀect on their psychosocial development. The
literature on the role of parenting styles on child development notes that harsh parenting
styles relate to children behaving more anti social (Roopnarine, Krishnakumar, Narine,
Logie, & Lape, 2014). Moreover, Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, and Armenta (2011) report
that parental warmth is predictive for prosocial behavior of children.8 Hence, each of the
three mechanism aﬀects the child separately, but presumably the amplify each other as
well.
As part of the coaching component, the pedagogues of Apoyar visited all community
mothers regularly. Thus, they were also in direct contact with the children and the chil-
dren experienced aﬀectionate treatment from them too. This might reinforced the eﬀects
8Note, these are correlational studies.
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mentioned above.
The third component of the intervention were the parental workshops, which aimed
at improving the knowledge of the parents. Through this element, I expect a further
benefit for the children. The mechanisms are the same as for the community mothers.
Because parents have more knowledge about infant development, they provide children
with more appropriate stimuli, they value health and nutrition of their children more,
and they employ more aﬀectionate parenting styles. These improvements should lead to
ameliorated parent-child interactions. According to Engle et al. (2011), stable parent-child
interactions are responsible for a better health status of the child, increase attachment and
encourage learning through appropriate stimuli. Analog to the eﬀect via the community
mother, these improvements might aﬀect not only the cognitive development of a child but
also its preferences.
Lastly, I expect a positive impact on the children through the monitoring component
of the intervention. Children with learning diﬃculties in school received extra classes.
Obviously, this should lead to better schooling performances. Moreover, these children
received more attention; this can aﬀect their psychosocial development.
Traditionally, evaluations of such programs have focused on the development of cogni-
tive skills. Some studies evaluated the eﬀect on psychosocial development, but to the best
of my knowledge, none has assessed the eﬀects on the preferences of children. As outlined
above, I expect the intervention to aﬀect children on diﬀerent developmental dimensions
such as their cognitive skills as well as their individual preferences. Therefore, it seems
crucial to extend the analysis to social preferences, trust, risk and time preferences.
Lastly, it is important to evaluate if and how the intervention aﬀected the parents.9
In the next section I will describe the monitoring data (short run) which I received from
Apoyar, and the data I collected additionally, to analyse the eﬀects of the intervention four
years after the treatment.
9Obviously it would also be interesting to assess how the intervention aﬀected the community mothers.
However, this research has been planned ex-post and hence all community mothers in the program are
treated by now. Thus, I cannot elaborate in a meaningful way how the knowledge of the community
mothers improved.
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3.4 Study Design and Data Analysis Strategy
I start with the description of the design and the analysis of the monitoring data (short run).
Subsequently, I will explain the design and the analysis of the grades and the preference
measures (longer run). Note, I used two diﬀerent datasets for these two parts of the
analysis. Hence, the control and the treated group of the monitoring dataset do not
correspond to the control and the treatment group for the analysis of the grades and the
preference measures.
3.4.1 Monitoring Data
During the treatment, Apoyar collected data to monitor the developmental status of the
children in the project. They used the escala abreviada de desarrollo which is a stan-
dardized survey10 widely used in Latin America to measure the developmental status of
children from birth to the age of six. The original questionnaire contains four dimensions.11
UNICEF adopted the measure to the Colombian context. It comprises four slightly dif-
ferent dimensions; literacy-numeracy, fine and gross psychomotor skills, and psychosocial
abilities. Apoyar merged the two indexes for psychomotor skills into one. Hence, they
evaluate the developmental status of the children in the project with three indexes: cog-
nitive development, psychosocial development, and psychomotor development. All three
indexes consist of several items, which are sorted by the ability for age. All items are rated
on a binary scale: fulfilled or not fulfilled. For example, the first item on the index for
psychosocial development measures whether the child follows with the eyes, movements
in front of her face. The examiner then judges whether the child fulfills the item or not.
Depending on the age in months, a child has to be able to fulfill a given number of items.
For instance, if a child is two months old, it should be able to fulfill the first four of the 31
items of the cognitive index. If a child is ten months old, it should reach eight additional
items, and so on.
For each index and child, Apoyar collected the number of items, which the child sat-
10UNICEF created and validated this survey based on the review of existing tests.
11The original dimensions are literacy-numeracy, physical, social-emotional, and learning.
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isfied.12 The index for literacy-numeracy measures the cognitive development of a child.
It starts with whether a child reacts to movements and sounds and ends with whether a
child can name all days of the week properly. I listed all items of the three indexes in the
appendix. The psychosocial index measures the emotional and social status of the child.
Lastly, the psychomotor index assesses the gross and fine motor skills of the children.
During the intervention, Apoyar elicited each index three times. At the very beginning,
they collected the so-called baseline measurements, i.e. the current developmental status of
the children before the treatment. For the first cohort (i.e. the first 20 treated community
mothers) the baseline data is from January 2011. For the second cohort, they gathered
the data in January 2012 and for the third cohort at the beginning of 2013. During the
treatment, they collected a second measurement of the three indexes. At the end of each
treatment period, Apoyar elicited the endline measurement of the three indexes. Hence,
for all children who have been in one of these community nurseries, I have data on their
cognitive, psychosocial, psychomotor status for three points in time. Furthermore, the
monitoring dataset also contains information about the age and the gender of the child
and data about the socioeconomic characteristics of all treated community mothers.
Estimation Strategy for the Monitoring Data
As outlined in the previous section, Apoyar collected the monitoring data at the begin-
ning and during the treatment. This means that for the three cohorts the overlap of the
measurement is displaced. Hence, it is not possible to estimate the eﬀect with a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence design. Therefore, I use the baseline measurements of the second cohort as a
control group for the eﬀect of the treatment on the first cohort (sample 1). Analogously,
I use the baseline measurements of the third cohort as a control group to estimate the
treatment eﬀect on the second cohort (sample 2). I call the control group from both sam-
ples the Monitoring Data (MD) control group and correspondingly the treatment group
the MD treatment group. Figure 3.1 depicts the situation graphically.
12The data only contains the total number of items, which a child reached, no information on the item
level.
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Cohort 1
y0i y1i y2i
Cohort 2
y0i y1i y2i
Sample 1
Cohort 3
y0i y1i y2i
Sample 2
Figure 3.1: Implementation of the treatment by Apoyar.
Note. Apoyar implemented the treatments stepwise. The first cohort was
treated in 2011, the second in 2012 and the third in 2013. They collected
monitoring data only during the treatment.
Furthermore, I restrict the sample of children for the first sample, to children born
in the years 2007 up to 2009, because on average children in the first cohort are nine
months older at baseline than children in the second cohort.13 At the point of comparison
(January 2012), children in cohort 1 are roughly two years older on average than children
of the second cohort. Since the number of potential items of the developmental indexes
increases with age, including all children would distort the measurement. One item less at
a younger age leads to a much bigger drop in percentage points than if a child scores one
item less at the age of five for example. Likewise, I restrict the second sample, i.e., cohort
two versus cohort 3, to children born in the years 2008, 2009, and 2010.
I pool the two samples to estimate ordinary least squares regressions and include all
available control variables to increase the precision of the estimates. The regressions take
the following form:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Xi + β4MCmi,
whereby yi is the outcome variable of interest of child i. Ti is the dummy variable
which indicates the treatment status, i.e., it is set to one to indicate that the child was
in the MD treatment group and it is zero if the child belonged to the MD control group.
Hence, β1 captures the treatment eﬀect. Xi is a vector of variables which includes the
demographic characteristics of the child and the cohort. Additionally, MCmi is a vector
13I depict the characteristics at baseline of the complete sample and the community mothers in Table
B1 in the appendix.
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of variables including the demographic variables of the respective community mother m.
Furthermore, in all estimations, I cluster the standard errors at the level of the community
mothers.
The exclusion of the oldest and youngest children allows controlling for the age eﬀect.
However, I cannot disentangle the treatment eﬀect from a potential time eﬀect.
To verify the results of the OLS regressions, I will conduct two additional robustness
checks. First, I will estimate the eﬀect using inverse probability weighted regression ad-
justment. Second, I will elaborate the relative degree of selection using the methodology
proposed in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and Oster (2014).
3.4.2 Grades and Preference Measures
Apoyar did not continue to collect systematic information about the children after the
treatment. Thus, to evaluate whether the program had persistent eﬀects, I had to collect
new data.
The children who started school immediately after the intervention are the most long-
term that I can evaluate. Today, these children are in third or fourth grade, meaning that
they were in one of the hogares three or four years ago.
The escala abreviada de desarrollo which Apoyar uses in the monitoring is eligible for
children up to the age of six. Hence, I cannot apply the same measurement instruments
to evaluate their development. To assess the eﬀect on the cognitive abilities, I collected
the grades of the children. I described in the introduction that individual preferences are
important from an individual and societal perspective. I will explain them in more detail
in the next paragraph. Let me first elaborate shortly on the methodology of experiments.
We conducted the lab-in-the-field experiments to elicit the individual preference mea-
sures and self-esteem with the children in their school. The data collection took place in
July and August 2016. Ahead of the data collection, we let all parents of the children sign
an informed consent.14 In each school, we set up a room with three to five separate tables.
We assigned each child randomly to one of the five Colombian research assistants who then
14The ethics committee of the University of Lausanne approved the study. In the informed consent,
parents received a short information about the aim of the study, the treatment of their own and their
children’s data, and the information about the possibility to quit the study at any given point in time.
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conducted the experiment with the child in private.15 Following the methodological stan-
dards in behavioral economics, we incentivized all decisions of the children. We prepared
a small kiosk with gifts and informed the children at the very beginning that they would
earn stars during the experiment, which they can exchange at the end for little presents.
All items in the kiosk had a price in stars.16 An example of how such a kiosk looked like
is in the appendix (Figure C4).
Moreover, to analyze the eﬀect of the program in more detail, I collected data of a
randomly selected sub-sample of parents. As outlined in the contextual framework, the
intervention potentially also aﬀected the parents via the enhanced bi-monthly parental
workshops. Therefore, by collecting information about the parents, it might be possible
to shed light on diﬀerent channels through which the intervention aﬀects children. Thus,
we elicited sociodemographic characteristics of the parents, as well as a measure of their
parenting style, and the same individual preferences as collected for their children. We
conducted the experiments with the parents at their proper home.17 Likewise to the kiosk
for the children, we incentivized their decisions in the experiments with money.
In the next paragraphs, I will explain the elicitation methods for the outcome variables
in more detail. I will start with the explanation of the individual preferences measures.
Social preferences
Social preferences, measure the degree to which a person cares about the welfare of others.
They are a strong motive for behavior, and in modern societies, the existence of social pref-
erences is of eminent importance. Social preferences facilitate cooperation among unrelated
individuals especially in situations with asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
(Bowles, 2004). Furthermore, social preferences are a predictor for charitable giving and
volunteering activities (de Oliveira, Eckel, & Croson, 2012). So far only limited evidence
exists on how the family situation and the social environment aﬀects the formation of social
15The protocol of the experiment is in the Appendix.
16We ensured that all children would earn in any case enough to buy the most expensive item in the
kiosk to avoid that their behavior is biased due to the need of a certain item.
17Due to limited capacities, we were not able to elicit the measures for all parents. Therefore, we
randomly selected 48 parents from each sample. Although it was hard to coordinate the interviews, all of
the selected parents participated.
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preferences. Deckers, Falk, Kosse, and Schildberg-Hörisch (2015) demonstrate that chil-
dren from high-income families in Germany behave more prosocial compared to children
from a low-income household. Kosse, Deckers, Schildberg-Hörisch, and Falk (2016) pro-
vide evidence that a mentoring program in primary school can close the gap in the level of
social preferences of children from low socioeconomic status families compared to children
from high socioeconomic backgrounds. Moreover, Cappelen, List, Samek, and Tungodden
(2016) are the first to provide causal evidence that a preschool program led children to
have more egalitarian fairness views. To the best of my knowledge, no research exists on
how preschool education aﬀects social preferences in the context of developing countries.
I elicited social preferences with two measurements. First, with four binary allocation
tasks, and second, with a standard dictator game. For the four binary tasks I followed the
procedures by Fehr et al. (2008) and Bauer, Chytilová, and Pertold-Gebicka (2014). In all
four tasks, subjects had to decide between two allocations that assign resources to oneself
and another recipient. For the children, this was another child from the same school. For
the parents, the recipient was another parent. We explicitly mentioned that we assigned
them a new recipient in each of the four allocation tasks.
In the costless prosocial task, subjects had to choose between the egalitarian choice of
(1,1) and the allocation (1,0). The egalitarian choice implies one experimental currency
unit (ECU)18 for the decision maker and one ECU for the recipient. In contrast, the (1,0)
allocation implies one ECU for the decision maker and nothing for the recipient. In this
task behaving fair came at no cost for the decision maker. The costly prosocial task oﬀered
the opportunity to choose between (1,1) and (2,0). In this task, being prosocial comes at
a cost, i.e., the decision maker has to give up one ECU to implement a fair allocation. The
so-called costless envy task consisted of the following two allocation possibilities; (1,1) vs.
(1,2). In the fourth task, the costly envy task, decision makers had to decide between (1,1)
and (2,3). Being envious in this task means that the decision maker forgoes one ECU to
establish equality.
I randomized the order of the four tasks to control for order eﬀects. Depending on
18For the children one ECU corresponded to one star. For the parents, one ECU corresponded to 100
COP.
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their choices, individuals can be categorized to be either altruistic, egalitarian, spiteful or
selfish. Furthermore, individuals classified as selfish can be sub-classified as being weakly
egalitarian, weakly altruistic or weakly spiteful. Table 3.1 describes the classification.
Table 3.1: Definition of types.
Game
Type costly prosocial costless prosocial costly envy costless envy
(1/1) vs. (2/0) (1/1) vs. (1/0) (1/1) vs. (2/3) (1/1) vs. (1/2)
Egalitarian (1/1) (1/1) (1/1) (1/1)
Altruistic (1/1) (1/1) (2/3) (1/2)
Spiteful (2/0) (1/0) (1/1) (1/1)
Selfish (2/0) ∼ (2/3) ∼
Weakly egalitarian (2/0) (1/1) (2/3) (1/1)
Weakly altruistic (2/0) (1/1) (2/3) (1/2)
Weakly spiteful (2/0) (1/0) (2/3) (1/1)
Note. Definition of types according to the choices in the four games. (1/1) stands for the egalitarian
option of one ECU for oneself and one ECU for the other person. Whereas for example (1/0) indicates
one ECU for oneself and zero ECU for the other person.
The second measure of social preferences is a standard dictator game. Subjects were
endowed with 10 ECU and had to decide how to split it between themselves and another
new recipient. The amount which they allocate to the other person is a proxy for their
altruism.
Trust
Besides social preferences, trust is another important factor for eﬃcient interactions among
strangers. Research links trust to various beneficial outcomes for societies. Cardenas and
Carpenter (2008) report that developing countries with higher levels of trust exhibit higher
growth rates, less poverty, less unemployment, and a more equal division of economic gains.
To measure trust, I followed the protocol proposed by Evans, Athenstaedt, and Krueger
(2013). We paired subjects in a group of two, the trustor and the trustee. Analog to the
social preferences, we told the children that the other person was a child from the same
school and for the parents, it was another parent. The trustor receives one ECU, the
trustee did not get any endowment. In the first step, the trustor had to decide to trust
and transfer the endowment to the trustee or not to trust and keep the endowment. In the
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case of trust, the trustee will receive four ECUs. Then, in a second step, the trustee has
to decide whether or not to transfer two ECUs back to the trustor. I applied the strategy
method; children and parents first decided in the role of the trustor and then in a second
decision they decided in the role as trustee. The proxy for trust is the behavior of the
trustor.
Time Preferences
Another relevant measure are time preferences. Research shows that more patient indi-
viduals attain higher levels of education and earn higher wages (Golsteyn, Grönqvist, &
Lindahl, 2014). Moreover, patient individuals are also more likely to be in a better health
condition (Sutter et al., 2013). Research on the formation of time preferences indicates that
children who grow up in low-income households display lower levels of patience (Deckers
et al., 2015).
I followed the procedures proposed by Angerer, Glätzle-Rützler, et al. (2015) to measure
time preferences (patience). In this task, subjects received five ECUs. They had to decide
how many ECUs to consume immediately and how many ECUs to invest into the future.
Each ECU which they choose to invest was doubled and paid out two weeks after the
experiment. To make this future payment credible for the children, the children had the
opportunity to select the present immediately after the experiment. However, we handed
it to their teacher, who would give it to them only in two weeks time. The amount invested
in the future serves as a measure of individual patience.
Risk
Finally, the literature on risk preferences provides evidence that risk seeking individuals
are more likely to smoke, to be self-employed, and to invest in the stock market (Dohmen
et al., 2011). In contrast to the other preferences, being more risk seeking is not only
beneficial. Nevertheless, it is important to evaluate if and how preschool education aﬀects
the formation of risk preferences.
We elicited risk preferences using the measure proposed by Gneezy and Potters (1997).
Subjects had an endowment of 5 ECU. They had to decide how many of these ECU to
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invest into a risky lottery. The lottery paid the triple of the investment with probability
0.5 and nothing with probability 0.5.
For the children, we used a wheel of fortune (see Figure C6 in the appendix). Half of
the area was colored and indicated the winning area. If the wheel stopped in this area,
they received the triple amount of their investment. We use the amount invested as a
proxy for risk preferences. The expected value of investing is higher than the value of not
investing. Hence, even a risk-neutral subject should invest the full amount. A risk averse
person might invest less, depending on her degree of aversion.
Self-confidence
To estimate self-confidence, all children had to fill out the standardized EDINA question-
naire (Mérida, Serrano, & Tabernero, 2015). It contains items such as “I like my body”, “I
am an important child”, and so on. For all items, children had to answer on a three-point
Likert scale (no, somewhat, yes). Besides a measure for general self-esteem, the ques-
tionnaire allows evaluating the self-esteem of a child with respect to his body, the family,
friends, school, and socio-emotional well-being.
Parenting style
For the parents, we obtained a measure of their parenting style. We employed a short
and validated version of the full survey developed by Robinson, Mandleco, Olsen, and
Hart (1995). Based on the seminal work by Baumrind (1971) it consists of 18 items and
allows to characterize the parenting style into authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive.
Authoritative means that parents are demanding and responsive. Meaning that these
parents usually have high expectations for their children, but at the same time, they provide
their children with the support which they need to succeed. Authoritative parents listen to
their children, encourage independence, and employ fair and consistent rules. Furthermore,
they allow children to express their own opinions and to discuss them. Authoritarian
parenting style relates to a strict, rather controlling parenting style. Authoritarian parents
focus on adherence and control. They use punishment with little or no explanation. Lastly,
permissive parenting style signifies that parents accept all types of behavior of their child.
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Such parents usually employ little or inconsistent rules and provide little structure for the
child.
Estimation Strategy for the Eﬀect on the Grades and the Preference Measures
To evaluate whether the treatment had persistent eﬀects I had to create a control group
ex-post. In Colombia, the school year starts at the beginning of a year. Apoyar started the
treatments also at the beginning of the respective year. We used this incidence to create the
so called Grades and Preferences Measures (GPM) control group.19 We identified children
who started school in 2012 from cohort 2 and 3. These children have been in a hogar,
which had not yet received the treatment. We do the same for children who started school
in 2013 from one of the hogares in the third cohort. The GPM treatment group, in contrast,
consists of children from cohort one and two who started school in either 2012 or 2013.
Hence, children in the GPM control and GPM treatment group started school at the same
time, and were in comparable conditions, if we accept the assumption that the hogares in
the three cohorts did not diﬀer systematically apart from being treated or not. In Figure
3.2, I illustrate the construction of the GPM control and treatment group.
2011 2012 2013 2016
Cohort 1
yi
Cohort 2
yi
Children who leave for school
Cohort 3
yi
Children who leave for school
Figure 3.2: Construction of control and treated group.
Again, I estimate the impact of the treatment using regressions of the following form:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β3Xi + β4MCmi + β5Pji,
where yi is one of the outcome variables explained in the previous section. Ti is the
dummy variable for the treatment; consequently, β1 captures the eﬀect of the treatment.
19Note the GPM control group does not contain the same children as the MD control group.
104
Xi is a vector of variables controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of the child.
Furthermore, I include control variables to adjust the estimate for observable characteristics
of the community mother (MCmi) and for the subset where we collected information about
the parental characteristics, I include socioeconomic characteristics of the parents as well
(Pji). I cluster standard errors at the level of the school and then within a school on
community mother to account for within-cluster dependencies.
Anew, I will employ the two robustness checks to provide further support for the results
from the OLS regressions.
3.4.3 Imbalances at Baseline
My proposed estimation strategy depends crucially on the assumption that the community
mothers in the three cohorts do not diﬀer systematically with respect to unobservable
characteristics. Thus, before I turn to the results, I want to render evidence that my
estimation strategy is a valid approach with an additional dataset.
The METRIX dataset contains information on the development status of the children
attended by a community mother in the city of La Dorada in 2006.20 In this dataset, I
can identify 31 community mothers, which participated in the program of Apoyar. I can
identify 13 MCs from the first, ten from the second, and nine from the third cohort. The
dataset contains information about the ratios of weight to height, height to age, and weight
to age of all children attended by these community mothers.21 Each ratio is rated on a
scale from one to four; one indicating adequate status and four indicating critical status.
In Figure 3.3, I depict the ratios of the children attended by one of theses community
mothers across the three cohorts.
20The METRIX dataset is a national database which stores the information collected by the local ICBF
on the development of the children. All community mothers are obliged to gather data about the children
in their hogar. They have to submit this data to the local ICBF agency. Unfortunately, the only available
data from the ICBF agency of La Dorada is the dataset at hand which is from 2006.
21The dataset does not include the height, weight, and age. It only contains the evaluation of the ratio.
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Figure 3.3: Diﬀerences in the development status of children across the three treatment
cohorts.
I do not observe significant diﬀerences in the status of the children in the three co-
horts in 2006. I take these results as suggestive evidence that the community mothers in
the three cohorts did not diﬀer before the intervention such that it aﬀected the children
systematically.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Development after one Year of Treatment
Descriptive statistics
In Table 3.2, I present the characteristics of the children and the community mothers for the
three cohorts from the monitoring dataset. This sample includes the data of 511 children.
Across the three samples, we observe that the children display cognitive, psychosocial, and
psychomotor levels of between 68% and 78%. Indicating that according to this UNICEF
scale children in my sample fall behind. Furthermore, while the cognitive and psychomotor
developmental indexes are not significantly diﬀerent at baseline, the psychosocial develop-
ment of the children in the third cohort is significantly lower compared to the other two
cohorts. Figure 3.4 depicts the average of the three indexes at baseline and at the end of
the intervention (endline) separately for the three cohorts.22
22The cognitive and the psychosocial development at baseline between the three cohorts are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent (based on two tailed t-tests). The same holds true for the psychosocial index between the
first and the second cohort. However, the children from the third cohort display a psychosocial develop-
ment which is significantly lower compared to the other two cohorts. I depict the separate indexes in the
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For the community mothers, I observe a significant diﬀerence with respect to their
age and the years of experience. The community mothers in the first cohort are slightly
older than the community mothers in the other two cohorts. This is also reflected in the
experience of the community mothers, which refers to the years that a women worked as
community mother. In cohort one they worked on average for 20 years as community
mother. In cohort two the average years of experience are 11 years, and in cohort three
their average experience amounts to 15 years. The income of the community mothers in the
first cohort is 377’000 COP (∼ 124 USD). This is lower than the income of the community
mothers in the second and the third cohort (cohort 2: 421’000 COP (∼ 139 USD) and
cohort 3: 430’000 (∼ 142 USD)). In all three cohorts, the income is less than the legal
minimum salary in Colombia which is 690’000 COP (∼ 240 USD). The educational levels
of the community mothers are comparable across the cohorts. The variable education
captures the level of education of the community mother. 2.5 indicates that on average
a community mother finished secondary school (level two) but not tertiary school (level
three).
As outlined in the previous section, I will account for all these observable diﬀerences
in the regression analysis by including them as control variables.
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
2011 2012 2013
Child Development
Baseline Endline
Figure 3.4: Development of the children in the three cohorts (in percentages).
appendix in Figure B1, B2, and B3.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
Cohort 1 (2011) Cohort 2 (2012) Cohort 3 (2013)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Children:
Age (in months) 32.39 9.21 29.38 9.66 29.56 9.52
Female (D) 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.50
Cognitive level (%) 76.23 14.38 74.74 8.52 75.74 6.13
Psychosocial level (%) 75.70 13.11 76.93 7.17 59.83 6.18
Psychomotor level (%) 68.34 15.81 68.64 14.51 74.01 7.38
Observations 136 328 164
Community Mother:
Age (in years) 53.32 7.35 46.83 8.92 48.85 8.21
Experience (in years) 19.42 6.28 11.22 5.99 15.54 8.74
Income (in 1’000 COP) 377.24 118.63 421.34 165.82 430.97 159.50
Education 2.57 0.79 2.49 0.75 2.17 0.90
Observations 20 20 20
Note. Descriptive statistics for the three cohorts. The children from the first cohorts are
born between 2007 and 2009. The children from the second cohort are born between 2007
and 2010, and the children from the third cohort are born between 2008 and 2010. Both
age variables depict the respective age at the beginning of the intervention. The develop-
mental status of the children are from the baseline measurement. For cohort 1, baseline
was elicited in January 2011, for cohort 2 the baseline was elicited in January 2012. For
cohort 3 the baseline was elicited in January 2013. The income of the community mothers
corresponds to the income at the beginning of the treatment.
Regression results
Table 3.3 depicts the results of the OLS estimations. The first column shows the treatment
eﬀect on cognitive development. Children in the MD control group reach on average
70% of the cognitive items. In contrast, treated children score on average 11 percentage
points (p < 0.001) higher on the cognitive development index. In column (2) I regress the
psychosocial development status on the treatment and the control variables. I find that
the intervention aﬀected the psychosocial status of the children considerably. Children in
the MD control group reach on average 70% of the items. Whereas children from the MD
treatment group attain on average 12 percentage points more on the psychosocial index
(p < 0.001). I observe a similar pattern for the psychomotor development (column (3)).
Children from the MD control group accomplish 60% of the items on average, and the
intervention accounts for an increase of 13 percentage points (p < 0.001).23
Interestingly, girls score on average significantly lower on the cognitive and the psy-
23The separate results (sample 1 and sample 2) are comparable. The corresponding tables are in the
appendix.
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chosocial index. Additionally, I observe that age has predictive power for all three indexes.
Table 3.3: OLS estimates for the development of the children.
Cognitive Psychosocial Psychomotor
Treated (D) 10.957∗∗∗ 12.212∗∗∗ 13.387∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.546) (0.868)
Age (in months) 0.247∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.090)
Female (D) −1.857∗∗∗ −1.551∗∗ −1.508
(0.663) (0.689) (0.928)
Age (in years) 0.134 0.125 0.101
(0.114) (0.116) (0.125)
Experience (in years) −0.241∗∗ −0.217 −0.197
(0.117) (0.134) (0.146)
Income (in 1’000 COP) 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education −0.071 0.124 0.001
(0.540) (0.466) (0.645)
Cohort 2 (D) −4.206∗ −2.064 −4.138∗
(2.138) (2.148) (2.278)
Cohort 3 (D) −3.535 −19.649∗∗∗ −2.790
(2.114) (2.066) (2.413)
Constant 69.660∗∗∗ 69.594∗∗∗ 60.876∗∗∗
(4.289) (3.679) (4.609)
F -test 116.8 280.9 62.7
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.387 0.692 0.423
N 511 511 511
Note. OLS estimates. The unit of all dependent variables is percentages. Depen-
dent variable in column 1 is cognitive development. In column 2 the dependent
variable is psychosocial development and in column 3 it is psychomotor develop-
ment. Robust standard errors, clustered on community mother, in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In a further set of estimations (reported in Table B4 the appendix) I estimated the
eﬀect including all interaction terms. I observe that the intervention was less eﬀective for
girls with respect to cognitive and psychosocial development. Furthermore, it seems that
for the psychosocial and the psychomotor development, the eﬀect of the intervention is
smaller the older the child.
To sum up, based on ordinary least squares regressions, I find that the program led
to large skill gains for the treated children. There are two potential caveats with these
results. First, the implementing NGO was also the NGO which elicited these develop-
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mental measures. Therefore, these measures might be biased. With the data at hand,
I cannot elaborate this caveat further. However, the second evaluation (four years after
the treatment) will not be subject to this bias and hence depending on the conclusion,
strengthen the results of this part. Second, it is possible that unobservable characteristics
of the community mother or the child are responsible for the diﬀerences and not the inter-
vention itself. Hence, in the next section, I will assess the validity of the results using two
alternative estimation methods.
Robustness checks
Given that the assignment to treatment was not random, I conduct two robustness checks.
First, I estimate the eﬀects of the program using inverse probability weighted regression
adjustment (IPWRA) as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and in line with the
analysis conducted by Bernal (2015).
The estimation procedure is as follows: first, I estimate for each child the probability
to belong to the MD treatment group using a probit regression. For that, I include all
observable characteristics of the child and the community mother.
I present the results in Table 3.4. This estimation serves as the basis for the subsequent
regression adjustment. They indicate that the income and the experience of the community
mother predict treatment participation. In the second step, I estimate the propensity score.
Figure 3.5 shows the propensity scores to check the common support condition. For the
subsequent estimation, I include all observations which are within the common support.
It is not surprising that all observations fall into the common support, given the small
number of control variables.
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Table 3.4: Probit of participation in treatment.
Prob. treated
Age (in months) 0.009
(0.006)
Female (D) −0.074
(0.114)
Age (in years) 0.001
(0.010)
Experience (in years) 0.017
(0.011)
Income (in 1’000 COP) −0.001∗
(0.000)
Education 0.285∗∗∗
(0.076)
Constant −0.970∗∗
(0.483)
χ2-test 24.2
p 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.034
N 511
Note. Probit estimates for the probability to
belong to the treated group. Standard errors
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.5: Common support.
Finally, to assess the treatment eﬀect, I estimate a linear regression where I weight the
observations of the treatment by the inverse probability of the propensity score and the
observations of the control group by one minus the inverse probability of the propensity
score (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). Table 3.5 summarizes the average treatment eﬀects
for the three dependent variables estimated with IPWRA. The point estimates of the
treatment eﬀect are very similar to the estimates of the OLS regressions and support the
results reported in the previous section.
Table 3.5: Treatment eﬀects estimated by IPWRA.
Outcome variable Control group Treatment eﬀect Standard error N
Mean SD
Cognitive development 76.461 7.163 12.574 0.819∗∗∗ 511
Psychosocial development 69.528 11.038 21.823 0.953∗∗∗ 511
Psychomotor development 73.757 11.284 14.582 0.937∗∗∗ 511
Note. Treatment eﬀects estimated using inverse probability weighted regression adjustment.
Second, I try to estimate the magnitude of the omitted variable bias using the method
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and by Oster (2014). This methodology bases on the
assumption that selection on unobservables is equal to selection on observables. It allows
to calculate the relative degree of selection (δ). The authors propose δ = 1 to be an
appropriate cutoﬀ. Table 3.6 depicts the estimated δ’s.
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Table 3.6: Selection on unobservables.
δ N
Cognitive 1.24 511
Psychosocial 1.83 511
Psychomotor 1.33 511
Note. Amount of selection on unob-
servables relative to selection on ob-
servables required to attribute the en-
tire high-quality preschool education
eﬀect to selection bias. Calculation
based on Oster (2014).
I find that all values for δ reach the critical threshold. Hence, the observed eﬀects
are likely to hold if we assume that selection on unobservables is equal to selection on
observables.
To sum up, the analysis of the monitoring data provides evidence that the program had
a considerable positive eﬀect in the short run on all three outcome variables. Thanks to
the intervention, the children are able to catch up with the national averages on these three
indexes.24 Furthermore, the results are in line with an evaluation by Bernal (2015). She
assessed a similar program from Bogotá in 200725 and observes that children’s psychosocial,
psychomotor and cognitive skills increased by up to 0.3 standard deviations compared to
children who visited a standard community mother.
These results are very promising, but the most important question remains, namely
whether these diﬀerences persist in the longer run, which is the scope of the next section.
3.5.2 Eﬀect four Years after the Treatment
Descriptive results
To assess the persistence of the treatment eﬀect, we collected data from 296 children. Of
these children, 173 belong to the GPM control group and 123 to the GPM treatment group.
Table 3.7 depicts the summary statistics of the characteristics of the children. Of the group
24According to the Tablas de normas para la población colombiana in Ortiz Pinilla (1999) the average
for cognitive development in the corresponding age is 85%, for psychomotor it is 87%, and for psychosocial
88%.
25The intervention evaluated in Bernal (2015) consisted of providing the community mothers with formal
preschool teaching education. The program did not include the other three components (coaching, parental
workshops, mentoring) of the intervention by Apoyar.
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of treated children, we were not able to find four of them, and the school did not know
either if they moved away or if they dropped out.26
Table 3.7: Characteristics of the children in the treated and the control group.
Treated Control Diﬀerence
Mean SD Mean SD ∆ t
Female 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.50 -0.15∗∗∗ (-2.64)
Age 9.15 1.07 9.67 1.29 -0.52∗∗∗ (-3.70)
SISBEN 40.47 14.85 38.56 16.35 1.91 (1.00)
Weight 28.64 6.72 29.96 9.16 -1.32 (-1.35)
Height 132.57 7.02 136.05 8.43 -3.48∗∗∗ (-3.75)
Mean grade (%) 74.15 13.77 69.89 13.40 4.27∗∗∗ (2.63)
Right grade for age .642 .481 .486 .501 -.156∗∗∗ (-2.695)
Token given away (DG) 2.55 2.04 2.05 2.12 0.51∗∗ (2.06)
Egalitarian 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.02 (0.86)
Altruistic 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.03 (1.52)
Spiteful 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 -0.02 (-0.56)
Selfish 0.59 0.49 0.70 0.46 -0.11∗ (-1.89)
Trust 0.33 0.47 0.23 0.42 0.10∗ (1.95)
Trustworthiness 0.70 0.46 0.63 0.48 0.07 (-1.24)
Risk 2.60 1.35 2.50 1.31 0.10 (0.63)
Patience 1.27 1.75 1.08 1.59 0.19 (0.99)
General self-esteem 0.85 0.11 0.85 0.09 -0.00 (-0.15)
Observations 123 173 296
Note. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
I find that children in the GPM treatment group are slightly younger and shorter.
Moreover, the proportion of girls is smaller in the GPM treatment group. The variable
SISBEN is a number which each Colombian household gets based on its socioeconomic
characteristics. It serves to determine whether a family is eligible for state subsidies.
Children in the two groups seem to live in households with a similar socioeconomic status.
If we look at the dependent variables, the table provides a first indication of possible
diﬀerences. To be specific, I observe that children in the GPM treatment group diﬀer
significantly (based on a two-tailed t-test) with respect to their grades, the probability of
being in the grade which corresponds to their age, altruism, trust, and the probability to
be categorized as selfish. I do not observe statistically significant diﬀerences for the other
26Apoyar collected the data of the children in the GPM control group by collecting the lists with the
names of all the children which are currently in school. Unfortunately, this approach does not allow to
identify how many children from the GPM control group dropped out of school or moved away.
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dependent variables.27
Table 3.8 provides the summary statistics for the parents. At first sight, the character-
istics of the parents in the two groups are very comparable. Only the probability of being
classified as an altruist is significantly higher in the sample of the treated parents.28
Table 3.8: Characteristics of the parents in the treated and the control group.
Treated Control Diﬀerence
Mean SD Mean SD ∆ t
Age 34.87 7.25 37.43 11.30 -2.55 (-1.30)
Highest degree 1.54 0.62 1.48 0.62 0.06 (0.50)
Monthly income 490.43 266.47 466.17 274.67 24.26 (0.43)
SISBEN 42.30 13.36 39.72 16.59 2.59 (0.79)
Homework help 0.82 0.32 0.82 0.28 0.00 (0.00)
Hours of help 8.96 5.14 8.47 5.71 0.49 (0.43)
Token given away (DG) 4.06 1.98 3.73 2.02 0.33 (0.82)
Egalitarian 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.00 (0.00)
Altruist 0.25 0.44 0.06 0.24 0.19** (2.59)
Spiteful 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.00 (0.00)
Selfish 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.46 -0.06 (-0.69)
Trust 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.13 (1.22)
Risk 2.40 1.65 2.96 1.71 -0.56 (-1.64)
Patience 3.50 2.06 3.40 2.04 0.10 (0.25)
Observations 48 48 96
Note. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Regression results
For all outcome variables of interest, I first estimate a model which only contains the
dummy variable for the treatment. In the second column, I add the variables to control
for the child’s characteristics. In the third column, I include the characteristics of the
community mother, and in the fourth column, I add the parental characteristics. Note,
that I only have the parental characteristics for the subset of children where we collected
data on their parents (N=96), this is why the number of observation drops considerably
in the last column.
I start the analysis of the long-term eﬀects with the elaboration of the cognitive skills.
27As described in subsection 3.4.2, we incentivized all decisions of the children. For the gifts we paid in
total 280 USD.
28For the experiments with the parents, we paid out in total 250 USD, corresponding to average earnings
of 2.60 USD.
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The grade refers to the grade obtained in the first quarter of 2016. I transform all the
grades to percentages. Table 3.9 provides evidence that children from the GPM treatment
group have higher grades on average than children from the GPM control group. In the
GPM control group, children reach on average a grade of 69.9 (SD : 13.4) compared to
a grade of 74.2 (SD : 13.8) in the GPM treatment group. This raw diﬀerence of roughly
four percentage points is significant and robust to the inclusion of the child characteristics
(column 2). Interestingly, age seems to be negatively related to grades. Furthermore,
on average girls achieve roughly four percentage points higher grades than boys. The
treatment dummy drops in size and loses its significance once we add the control variables
of the respective community mother (p = 0.152, column 3). In the last column, the
estimate of the treatment remains insignificant (p = 0.286), which is no surprise given the
low number of observations. Besides the main eﬀect, I observe that socioeconomic status
of the family becomes predictive for the grade. Children from lower SES families have on
average lower grades.
Next, I analyze whether the children are in the grade which corresponds to their age.
I find that in the GPM control group only 48% of the children are in the “right” grade. In
the GPM treatment group, 64% of the children are in the grade which corresponds to their
age. A probit estimation reveals that the probability of being in the right grade is aﬀected
significantly by the treatment. Children in the GPM treatment group are on average
11 percentage points more likely to be in the right grade, controlling for all observable
characteristics (see B5). This diﬀerence can occur during two points in time. Either
children start school too late, or they fall behind during school. I find that presumably,
the lag occurs during school because children in both groups start school on average with
the correct age of five years. Unfortunately, I do not have the data about grade repetition.
I continue with the analysis of the treatment eﬀect on the individual preference mea-
sures.
First, I evaluate the eﬀect of the intervention on the continuous measure for altruism.
The dependent variable is the amount given to the recipient in the dictator game. On
average, children transferred two stars out of ten to the other child. This is comparable to
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Table 3.9: OLS estimates for the grade.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 4.233∗∗ 3.885∗ 2.892 4.898
(1.838) (2.104) (2.006) (4.543)
Age −4.145∗∗∗ −4.094∗∗∗ −1.796
(1.457) (1.458) (2.115)
Female 3.798∗∗ 3.509∗ 4.768
(1.847) (1.893) (3.827)
Height (cm) 0.189 0.185 0.043
(0.161) (0.170) (0.367)
Weight (kg) −0.004 −0.019 0.111
(0.101) (0.103) (0.279)
Entry into school 0.361 0.439 −1.438
(1.631) (1.655) (3.552)
Current class 0.006 0.007 −0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.026)
Sisben 0.035 0.038 −0.265∗∗
(0.061) (0.063) (0.101)
MC: Age 0.160 0.603∗
(0.166) (0.314)
MC: Experience (y) −0.215 −0.582
(0.198) (0.361)
Parent: Age −0.038
(0.228)
Parent: Income 0.009
(0.005)
Parent: Degree 0.632
(2.993)
Constant 69.921∗∗∗ 76.871∗∗∗ 73.126∗∗∗ 68.577
(1.171) (17.016) (19.350) (43.769)
F -test 5.3 5.0 4.5 4.6
Prob > F 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.020 0.105 0.092 0.109
N 286 233 220 72
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is the average grade (measured in percentages).
Robust standard errors, clustered on school and community mother, in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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what other researchers observe with infants of the same age in other countries.29 Table 3.10
summarizes the results for the eﬀect of the intervention on altruism. I find that children in
the GPM treatment group allocate on average between 0.5 and one stars more to another
anonymous child.30 The eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of all control variables.
Besides the continuous measure for altruism, I elicited social preferences with the four
binary decisions described in the subsection 3.4.2. Using the approach by Fehr et al. (2008),
I classify all the children according to their type. I find that in the control group, 2.3% of
the children classify as egalitarian, 2.3% as altruists, 14.5% as spiteful, and 70% as selfish.
In the group of treated children, 5.7% classify as egalitarian, 4% as altruists, 12.2% as
spiteful, and 59.3% as selfish. The selfish ones can be further sub-classified into weakly
egalitarian, weakly altruistic, and weakly spiteful. I observe that in the GPM control
and the treatment group roughly 13% are sub-classified as weakly altruistic (13.2% in the
control group and 12.1% in the treated group), 17.9% are weakly egalitarian in the GPM
control group and 13% in the GPM treatment group. 26% in the GPM control group
are sub-classified as weakly spiteful compared to 20.3% in the GPM treatment group. In
contrast to children from Europe (Austria and Czech Republic) children in both GPM
groups are much more likely to be classified as selfish or spiteful.31 The comparison with
children from more developed contexts, confirms the observation of Deckers et al. (2015),
that the socioeconomic background is related to selfish behavior. Put diﬀerently, the
children in my sample are from very vulnerable households, the children in the sample of
Fehr et al. (2013) and Bauer et al. (2014) are from developed countries, and presumably,
the socioeconomic status of their families is much higher. A further regression analysis
provides evidence that children from the treatment group are significantly less likely to be
29Harbaugh, Krause, and Liday (2003) observe in a sample of 9-year-old children in the US an average
of 1.7 tokens and Benenson, Pascoe, and Radmore (2007) observe an average of 3 tokens in a sample of
children from the UK. Furthermore, Kogut (2012) reports an average of 3.24 for second and fourth graders
in Israel.
30I further evaluated whether the eﬀect diﬀers by gender, age or the characteristics of the parents and
community mothers. However, I do not find any significant interactions, which indicates that the treatment
eﬀect is rather homogeneous.
31Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, and Sutter (2013) report that in a sample of 8 to 9-year-old children in Austria,
3% of the children behave egalitarian, 34% weakly egalitarian, 17% weakly altruistic, and 42% spiteful.
Bauer et al. (2014) find 15.6% of the children to be altruists, 8.9% egalitarian, 6.3% spiteful, and 39.8%
selfish. Within the selfish category, they find 10.8% to be weakly altruistic, 11.5% weakly egalitarian and
10% weakly spiteful.
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Table 3.10: OLS estimates for altruism.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 0.515∗∗ 0.602∗∗ 0.647∗∗ 1.018∗
(0.240) (0.286) (0.295) (0.553)
Age 0.235 0.143 0.329
(0.164) (0.172) (0.301)
Female 0.125 0.110 0.217
(0.260) (0.267) (0.670)
Height (cm) 0.026 0.014 0.025
(0.033) (0.034) (0.053)
Weight (kg) −0.029 −0.022 −0.002
(0.022) (0.022) (0.051)
Entry into school −0.504∗∗ −0.402∗ −0.611
(0.222) (0.220) (0.562)
Current class 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Sisben −0.003 −0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
MC: Age 0.017 −0.041
(0.023) (0.061)
MC: Experience (y) −0.003 0.075
(0.032) (0.067)
Parent: Age −0.040
(0.032)
Parent: Income 0.002
(0.001)
Parent: Degree −0.680
(0.495)
Constant 2.018∗∗∗ −0.998 −0.125 0.043
(0.168) (3.545) (3.565) (7.035)
F -test 4.6 2.1 1.5 1.7
Prob > F 0.034 0.039 0.151 0.081
R2 adjusted 0.012 0.017 0.002 −0.006
N 291 235 222 73
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is altruism (tokens given to the other person
in the dictator game) measured from [0,10]. Robust standard errors, clustered on school
and community mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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classified as selfish (see Table B6 in the appendix). For the other three categories (altruist,
egalitarian, spiteful) I do not observe significant diﬀerences. Hence, even though that the
intervention led to a decrease in the probability of being selfish, it is still high in comparison
with children from more advantaged backgrounds.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of types in the treated versus the control group.
I turn now to the analysis of the trust behavior. In the GPM control group, 23% of
the children decided to trust and send the star to the other child. In contrast, in the GPM
treatment group, 33% of the children decided to trust. A probit estimation reveals that
the observed diﬀerence is just statistically insignificant (p=0.115, complete Table B7 in
the appendix). Interestingly, I observe that older children are less likely to transfer the
star. Moreover, once I include the parental characteristics, I find that children with a
higher socioeconomic background are significantly more likely to trust. The comparison
of trust behavior to studies with samples of other children provides further evidence for
the hypothesis that individual preferences relate to the socioeconomic background of the
family. Evans et al. (2013) find in a sample of children from Austria trust rates of 55%,
which is considerably higher compared to what I observe in my sample. The behavior of
the second mover in the trust game is not diﬀerent in the two groups. Roughly 70% of the
subjects reciprocate trust and decide to send the two stars back.
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In a next step, I elaborate on the eﬀect of the treatment on risk preferences. On
average children invested half of their endowment (2.5 stars) into the wheel of fortune.
However, the behavior does not diﬀer depending on being exposed to the intervention (for
the regressions, see Table B8 in the appendix).
The last individual preference measure under consideration is patience. On average
children invested 3.45 stars for later payout. Again, I do not observe that the treatment
aﬀected time preferences of the children (see Table B8). The level of patience observed in
both GPM groups is much higher compared to the time preferences of children of the same
age in Austria (Angerer, Lergetporer, Glätzle-Rützler, & Sutter, 2015). They observe that
children aged 7 to 11 invest on average between 1.14 and 2.15 tokens (out of 5).
Eventually, I evaluate whether the treatment aﬀects the self-esteem of the children.
As already indicated in the descriptive statistics, children in the two GPM groups do not
diﬀer significantly (Table B10 in the appendix). I further assessed whether the treatment
might aﬀected only certain self-esteem categories. However, I do not observe diﬀerences
for any of the subscales.
So far I provide evidence that the treatment had an eﬀect on the children, which is
observable four years after being in one of the treated nurseries. The question which
component of the intervention or which combination of components is responsible for this
diﬀerence is still open. The only possibility with the data at hand is to evaluate whether
parents of the children in the GPM treatment group diﬀer compared to the parents of
children from the GPM control group.
Table 3.11: Parenting style.
Treated Control Diﬀerence
Mean SD Mean SD ∆ t
Authoritative PS 4.50 0.47 4.52 0.41 -0.02 (-0.23)
Authoritarian PS 2.91 0.81 3.00 0.91 -0.09 (-0.51)
Permissive PS 2.98 0.82 2.98 0.66 - -
Observations 48 48 96
Based on Table 3.11 I do not find that parents in the GPM control and the GPM
treatment group apply diﬀerent parenting styles. Compared to parents from Western
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countries, the means for authoritarian and permissive parenting style are considerably
higher. This suggests that on one hand parents in the sample employ a more authoritarian
but at the same time also more permissive parenting style. In the appendix, I report
all regression estimations of the parental characteristics on the treatment. I observe that
parents from the GPM treatment group are less risk seeking, but the eﬀect is only weakly
significant. For all other variables, the treatment does not account for diﬀerences.
Hence, I do not observe that the intervention aﬀected parents directly. Still, it might be
that the eﬀect on the parents is more subtle. To test this, I elaborate how parents’ and their
oﬀspring’s traits correlate. Socialization models provide theoretical rationales for these
correlations (for example see Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) or Bisin and Verdier (2011)).
Not the number of observations for this explorative analysis is rather low. Nevertheless, I
hypothesize that well-functioning parent-child interactions are necessary to transmit traits
from one generation to another.
In Table 3.12 I depict the results of the estimation of a child’s altruism on the altruism of
its parents controlling for the child’s characteristics. Interestingly, I find that the estimate is
positive and significant within the GPM treatment group while negative and non-significant
in the GPM control group.
In line with the previous analysis, I evaluate whether trust displays a similar pattern.
I find the same systematic diﬀerences between the GPM control and the treatment group.
For parent-child pairs in the GPM treatment group the relation is significantly positively
(column 1), whereas, for parents and their oﬀsprings in the GPM control group, the relation
is weakly significantly negative (column 2). Put diﬀerently, parents in the GPM treatment
group who trust are likely to have children who trust as well; this observation is not the
case for parents in the GPM control group.
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Table 3.12: OLS estimates for altruism, separated by treatment.
(1) (2)
Treated Control
Parent: Altruism 0.302∗∗ 0.118
(0.139) (0.187)
Age 0.067 0.023
(0.302) (0.179)
Female −0.005 0.293
(0.582) (0.806)
Height (cm) 0.185∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.059) (0.059)
Weight (kg) −0.097 0.014
(0.074) (0.067)
Constant −21.105∗∗∗ 6.387
(6.138) (6.227)
F -test 4.4 0.8
Prob > F 0.003 0.567
R2 adjusted 0.177 −0.078
N 47 47
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is al-
truism (tokens given to the other person in the
dictator game) measured from [0,10]. Column 1 is
the estimation within the treated, column 2 for the
control group. Robust standard errors, clustered
on school and community mother, in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
For the other two preference measures, I do not find any systematic relations between
the parents and their oﬀsprings measure. Obviously, these results come from an explorative
analysis and are only a first interesting indication that there might be an eﬀect of the
intervention on the parents of the treated children. However, without further research,
this remains only a hypothesis.
To sum up, based on linear regression models, I show that the intervention aﬀected
grades and altruism. Next, I apply the same procedures as in the analysis of the monitoring
data to check the robustness of the results.
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Table 3.13: Probit estimates for trust, separated by treatment.
(1) (2)
Treated Control
Parent: Trust 1.043∗∗ −1.099∗
(0.470) (0.623)
Age 0.036 −0.547∗∗
(0.227) (0.239)
Female 0.071 −0.221
(0.395) (0.337)
Height (cm) 0.042 0.044
(0.042) (0.050)
Weight (kg) 0.001 0.010
(0.043) (0.053)
Constant −7.361 −1.674
(4.560) (6.583)
χ2-test 12.6 14.4
p 0.027 0.013
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.223
N 47 47
Note. Probit estimates. Dependent variable is
trust measured with a dummy variable. Column
1 is the estimation within the treated, column 2 for
the control group. Robust standard errors, clus-
tered on school and community mother, in paren-
theses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Robustness checks
Again, I start with the estimation of the eﬀect using IPWRA. I display the results of the
estimation of the probability to belong to the treatment group in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14: Probit regression for participation in treatment.
Prob. Treated
Age −0.097
(0.082)
Female −0.413∗∗
(0.166)
Height (cm) −0.036∗∗
(0.016)
Weight (kg) 0.018
(0.013)
Sisben 0.007
(0.005)
MC: Age 0.004
(0.013)
MC: Experience (y) −0.043∗∗∗
(0.017)
Constant 5.442∗∗∗
(1.750)
χ2-test 38.1
p 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.107
N 264
Note. Probit estimates. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.7: Common support.
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In Figure 3.7 I depict the common support. I excluded 20 observations because they
do not fall into the common support.
Table 3.15 summarizes the eﬀects estimated by IPWRA. The estimation confirms the
results observed with the OLS regressions, which indicate that the treatment had a signif-
icant and positive eﬀect on the grades of the treated children and their prosocial behavior.
Table 3.15: Treatment eﬀects estimated by IPWRA.
Outcome variable Control group Treatment eﬀect Standard error N
Mean SD
Grade 70.15 13.30 3.01∗ 1.68 264
Right grade .52 0.04 .16∗∗ 0.06 264
Altruism 1.93 2.07 .74∗∗∗ .27 264
Trust .24 .44 .05 .06 264
Risk 2.41 1.28 .15 .16 264
Patience 1.13 1.59 .10 .21 264
Self-esteem .86 .09 -.02 0.01 264
Note. Treatment eﬀects estimated using inverse probability weighted regression ad-
justment.
Second, I evaluate the amount of selection on unobservables relative to selection on
observables required to attribute the entire eﬀect to selection bias. Table 3.16 contains
the results. Except for trust, the relative degree of selection reaches the critical threshold.
These results provide further support that omitted variables do not entirely drive my
results.
Table 3.16: Selection on unobservables.
δ N
Grade 1.04 297
Right grade 1.07 297
Altruism 1.73 297
Trust 0.36 297
Note. Amount of selection on unob-
servables relative to selection on ob-
servables required to attribute the en-
tire high-quality preschool education
eﬀect to selection bias. Calculation
based on Oster (2014).
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3.5.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Lastly, I compare the costs to the benefits estimated in this chapter. According to Bernal
(2013), the cost of a standard (non-treated) hogar is 288 USD per child and year. The
intervention of Apoyar costs 5464 USD per community mother and year, which amounts
to 453 USD per child and year. Note that a community mother, once she has received
training, will probably apply her new skills on children outside this evaluation. The 453
USD represent an upper bound on the cost of this investment.
To translate the increase of the cognitive skills to the expected wage increase, we rely
on numbers published in Chetty et al. (2011) and Bartik, Gormley, and Adelstein (2012).
I expect the rise in cognitive skills to lead to an increase of the wage by 3%. The expected
eﬀects on the wage due to an increase in non-cognitive skills is based on the numbers
reported in Flossmann, Piatek, and Wichert (2007). It amounts to an increase of the wage
by 1%. Based on these conservative estimates, the intervention is likely to increase the
children’s future wages in adult life by around 4%.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I elaborated if enhancing the quality of a community-based preschool
program in Colombia leads to better outcomes for the treated children. Research on
preschool education in Colombia revealed that the knowledge about infant development of
many caregivers is insuﬃcient. In response to this issue, a Colombian NGO implemented an
intervention, which consisted of four components. The first component was the provision
of a formal education as preschool teachers to the caregivers. Second, the NGO supported
the caregivers to implement their newly acquired knowledge in their daily nursery routines.
Third, the caregivers received assistance for the organization of parental workshops, which
aimed at increasing the knowledge of parents about infant care and development. Fourth,
the NGO monitored the children in school and supported them if needed.
I find that children in the program benefited on several dimensions. First, in the
short run, children who visited a treated community mother display improved cognitive,
psychosocial, and psychomotor skills. Second, the eﬀects of the intervention seem to be
127
persistent. Four years after the treatment, children from treated nurseries have on average
higher grades, are more likely to be in the right grade, and behave more prosocial. For the
other behavioral measures (trust, risk, and time preferences) I do not observe significant
diﬀerences. Moreover, I provide suggestive evidence that the treatment aﬀected the parent-
child interaction positively. This last result stems from an explorative analysis and hence
further research is needed to confirm it. Moreover, I elicited the parenting style via self-
reported survey. It might be that this leads to a bias because parents want to appear as
good parents. Thus, it would be important to employ more objective methods to evaluate
if parenting style was aﬀected by the treatment.
Given that in this study the assignment to the treatment was not random, I cannot
make causal claims because I cannot entirely rule out that unobservable characteristics
of the community mothers or the children are responsible for the diﬀerences. For this
reason, I conducted diﬀerent robustness checks. They provide evidence for the observed
results. Another caveat of this study is that I cannot disentangle the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
components of the program. For the further development of this intervention, it would
be very interesting to know how the diﬀerent components contributed to the treatment
eﬀect. At last, further research is needed to elaborate to what extent the program had
spill-over eﬀects within the family and the school environment. Meaning to elaborate
whether the intervention had eﬀects beyond the treated children. It is likely that the
positive implications of the intervention extended to the siblings of a child who visited a
treated nursery and to their peers in school.
Summing up, the results lead me to believe that enhancing the quality of preschool
education, by providing community mothers with formal education, supporting them in
the implementation, and including the parents is a promising policy option to improve the
school readiness and thus, further success in life of disadvantaged children in Colombia.
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Appendix
3.A Early Development Instrument
Cognitive Development
• 0 months:
1. Startles in response to loud noise
• 1 to 3 months:
2. Indicates with her eyes that she recognized where the noise comes from
3. Makes two diﬀerent guttural sounds
4. Babbles with persons
• 4 to 6 months:
5. 4 or more diﬀerent sounds
6. Laughs loudly when stimulated to do so
7. Reacts when he is called by his name
• 7 to 9 months:
8. Pronounces 3 or more syllables
9. Makes a sound with the bell
10. One clear word (M)32
• 10 to 12 months:
11. Shakes her head (M)
12. Calls his mother or his responsible caregiver
13. Understands simple orders
• 13 to 18 months:
32(M) indicates that the mother or the responsible caregiver of the child reports whether the child is
able to fulfil the item.
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14. Recognizes three objects
15. Combines two words
16. Recognizes six objects
• 19 to 24 months:
17. Names five objects
18. Makes phrases with three words (M)
19. More than 20 clear words (M)
• 25 to 36 months:
20. Says her complete name
21. Knows high/low, big/small
22. Uses complete sentences
• 37 to 48 months:
23. Defines five objects by their use
24. Repeats three digits
25. Describes a picture in detail
• 49 to 60 months:
26. Counts the fingers of his hands
27. Distinguishes back/front and under/above
28. Names 4 to 5 colors
• 61 to 72 months:
29. Expresses her opinion
30. Knows left and right
31. Knows the days of the week
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Psychosocial Development
• 0 months:
1. Follows movements in front of his face
• 1 to 3 months:
2. Recognizes her mother
3. Smiles when the mother turns the attention him
4. Tries to turn around when she hears her mother talk
• 4 to 6 months:
5. Tries to grab the hands of the examiner
6. Takes a toy if it is to him
7. Pays attention to a conversation
• 7 to 9 months:
8. Tries to help holding a cup when drinking (M)
9. Recognizes herself in the mirror
10. Imitates applause
• 10 to 12 months:
11. Brings a toy to the examiner
12. Asks for an object or a toy
13. Drinks alone from a cup
• 13 to 18 months:
14. Identifies one set of articles of clothing correctly
15. Identifies two parts of the body
16. Indicates when he needs to go to the bathroom (M)
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• 19 to 24 months:
17. Identifies five parts of the body
18. Tries to talk about experiences (M)
19. Controls urination during the day (M)
• 25 to 36 months:
20. Diﬀerentiates between girl and boy
21. Knows the name of her mother and father
22. Washes his face and hands on his own
• 37 to 48 months:
23. Can take some cloths oﬀ on her own (M)
24. Shares toys with other children (M)
25. Has special friends
• 49 to 60 months:
26. Can dress and undress on his own completely (M)
27. Knows her age
28. Organizes/initiates playing with other children (M)
• 61 to 72 months:
29. Executes orders to help at home (M)
30. Knows his exact address
31. Talks about her family
Psychomotor Development
• 0 months:
1. Struggles strongly
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2. Follows with the eyes vertical and horizontal movements in front of his head
• 1 to 3 months:
3. Lifts her head when lying in prone position
4. Lifts his head and chest when lying in prone position
5. Holds her head
6. Opens/closes his hands and looks at them
7. Holds an object in her hands
8. Puts an object into his mouth
• 4 to 6 months:
9. Controls the movements of her head when sitting
10. Is able to turn around (M)
11. Tries to sit on his own
12. Tries to grab objects
13. Holds objects in both hands simultaneously
14. Moves an object from one hand to the other
• 7 to 9 months:
15. Can stay seated on her own for a few seconds
16. Crawls on his belly
17. Can sit down on her own
18. Plays with various objects at the same time
19. Grabs an object with the hands
20. Grabs a cube with the thumb and trigger finger
• 10 to 12 months:
21. Crawls on hands and knees
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22. Stands up with the help of a table or chair
23. Can stand on his own without holding himself for at least 15 seconds
24. Takes objects out of a box
25. Can hold up to three objects in her hands
26. Searches for hidden objects
• 13 to 18 months:
27. Makes a few steps on his own
28. Walks on her own
29. Runs
30. Builds towers with three cubes
31. Turns around pages of a book
32. Anticipates where an object appears after being put in a tube from one side
• 19 to 24 months:
33. Kicks a ball without loosing the equilibrium
34. Throws a ball with the hands
35. Jumps on two feet
36. Puts toys in a box and closes the box
37. Makes round scribbles
38. Builds towers with five cubes
• 25 to 36 months:
39. Can stand on his toes without loosing the equilibrium
40. Stands up without using her hands (M)
41. Walks a few steps backward
42. Threads six or more beads
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43. Draws horizontal and vertical lines after being shown how to do so
44. Separates small from big objects
• 37 to 48 months:
45. Walks on the tips of his toes
46. Can stand on one foot
47. Throws and catches a ball
48. Draws a rudimentary human figure
49. Cuts paper with a scissor
50. Draws a cube and circle after being shown how to do so
• 49 to 60 months:
51. Walks in a straight line
52. Jumps three or more steps on one foot
53. Catches and throws the ball back to the examiner
54. Draws a more detailed human figure
55. Groups objects by form and color
56. Draws a ladder after being told to do so
• 61 to 72 months:
57. Jumps down from something with the height of 25 cm
58. Hops and alternates the feet
59. Jumps down from something with the height of 60 cm
60. Groups objects by form, color and size
61. Has to reconstruct a stair with 10 cubes after it has been shown to her
62. Draws a house
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3.B Additional Tables
Table B1: Descriptive statistics separated by cohort.
Cohort 1 (2011) Cohort 2 (2012) Cohort 3 (2013)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Children:
Age (in months) 42.80 15.46 33.18 14.68 34.50 15.33
Female (D) 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.50
Cognitive level (%) 78.58 11.77 74.82 8.34 75.22 6.15
Psychosocial level (%) 78.16 11.18 76.89 7.12 58.35 7.28
Psychomotor level (%) 72.52 13.80 68.59 13.74 73.46 6.88
Observations 236 235 235
Community Mother:
Age (in years) 53.32 7.35 46.83 8.92 48.85 8.21
Experience (in years) 19.42 6.28 11.22 5.99 15.54 8.74
Income (in 1’000 COP) 377.24 118.63 421.34 165.82 430.97 159.50
Education 2.57 0.79 2.49 0.75 2.17 0.90
Observations 20 20 20
Note. Descriptive statistics for the three cohorts. The children from the first cohorts are
born between 2007 and 2009. The children from the second cohort are born between 2007
and 2010, and the children from the third cohort are born between 2008 and 2010. Both
age variables depict the respective age at the beginning of the intervention. The devel-
opmental status of the children depict the baseline measurement. For cohort 1, baseline
was elicited in January 2011, for cohort 2 the baseline was elicited in January 2012. For
cohort 3 the baseline was elicited in January 2013. The income of the community mothers
corresponds to the income at the beginning of the treatment.
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Figure B1: Cognitive development of the children in the three cohorts in percentages.
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Figure B2: Psychosocial development of the children in the three cohorts in percentages.
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Figure B3: Psychomotor development of the children in the three cohorts in percentages.
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Table B2: OLS estimates for sample 1.
Cognitive Psychosocial Psychomotor
Treated (D) 16.222∗∗∗ 15.408∗∗∗ 17.982∗∗∗
(2.672) (2.596) (2.871)
Age (in months) 0.233 0.181 0.584∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.185)
Female (D) −2.723∗∗ −2.596∗∗ −2.311
(1.060) (1.101) (1.467)
Age (in years) 0.163 0.261 0.200
(0.178) (0.172) (0.185)
Experience (in years) −0.355 −0.438∗ −0.343
(0.233) (0.226) (0.253)
Income (in 1’000 COP) 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Education 0.094 −0.526 −0.360
(1.048) (0.927) (1.199)
Constant 60.590∗∗∗ 62.874∗∗∗ 41.604∗∗∗
(6.186) (5.444) (7.277)
F -test 21.4 15.8 19.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.341 0.320 0.399
N 297 297 297
Note. OLS estimates. The unit of all dependent variables is percentages. Depen-
dent variable in column 1 is cognitive development. In column 2 the dependent
variable is psychosocial development and in column 3 it is psychomotor develop-
ment. Robust standard errors, clustered on community mother, in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B3: OLS estimates for sample 2.
Cognitive Psychosocial Psychomotor
Treated (D) 10.556∗∗∗ 29.963∗∗∗ 12.218∗∗∗
(0.758) (0.704) (0.876)
Age (in months) 0.255∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.050) (0.044)
Female (D) −0.897 −0.382 −0.752
(0.545) (0.572) (0.809)
Age (in years) 0.100 0.005 0.017
(0.073) (0.074) (0.077)
Experience (in years) −0.156∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.076
(0.053) (0.090) (0.087)
Income (in 1’000 COP) −0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Education −0.095 0.590 −0.017
(0.470) (0.479) (0.627)
Constant 67.808∗∗∗ 52.005∗∗∗ 65.960∗∗∗
(4.363) (3.252) (3.978)
F -test 65.4 337.9 55.3
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.514 0.892 0.534
N 331 331 331
Note. OLS estimates. The unit of all dependent variables is percentages. Depen-
dent variable in column 1 is cognitive development. In column 2 the dependent
variable is psychosocial development and in column 3 it is psychomotor develop-
ment. Robust standard errors, clustered on community mother, in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B4: OLS estimates for the development of the children including interaction terms.
Cognitive Psychosocial Psychomotor
Treated (D) 12.023∗ 16.060∗∗∗ 24.130∗∗∗
(6.362) (5.942) (7.034)
Age (in months) 0.347∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.038) (0.087)
Female (D) −0.683 −0.345 −0.390
(0.700) (0.617) (1.232)
Age (in years) 0.067 0.025 0.020
(0.079) (0.075) (0.105)
Experience (in years) −0.151∗∗ −0.082 −0.082
(0.062) (0.091) (0.122)
Income (in 1’000 COP) 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education −0.529 −0.071 −0.333
(0.598) (0.540) (0.917)
Cohort 2 (D) −5.120∗ −3.268 −5.692∗∗
(2.595) (2.648) (2.782)
Cohort 3 (D) −4.902∗ −21.287∗∗∗ −4.857
(2.727) (2.779) (2.964)
Age × Treat −0.203 −0.331∗∗ −0.565∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.136) (0.154)
Gender × Treat −2.318∗ −2.302∗ −1.975
(1.204) (1.239) (1.479)
Age (MC) × Treat 0.134 0.226 0.204
(0.209) (0.202) (0.221)
Exp (MC) × Treat −0.238 −0.355 −0.347
(0.277) (0.279) (0.294)
Educ (MC) × Treat 0.995 0.299 0.628
(0.999) (0.967) (1.241)
Constant 70.398∗∗∗ 69.294∗∗∗ 57.380∗∗∗
(5.112) (4.133) (5.945)
F -test 67.9 179.5 61.1
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 adjusted 0.395 0.704 0.463
N 511 511 511
Note. OLS estimates. The unit of all dependent variables is percentages. Depen-
dent variable in column 1 is cognitive development. In column 2 the dependent
variable is psychosocial development and in column 3 it is psychomotor develop-
ment. Robust standard errors, clustered on community mother, in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B5: Probit estimates for being in the right grade.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 0.401∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.808∗∗
(0.153) (0.160) (0.172) (0.322)
Age −0.272∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.238
(0.092) (0.095) (0.182)
Female 0.176 0.182 1.035∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.159) (0.348)
Height (cm) 0.010 0.014 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.036)
Weight (kg) −0.014 −0.016 −0.055
(0.013) (0.013) (0.035)
Sisben 0.008∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
MC: Age −0.008 0.055∗
(0.011) (0.029)
MC: Experience (y) 0.011 −0.041
(0.015) (0.033)
Parent: Age 0.015
(0.017)
Parent: Income 0.000
(0.001)
Parent: Degree −0.295
(0.264)
Constant −0.022 1.206 0.911 0.630
(0.092) (1.627) (1.775) (3.541)
χ2-test 6.9 36.8 35.3 21.6
p 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.027
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.086 0.083 0.238
N 291 282 264 83
Note. Probit estimates. Dependent variable is if the child is in the right grade. Robust
standard errors, clustered on school and community mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B6: Probit estimates for being selfish.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) −0.287∗ −0.230 −0.210 −1.179∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.189) (0.203) (0.410)
Age 0.026 −0.026 −0.258
(0.105) (0.102) (0.283)
Female 0.423∗∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.651
(0.168) (0.177) (0.463)
Height (cm) −0.007 −0.013 0.003
(0.015) (0.016) (0.043)
Weight (kg) 0.008 0.008 −0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.048)
Entry into school −0.036 0.034 −0.376
(0.144) (0.142) (0.357)
Current class −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Sisben 0.001 0.000 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
MC: Age −0.005 0.019
(0.015) (0.037)
MC: Experience (y) 0.008 0.018
(0.019) (0.040)
Parent: Age −0.001
(0.022)
Parent: Income −0.001
(0.001)
Parent: Degree 0.637∗∗
(0.287)
Constant 0.536∗∗∗ 1.634 2.736 4.109
(0.106) (1.731) (1.873) (5.166)
χ2-test 3.3 16.4 16.3 36.1
p 0.068 0.037 0.092 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.043 0.047 0.346
N 291 235 222 73
Note. Probit estimates. Dependent variable is being selfish, measured with four binary
decision tasks. Robust standard errors, clustered on school and community mother, in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B7: Probit estimates for trust.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 0.271 0.297 0.270 0.695
(0.172) (0.190) (0.198) (0.467)
Age −0.205∗ −0.237∗∗ −0.537∗∗
(0.115) (0.120) (0.217)
Female 0.115 0.083 −0.404
(0.172) (0.172) (0.428)
Height (cm) 0.005 0.002 0.023
(0.016) (0.017) (0.035)
Weight (kg) −0.007 −0.007 −0.028
(0.014) (0.015) (0.032)
Entry into school 0.097 0.190 0.271
(0.158) (0.162) (0.404)
Current class 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Sisben −0.001 0.000 0.031∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
MC: Age 0.015 0.017
(0.015) (0.040)
MC: Experience (y) 0.000 0.055
(0.019) (0.036)
Parent: Age 0.032
(0.022)
Parent: Income 0.001
(0.001)
Parent: Degree 0.089
(0.320)
Constant −0.717∗∗∗ −0.071 −0.625 −5.810
(0.120) (1.887) (2.067) (4.567)
χ2-test 2.5 8.1 9.4 18.2
p 0.115 0.420 0.493 0.151
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.027 0.031 0.210
N 291 235 222 73
Note. Probit estimates. Dependent variable is trust measured with a dummy variable.
Robust standard errors, clustered on school and community mother, in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B8: OLS estimates for risk.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 0.121 0.173 0.261 0.344
(0.171) (0.189) (0.199) (0.413)
Age 0.178∗ 0.201∗ 0.048
(0.104) (0.103) (0.148)
Female 0.141 0.205 0.417
(0.171) (0.176) (0.401)
Height (cm) −0.031∗∗ −0.029∗ 0.041
(0.015) (0.016) (0.041)
Weight (kg) 0.013 0.011 −0.043
(0.010) (0.011) (0.032)
Entry into school −0.007 −0.068 0.116
(0.163) (0.175) (0.289)
Current class −0.000 −0.000 −0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sisben −0.012∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.015
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
MC: Age 0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.038)
MC: Experience (y) −0.010 0.003
(0.017) (0.037)
Parent: Age −0.001
(0.019)
Parent: Income 0.000
(0.001)
Parent: Degree 0.117
(0.360)
Constant 2.485∗∗∗ 5.015∗∗∗ 5.020∗∗∗ −1.838
(0.110) (1.722) (1.915) (5.182)
F -test 0.5 1.6 1.6 0.5
Prob > F 0.479 0.143 0.123 0.919
R2 adjusted −0.001 0.010 0.017 −0.126
N 291 235 222 73
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is risk (starts invested) [0,5]. Robust standard
errors, clustered on school and community mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B9: OLS estimates for patience.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) 0.161 0.303 0.186 0.260
(0.190) (0.208) (0.218) (0.367)
Age −0.139 −0.125 −0.194
(0.168) (0.169) (0.205)
Female −0.130 −0.143 −0.182
(0.217) (0.231) (0.465)
Height (cm) 0.013 0.011 −0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.041)
Weight (kg) −0.013 −0.013 0.043
(0.017) (0.017) (0.039)
Entry into school 0.238 0.254 0.218
(0.211) (0.222) (0.268)
Current class 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Sisben −0.008 −0.010 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
MC: Age 0.024 0.026
(0.021) (0.036)
MC: Experience (y) −0.047 −0.019
(0.028) (0.037)
Parent: Age 0.017
(0.019)
Parent: Income 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Parent: Degree −0.548
(0.377)
Constant 1.077∗∗∗ −0.384 −0.662 −0.407
(0.102) (2.201) (2.414) (5.711)
F -test 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.3
Prob > F 0.398 0.537 0.643 0.245
R2 adjusted −0.001 0.002 0.007 0.018
N 291 235 222 73
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is patience (stars invested into future
payoﬀ) [0,5]. Robust standard errors, clustered on school and community mother,
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B10: OLS estimates for self-esteem.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated (D) −0.001 −0.004 −0.012 −0.019
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027)
Age −0.029∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Female 0.026∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.057
(0.012) (0.013) (0.034)
Height (cm) 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Weight (kg) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Entry into school 0.014 0.010 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.027)
Current class −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sisben 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
MC: Age −0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
MC: Experience (y) −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
Parent: Age −0.002
(0.002)
Parent: Income −0.000
(0.000)
Parent: Degree −0.011
(0.025)
Constant 0.851∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.135) (0.143) (0.309)
F -test 0.0 6.2 5.4 1.2
Prob > F 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.338
R2 adjusted −0.004 0.087 0.097 −0.057
N 272 219 206 65
Note. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is self-esteem measured in a questionnaire and
averaged across all questions [0,3]. Robust standard errors, clustered on school and community
mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B11: OLS Regression for parental diﬀerences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Altruism Risk Later Authoritative Authoritarian Permissive
Treated 0.114 −0.802∗ 0.223 −0.041 0.014 0.015
(0.369) (0.411) (0.342) (0.093) (0.180) (0.159)
Parent: Age −0.015 −0.033∗ −0.000 0.004 0.015 −0.008
(0.026) (0.019) (0.032) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Parent: Income 0.002∗ 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.001∗ −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Parent: Degree −0.137 −0.421 0.054 −0.044 0.221 0.167
(0.400) (0.367) (0.379) (0.103) (0.160) (0.158)
Sisben 0.038∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.011 0.004 0.001 −0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 2.230 4.278∗∗∗ 3.361∗∗ 4.217∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 3.219∗∗∗
(1.399) (1.183) (1.649) (0.314) (0.543) (0.640)
F -test 5.1 1.1 0.3 0.5 2.8 0.8
Prob > F 0.001 0.370 0.891 0.788 0.028 0.568
R2 adjusted 0.117 0.032 −0.046 −0.034 0.042 −0.031
N 84 84 84 82 81 82
Note. OLS estimates. In column 1 the dependent variable is altruism [0,10]. In column 2 the dependent
variable is the measure for risk preferences [0,5]. In column 3 the dependent variable is patience [0,5].
Column 4 to 6 are the eﬀects on the parenting styles [0,5]. Robust standard errors, clustered on community
mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table B12: Probit regression for parental diﬀerences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust Egalitarian Alturist Spiteful Selfish
Treated (D) 0.023 −0.233 0.685 0.271 −0.212
(0.271) (0.349) (0.440) (0.445) (0.306)
Age −0.011 0.020 −0.026 0.014 −0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017)
Income 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Degree −0.227 0.249 −0.073 −0.363 −0.183
(0.263) (0.252) (0.336) (0.317) (0.327)
Sisben 0.015∗ 0.009 0.042∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011)
Constant −0.424 −2.811∗∗ −2.801∗ −1.554 0.252
(1.126) (1.180) (1.497) (1.252) (1.035)
χ
2-test 6.7 2.8 17.4 15.6 2.9
p 0.244 0.735 0.004 0.008 0.723
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.047 0.232 0.143 0.020
N 84 84 84 84 84
Note. Probit estimates. In column 1 the dependent variable is trust. Column 2
to 5 depict the results of the binary measures for social preferences. In column
2 it is the probability to be classified as egalitarian, in column 3 to be classified
as altruist, in column 4 as spiteful, and in column 5 as selfish. Robust standard
errors, clustered on community mother, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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3.C Translated Instructions for the Children
Short introduction
Hi! I’m name of the research assistant
What’s your name?
Now we’re going to play some games. In all games, you can earn stars. For each star that
you earn during these games, you can buy one item at the “shop”. I will show you the shop
now.
Figure C4: Example of a shop.
Explanation for the egalitarian choices
You get some stars, and you can give stars to another child as well.
Here I have two envelopes. One is for you.
Let’s write your name on it.
The other envelope is for another child that is of your age and goes to the same school.
But both of us do not know exactly who that other child is. So we will not write a name
on the second envelope. The envelopes are for the stars that you and the other children
are going to get in this game.
Instructions for the (1/1) vs. (1/0) choice
Note. The instructions for the four choices were identical except for the amount of stars.
As an example, I depict the instructions for the (1/1) vs. (1/0) choice.
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Okay! Here are two sheets of paper. (Place both sheets of paper in front of the child (right
and left).
In each sheet, you can see two circles with arrows. On both sheets, one arrow is pointing
to the bag of the other child, and the other arrow is pointing to you and your bag.
On the first sheet, I place one star in the circle that is closer to the bag of the other child,
and I place one star in the circle that is closer to you. (Place the stars in the circles now.)
On the second sheet, I place one star in the circle that is closer to you. In the other circle
that is pointing to the bag of the other child, I place no star.
You can now choose one of those sheets.
(Point to the respective sheets.) If you choose this one, this arrow is pointing at you. That
means you are getting what is placed in this circle, one star.
The other circle is pointing to the bag of the other child. This means that the other child
is getting what is placed in this circle, one star.
If you choose this sheet, you get one star and the other child gets no star.
Before you can decide, I have some questions for you.
Questions
(Point to the first sheet.) If you choose this sheet, what will the other child get? And what
will you get?
(Point to the second sheet) If you choose the second sheet, what will the other child get?
And what will you get?
Do you have any questions?
Decision
Alright, now you can choose a cardboard. Which sheet do you choose? (Put the stars into
the envelopes)
Dictator game
Now we will again play a game in which you can win stars. As I told you, you can exchange
the stars for a present later on. The more stars you win, the more presents you can buy
at our "shop".
You will now get some stars, and you can give stars to another child as well.
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Here I have two envelopes. The first one is for you. Let’s write your name on it.
The other envelope is for another child that is of your age and goes to the same school.
But both of us do not know exactly who that other child is. So we will not write a name
on the second envelope. The envelope are for the stars that you and the other child are
going to get in this game.
(Put both envelopes side by side on the table in front of the child.)
Look! Here are ten stars.
(Put the stars in front of the child between the two envelopes.)
Now you can decide how many stars you put on your envelope and how many you put on
the envelope of the other child. The stars on your envelope (point to the envelope) are for
you. The stars on the other envelope are for the other child. I will make sure that the
other child gets something nice for the stars.
Decision
You can decide how you want to divide the stars. You can split the stars, or you can put
all stars on one envelope.
Now, please put all ten stars on the envelopes in a way you would like to have it.
(Child puts the stars on the bags.) Okay. How many stars do you get? And how many
stars does the other child get? Fine. Let’s now put the stars in the envelopes.
(In case the answers are not correct: explain the correct answer and ask for a new sugges-
tion. In case both answers are correct: Remove the envelopes.)
Patience
You will receive five stars (please place the five stars in front of the child).
You have to decide how many of these five stars you want to put in the box labeled “NOW
(point at the left box) and how many stars you want to put in the box labeled “IN TWO
WEEKS” (point at the right box).
You will receive the stars that you put in the box “NOW” immediately after the game, and
you can use these stars for buying presents in our present shop. You can take these presents
home today. Each star that you put in the box “IN TWO WEEKS” will be doubled and
you will receive the presents that you choose with these stars in 2 weeks only.
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Let’s consider an example: If you, for instance, want to receive two stars today, what do
you have to do? (Answer of the child: I have to put two stars in the left box)
And what happens with the other three stars? (Answer: I have to put these stars in the
right box; please let the child demonstrate this)
How many stars will be added to this box? (point at the right box; answer of the child: 3;
please demonstrate!)
How many stars are in the box in total? (Answer of the child: 6)
When will you receive the presents which you can choose with these six stars? (Answer of
the child: in two weeks)
And what happens if you put five stars in that box? (point at the left box; Answer of the
child: then I will receive five stars immediately after the game, and I can choose presents
with these five stars which I can take home today)
And what happens if you put all five stars in that box? (point at the right box; Answer
of the child: then these stars will be doubled and I can choose presents with the ten stars
which I will receive only in two weeks.)
Could you please repeat the rules of the game?
Decision
Ok, now you can take your decision, remember the stars which you want to receive today,
you have to put them in this box (point to the NOW box). And the stars which you will
receive in two weeks you have to put them in the IN TWO WEEKS box (point to the XXX
box).
Take as much time as you need for your decision. In the meantime, I will turn around, so
I don’t disturb you. Just call me when you are done.
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Figure C5: Example of how the boxes for the patience decision looked like.
Risk
In the beginning, you will receive five stars. (Place the five stars in front of the child)
You have to decide how many of these five stars you want to keep for sure and with how
many of these stars you want to play the “wheel of fortune”-game. You have to put the
stars you want to keep for sure in this box (point at the left box).
Likewise, you must put the stars with which you want to play the treasure-game in that
box (point at the right box).
I will triple the amount of stars that you put into the wheel of fortune box. Then you
can turn the wheel of fortune. If it stops in one of the colored areas, for example, (point
at these areas), then you will receive all the stars from this box. On the other hand, if it
stops at a gray area (point at this area of the wheel) then you will lose all the stars from
this box.
At the end you will receive the stars that you keep for sure (point at the left box) and the
stars that you win in the wheel of fortune game (point at the right box).
Let’s consider an example: If you, for instance, want to keep one star for sure and play
the wheel of fortune game with the other four stars, what do you have to do? (Answer of
the child: I have to put 1 star in the left box and four stars in the right box; please let the
child demonstrate this)
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How many stars will be added to this box? (point at the right box; answer of the child: 8;
please demonstrate!) What happens next? How does the wheel of fortune work? (Child
has to repeat the rules of the game).
How many stars will you win if the wheel stops in one of the colored areas? (Answer of
the child: 12 stars).
And how many stars will you receive in total? (Answer of the child: 13).
Exactly. You will receive 12 stars from the wheel-of-fortune-game plus one additional star
which you kept for sure.
What happens if the wheel stops in a gray area? (Answer of the child: I lose all the stars
of the wheel of fortune game)
Exactly.
How many stars will you receive in total? (Answer of the child: 1)
Exactly. This was only an example. Let’s consider another example: Could you please
explain the rules of the game if you want to keep four stars for sure and play the wheel-of-
fortune-game with 1 star? (The child has to recapitulate the game with the new example).
What happens if you, for instance, put all your five stars in this box? (point at the right
box; let the child recapitulate the game)
What happens if you, for instance, put all your five stars in this box? (point at the left
box; let the child recapitulate the game)
Decision
Please take your decision now. You have to put the stars which you want to keep for sure
in this box (point at the left box) and the stars with which you want to play the wheel-of-
fortune-game have to be put in that box (point at the right box). Take as much time as
you need for your decision. In the meantime, I will turn around, so I don’t disturb you.
Just call me when you are done.
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Figure C6: The wheel of fortune.
Trust
In this game, you will be playing with another child that is of your age and goes to the
same school. You will now get one star, and you can give this star to the other child, or
you can keep it for yourself.
If you keep it, the other child gets nothing. If you give the star to the other child, the
other child will get four stars.
Then the other child can decide whether to keep all four stars or whether to keep two stars
and give the other two stars back to you.
Let’s consider an example. What happens if you keep the star? (Answer of the child: I
will have one star, and the other child will not get anything).
And what will happen if you decide to transfer the star? (Answer of the child: The other
child will get four stars and can decide then whether to transfer two stars back to me or
whether to keep all four stars.)
Exactly, and how many stars will you have if the other child decides to not transfer any
stars back to you? (Answer of the child: zero)
Exactly.
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And how many stars will you have if the other child decides to transfer two stars back
to you? And how many stars will the other child have? (Answer of the child: two each).
Decision
Do you want to transfer the star to the other child?
Now, let’s consider that another child transferred the star to you. Hence, you have four
stars now. Do you want to transfer two stars back?
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